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ABSTRACT 
 
ESSAYS ON CHINESE FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Chenying Zhang 
Franklin Allen 
My dissertations aim at understanding the different aspects of the Chinese financial markets. It 
includes three chapters. 
The first chapter studies how firm level political connections affect a firm's decision of going to 
court and the trial outcomes, using hand-collected data on Chinese listed firms. We found that 
connected firms have a win rate that is 8.6% higher than unconnected firms have. The higher win 
rate is most significant in cases with straightforward facts, in provinces where the local legal 
institutions are weak, and in cases tried in politically-connected firms' home provinces. The 
empirical evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the difference in the win rates is caused 
by judicial bias. We show that trial outcomes have real impacts on firms' stock prices.  
In the second chapter, I examine the effectiveness and cost of monetary sterilization in China. 
The study adapts a 2SLS method to estimate the extent of China's sterilization. It also compares 
the sterilization cost with the central bank's income from investing foreign exchange reserves. I 
conclude that the sterilization has been highly effective to date. Moreover, so far the sterilization 
cost of the central bank can be fully covered by the income from foreign reserve investment.  
The third chapter provides a comprehensive review of China’s financial system, and explore 
directions of future development. First, the financial system has been dominated by a large 
banking sector. Second, the role of the stock market in allocating resources in the economy has 
been limited and ineffective. Third, the most successful part of the financial system is a non-
standard sector that consists of alternative financing channels, governance mechanisms, and 
institutions. Finally, among the policies that will help to sustain stable economic growth in China 
are those that reduce the likelihood of damaging financial crises, including a banking sector crisis, 
a real estate or stock market crash, and a “twin crisis” in the currency market and banking sector.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND JUDICIAL BIAS: 
EVIDENCE FROM CHINESE CORPORATE LITIGATIONS 
 
Haitian Lu Hongbo Pan  Chenying Zhang†
The Polytechnic University 
 
Wuhan University The Wharton School 
Hong  Kong China University of Pennsylvania 
 
1.1 Introduction 
There has been increasing economic interest in the significance of political connections in 
corporations, particularly in the context of emerging markets (Fisman 2001, Faccio 2006, Khwaja 
and Mian 2005, Fan et al. 2007). However, little of the work has paid attention to the 
relationships between a firm’s political ties, its decision to seek protection from the judiciary, 
and litigation outcomes. There are a number of reasons why trial outcomes matter for 
corporations. In a market economy, courts serve as an important protective mechanism for 
entrepreneurs to secure property rights and enforce contracts (McMillan and Woodruff 1999, 
Frye and Zhuravskaia 2000). Litigation also has direct impacts on firms' shareholder wealth. Both 
Bhagat et al. (1993) and Firth et al. (2010) concluded that defendant firms suffer losses upon 
litigation announcements due to the potential of financial distress. Litigation is thus a direct yet 
undocumented channel in the literature through which political connections may affect firm 
values.  
                                                          
†Corresponding author: Finance Department, the Wharton School of Finance, University of Pennsylvania, 
3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104. Phone: 617-412-0955, E-mail: chezhang@wharton.upenn.edu. 
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In this paper, we investigate how political connections affect trial outcomes based on 
hand-collected data from 3,323 court rulings that include all litigations involving Chinese listed 
companies during 1998-2010. More than 50% of our cases are loan related, making our findings 
directly relevant to firms' financing decisions. Taking state ownership as a natural form of 
political connection, we find that listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs)1
If the politically connected firms have a higher win rate, then a potentially more 
important question is through what channel do the political connections take effect. There are 
two possible explanations: (1) connected firms are better able to acquire information about the 
intrinsic merits of the case, which enables them to bring stronger cases to trial or (2) connected 
parties play a direct role in setting the decision standard of the court. In the latter case, the 
judge may overlook the case facts to rule in favor of the connected party, resulting in what we 
define as judicial bias. The term judicial bias is used loosely here to refer to the judge exerting 
varying levels of discretion over a case verdict that is not solely based on merits, and does not 
necessarily indicate any unlawful activity. Nevertheless, political connections undermine the 
base of the judicial dispute resolution in this situation, for the judge is no longer impartial. 
 (either as plaintiffs or as 
defendants) win 8.6% more often at trial than non-SOEs. Using the personal ties of the top 
managers in the non-SOEs as a second proxy for political connections, we show that connected 
non-SOEs fare better than the unconnected ones in court rulings by 8.9%. However, personal 
political ties do not serve as a perfect substitute for state ownership. We find that the 
connected non-SOEs are still at a disadvantage compared to the SOEs. 
                                                          
1 As will be explained later, here we define SOE as a firm with the government as its ultimate shareholder. 
These SOEs are publically listed companies whose stocks can be traded .  
3 
 
Empirically, it is hard to disentangle these two explanations since we cannot observe all 
of the characteristics of a case. This paper represents a first attempt in the literature to 
distinguish between those two possibilities. First, we argue that if the connected firms win more 
often due to better information about case merits, their advantages should diminish among 
cases with straightforward merits because it is equally easy for both the connected and 
unconnected firms to discover the facts in those cases. However, using the types of suits2
Next, we find that better legal environments in a province lead to a lower win rate of 
connected firms. We use whether a Chinese province was opened as a leased territory or treaty 
port to foreign countries in the late Qing dynasty as an exogenous proxy for better local legal 
environments to address the reverse causality concern. Since the leased territories and treaty 
ports were set up more than a hundred years ago, their establishment should not affect a 
judge's ruling today. However, the establishment of the leased territories and treaty ports is 
likely to have a long-term positive impact on the local legal institution development by 
introducing the Western-style laws at an early stage. Similarly, using the exogenous local 
governor turnovers caused by circumstances such as sudden death as a proxy for periods of 
weakened local political connections, we show that weaker connections also lower the win rate 
for connected firms. Moreover, the win rate of locally connected firms is higher when the case is 
tried in their home province. These findings suggest that the higher win rate of connected firms 
can be attributed to biased courts.  
 as a 
proxy for the straightforwardness of case facts, we show that the connected firms win most 
often in cases with simple facts, suggesting the influence of judicial bias but not information 
asymmetry about merits.  
                                                          
2I.e., loan suits, sales and purchase contract suits, tort suits, and others.  
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The higher win rate of connected firms has a real impact on shareholder wealth. Using an 
event study, we find that a winning firm has a five-day average market-adjusted cumulative 
abnormal return that is 50 basis points higher than that of a losing firm. Because an adverse 
verdict is often associated with future financial losses, the markets react upon receiving the 
news.  
We see three contributions of this research. First, our work belongs to an increasing 
volume of literature on the impact of political connections on firm performance. It has been 
documented that corporations enjoy various benefits associated with political connections, 
including favorable regulatory conditions (Agrawal and Knoeber 2001, Morck et al. 2005) and 
access to resources such as bank loans (Khwaja and Mian 2005, Faccio 2006), which ultimately 
increase firm values (Roberts 1990, Fisman 2001, Claessens et al. 2008, Johnson and Mitton 
2003). On the other hand, Fan et al. (2007), Yuan (2008) and Boubakri et al. (2008) found that 
political connectedness may destroy firm values. However, to the best of our knowledge, no 
prior study has demonstrated direct evidence of how political connections play a role in court 
decisions; nor have we seen a connection between litigation outcomes and shareholder wealth. 
This paper adds to the literature by offering a missing channel through which political 
connections can increase firm values. 
Second, our study adds new evidence on formal and informal institutions that secure 
property and contractual rights. It draws from the emerging law and finance literature on the 
role of political connections in a transitional economy (La Porta et al. 1997, Allen et al. 2005, Fan 
et al. 2007). In countries with fewer constraints on politicians and elites, the government is 
more likely to violate the property rights of private producers and seek benefits for the interest 
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groups (Acemoglu et al. 2005). Political ties then become necessary for companies to run 
businesses when they cannot rely on the legal system to secure property rights (Li et al. 2008). 
This paper provides evidence that though SOEs receive favorable rulings in court, the judicial 
bias against non-SOEs can be partially corrected by the personal political ties of their top 
managers. 
Our work also extends the large body of literature on the economic analysis of litigation 
behavior by incorporating the often-neglected judicial bias factor to the well-cited Priest/Klein 
framework (Priest and Klein 1984), which assumes that the decision between settlement and 
litigation is solely based on information asymmetry about case merits. In the Priest/Klein model, 
it is suggested that two parties take a case to court because they have divergent information on 
case merits. Where parties are symmetrically informed about merits, they tend to settle instead 
of litigate. Built on this hypothesis, Hylton (1993, 2002) argued that when parties are not 
symmetrically informed about the case merits, the party with informational advantage will have 
a more precise estimate about the likelihood of success at trial. Consequently a higher-than-50% 
win rate should be observed for the party with an informational advantage if the dispute finally 
goes to trial3
                                                          
3Empirical evidence on this is mixed. Kessler et al. (1996) gave a review of the findings from the U.S. 
courts. Evidence outside the U.S. has been limited (Ramseyer and Nakazato 1989). 
. Our paper builds on this literature by analyzing litigation outcomes in a large, 
emerging market, proposing that the determinants of court outcomes should not be confined 
only to the parties’ respective perceptions of the case merits, but also incorporate at least their 
prediction on the direction and extent of judicial bias. We present empirical evidence that 
judicial bias alone leads to a higher win rate of the favored party.  
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Though we use China as a case study in this paper, our findings are relevant to other 
countries, especially those with a socialist and civil law origin. The proposed tests to distinguish 
judicial bias from information asymmetry about case merits can be readily applied under other 
legal systems. Finally, the judicial bias we document imposes an additional litigation risk on the 
multinational companies participating in the Chinese market, which are of increasing 
importance as globalization accelerates.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 provides the institutional 
background of the legal reforms in China. Section 1.3 presents the data. Section 1.4 outlines 
the empirical methodology and displays the results. Section 1.5 further supports our results with 
robustness checks, and Section 1.6 concludes. 
 
1.2 Legal Reform, Political Ties and Judicial Bias: A Review of China  
The Chinese legal reforms have been the subject of intense scholarly interest in the West. 
Existing legal studies have mainly covered the administrative cases (Pei 1997) and economics 
cases (He 2007), most of which focused on historical reviews of the evolution of the related law 
and its implementation. Quantitative evidence remains scarce. The reforms started in 1978 
when Deng Xiaoping emerged as the de facto political leader of China following the death of 
Mao Zedong in 1976. The role of the legal system at first was to bring order and stability to 
political and social life after the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. Since then, China’s 
phenomenal economic development and corresponding rapid social changes have dramatically 
increased pressures on courts to cope with the problems that other government agencies have 
failed to resolve. Legal reform became a government priority in the 1990s as a result of the 
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increasing global exposure. To provide a trust worthy legal environment for the incoming 
foreign investments, the government has devoted enormous resources to revamp its legal 
institutions, putting major efforts in the rationalization and strengthening of the legal structure.  
After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) decided at the Fifteenth Party Congress to 
“promote judicial reform” in 1999, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) announced a five-year 
reform plan to build a “fair, open, highly effective, honest, and well-functioning” judicial system. 
“Fairness” was highlighted as the “essence” of judicial reform and has been the central theme 
since then. The SPC completed the second five-year plan between 2004 and 2008. During that 
time, documents were issued by the SPC demonstrating a cautious awareness of the importance 
of bringing greater professionalism, independence, and integrity to the judiciary. 
Improvements resulting from the legal reform are obvious. New Western-style laws 
were introduced, and existing laws were amended for more comprehensive and fair coverage. 
For example, the 1994 Administrative Procedure Law was introduced to allow citizens to sue 
officials for abuse of authority or malfeasance. The trademark law has been modified and used 
more extensively as a result of increasing concerns over violations of intellectual property rights 
of foreign corporations in the early 1990s. In late 2005 a largely rewritten Company Law was 
adopted, radically increasing the role of courts. A new Enterprise Bankruptcy Law was 
promulgated in 2006, which in many aspects resembles the modern bankruptcy law in 
developed countries. As of 2008, China has roughly 200,000 judges, 160,000 procurators 
(prosecutors), and 150,000 lawyers. Over 600 law departments and law schools send out several 
hundred thousand graduates4
                                                          
4 Thirty Years of Chinese Legal Reform, The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 4th, 2008. 
 every year. There is a development of a legal services market as 
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well. Foreign lawyers have accompanied foreign capital and their clients to China, which has had 
an immense influence on the promulgation of new Chinese laws, especially in regard to 
intellectual property, and corporate and securities laws. 
The reform also has awakened citizen’s inherent demand for court services. This change 
in China can be described as a transformation from a former “acquaintance society” (Fei 1948) 
to an arm’s length one. In an acquaintance society, the courts play a less important role as 
networks and reputations play a dominant role in directing economic activities. However, the 
use of courts as a forum for dispute settlement increases as a result of the prevalence of 
impersonal and contractual relations (Vago 2006). Figure 1 shows the number of civil, criminal 
and administrative cases filed in China has been increasing from 1990 to 2008 on a per million 
population basis.  
 
Figure 1 Number of cases per million population, national average 
This figure shows how the number of cases per million population changes across the years. The left hand side y-axis 
is for the number of civil and commercial cases,  and criminal cases. The right hand side y-axis is for the number of 
administrative and criminal cases. 
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Source: The Law Yearbook of China (1990-2009), published by China Law Society 
 
Despite the growing demand for court services, court impartiality is still a primary 
concern of the public, especially when citizens are acting against the government or its affiliated 
enterprises (Chen 1995). Lubman (1999) indicated that the laws and court systems in China still 
serve more as a top-down instrument of Party control than as a framework to facilitate private 
transactions. Howson (2010) reviewed more than 1000 Company Law-related disputes between 
1992 and 2008 in Shanghai and concluded that there is significant momentum toward the 
competence and autonomy of the People’s Courts. However, the path toward autonomy is 
inconsistent; sometimes a development is followed by setbacks. As of today, litigation is still 
hampered by local governments and judicial corruption5
 
. It is not clear whether the legal system 
has achieved its goal of fairness at the completion of the second five-year program.  
1.3 Data Description 
1.3.1 Variable of Interests 
The obligation of Chinese listed companies to disclose their involvements in the lawsuits 
and arbitrations is stipulated in Chapter 11.1 of the Listing Rule of the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange, respectively6
                                                          
5 In March 2004, the Procurator-General Jia Chunwang admitted, "the procurators at all levels had not done 
enough to check the problems of unfairness in the implementation of laws " (Firth et al. 2010). 
. The WIND database, a leading Bloomberg-style data provider in 
6 According to the Listing Rule, a company must disclose its involvement in litigation/arbitration if the 
litigation/arbitration stake (of a single case or accumulative cases within 12 month) is over RMB 10 million 
($1.54 million) and over 10% of the company’s net assets, based on the company’s last audited report. For 
litigations/arbitrations whose stake amount below the above threshold, the Board should also disclose if in 
their opinion such case would have a significant impact on the company’s securities. See Chapter 11.1 of 
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China, collects information on all Chinese listed firms that have reported their involvements in 
the lawsuits, either as plaintiffs or as defendants, by reproducing the original unprocessed texts 
from the companies’ disclosure reports. We read through all of the case reports and hand-code 
useful information such as the nature of the disputes (type of suit), the parties in question, the 
claimed stake, the trial outcomes, the level of the courts, and others. Given that a large 
proportion of the appealed cases do not have information on final rulings, We only consider the 
verdicts from the first rulings7. Our final sample consists of 4,089 cases filed by listed firms 
between 1998 and 20108
Another variable of major interest in this study is the political connection status of a 
company. Previous literature has proposed different measures for connections, including the 
chief executive officer (CEO)'s contribution in an election (Khwaja and Mian 2005, Claessens et 
al. 2008), firms' affiliations to large business groups (Fisman 2001), and whether the board has 
current/past politicians as members (Faccio 2006, Fan et al. 2007, Boubakri et al. 2008, Li et al. 
2008). In China's case, one analogous aspect to consider is whether the firm has the government 
as its controlling shareholder. State ownership creates a natural connection with the 
government for the company and provides benefits such as immunity from bankruptcy. The 
heads of the SOEs are often important members in the communist party, which characterizes 
them as politicians. Though the privilege of SOEs may have been restricted due to a series of 
financial and legal system reforms in China, anecdotal evidence suggests that SOEs enjoy 
.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
Listing Rule of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (1998) and Listing Rule of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(1998). 
7 In China, the success rate of appeal is extremely low. The lower level of courts tend to report and “seek 
opinion” from their upper courts in making decisions in the first instance, especially when the stake of a 
case is significant. Therefore, even if the case is appealed, the upper court will generally not alter the 
decision of the lower court. 
8 We choose 1998 as the starting year because this is when the listing rules requiring mandatory disclosure 
of litigations were promulgated, both on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. 
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advantages over non-SOEs when dealing with the government9
For non-SOEs, closer bonds to the authority may be established by hiring CEOs or 
directors who formerly held positions in the local or central governments (See Calomiris, Fisman, 
and Wang 2009 and Fan et al. 2007 for documentations on politically connected CEOs). We thus 
argue that for non-SOEs, CEO or directors' personal ties with the government can serve as an 
alternative measure for the firm's political connection.  
. For our purposes, we define a 
listed company to be an SOE if the ultimate holder of the company is the local (at least at a city 
level) or central government as recorded in CSMAR, another leading Chinese data provider.  
To test this, we collect data on CEO or directors' previous employment histories of the 
non-SOEs. We consider a non-SOE as politically connected if the company’s CEO or director is or 
was a government official (at least a leading official of a division, i.e., Ke Zhang) or a leader of 
the People’s Congress, or the People’s Political Consultative at either the national or regional 
level. We first use the firm's annual reports to identify its top managers, and then we refer to 
the WIND database, which has some records on whether the top manager of a listed firm has 
held positions in the government or in the communist party. For those CEOs/directors whose 
information is missing, we search on internet. If there is no evidence suggesting that the 
CEO/director was previously connected to the government, we then conclude that the 
CEO/director is not politically connected. Sometimes, especially for CEOs/directors who are 
recently appointed, the information is harder to trace because they tend to hide their previous 
                                                          
9 For instance, in 2011, China started a reform in the steel industry with the target to "increase the global 
competitiveness of the steel industry." The reform plans to shutdown less efficient steel productions to 
solve the long standing problem of excess production capacity in China. In reality, however, the reform 
simply leads to massive acquisitions of non-state-owned steel companies by large SOEs such as Bao Gang 
and An Gang. The small scale non-SOEs, which may not necessarily be less efficient, have virtually no 
other choice but being acquired by a large SOE. 
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relationship with the government to avoid undesired publicity. Under other circumstances, 
government officials may not sit on the board, but instead would have someone act on their 
behalf. We are aware of the potential selection bias here: it is possible that some CEOs/directors 
are actually connected but successfully hid the information from the public. However this bias 
makes it harder for us to detect whether the politically connected CEOs have a positive impact 
on the firm's win rate. If we can correct for the bias, our results will only be stronger.  
Finally we collect financial and stock data for each company from CSMAR and WIND, 
and match the financial data at the end of the last year to the cases that are tried in this year. 
Since a majority of the counterparties in the suits are not listed, their financial information 
cannot be retrieved. We do, however, include a variable for the ownership statuses of the 
counterparties wherever available, which we obtain from the internet. Since the status of 
political connection of a firm is the core of our paper, not controlling the counterparty’s state 
ownership status would be an important miss. We further exclude the following five types of 
cases from our sample: (1) cases which were not tried in the Chinese courts, including cases 
heard by foreign courts and arbitration, (2) non-civil cases, including criminal and administrative 
cases, (3) cases which were withdrawn by the plaintiffs in the first trial, (4) cases which were 
settled during the first trial, and (5) cases for which court judgments were not disclosed.  
Matching the litigations, political connections and financial data reduces our final 
sample size to a total of 3,323 cases, including 2,004, or 60% cases involving SOEs. Our sample 
has 714 distinct firms, with 502, or 70% SOEs. Many firms are repeated players in court, 
generally for similar reasons, such as loan disputes. Banks, in particular, may repeatedly sue 
other firms for over-due loans. We control for this factor in our later regression. In terms of the 
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geographical distribution, the cases are widespread across the regions. Guangdong and 
Shanghai are the two provinces with the largest total number of cases between 1998 and 2010, 
while Shanghai and Hainan have the highest litigation rate on a per million person basis. 
Panel A of Table 1 gives a summary of our final sample on the number of litigations each 
year, classified by suit types. We divide the suits into four types: (1) bank loans, (2) non-bank 
loans (3) sale/purchase and other contracts, (4) right infringement and other tort cases10
The number of tried cases reached its peak in 2005, and then dropped to a low level in 
2010. This can be attributed to the banking reform propelled by the Chinese government in 
2004, in which the big state banks launched their IPOs. The banks must write off the non-
performing loans on their balance sheets to meet the listing criteria, leading to an increased 
number of the loan suits. Since 2007, the government started implementing several reforms on 
the financial market, including the stock reform that completes the conversion of all the non-
floating shares to floating ones, and a new accounting standard that is enforced on listed firms. 
The number of litigations drops during the transition period. Moreover, the Chinese government 
has been actively advocating the idea of building a "harmonious society" since 2005 under the 
Hu Jintao administration. The ideology pursues a society with balance and harmony, resulting in 
a significant drop in the number of litigations after 2005.   
. Cases 
related to loan and debt payment account for the majority of the litigations, but we see a variety 
of types of suits.  
 
                                                          
10A loan case here does not necessarily involve only the lender and the borrower. Disputes between a loan 
guarantor company and the borrower are also categorized under type 1 or 2. Type 4 includes torts such as 
civil tort on false statements in the securities market, disputes over trust management contract, and assets 
transfer and product liability. 
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Table 1 Distribution of suit types 
This table presents the distribution of different type of cases. Cases are divided into four types: (1) bank 
loans, (2) non-bank loans, (3) sales/purchase and other contracts, and (4) right infringement and other 
torts. 
Panel A: Number of cases by suit types 
The panel presents distribution of different type of cases across between 1998 and 2010. The numbers in 
bold are the numbers of the cases of a particular suit type as percentage of the total cases in a year.  
Suit 
type 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
1 16 36 106 76 92 90 184 275 228 167 56 58 24 1408 
38.1 32.4 45.7 35.8 41.3 39.3 46.6 55.9 54.4 39.7 25.9 23.6 28.2 42.4 
2 6 22 44 47 38 47 73 44 65 70 31 34 16 537 
14.3 19.8 19.0 22.2 17.0 20.5 18.5 8.9 15.5 16.6 14.4 13.8 18.8 16.2 
3 12 40 79 87 83 85 128 160 111 158 101 118 35 1197 
28.6 36.0 34.1 41.0 37.2 37.1 32.4 32.5 26.5 37.5 46.8 48.0 41.2 36.0 
4 8 13 3 2 10 7 10 13 15 26 28 36 10 181 
19.0 11.7 1.3 0.9 4.5 3.1 2.5 2.6 3.6 6.2 13.0 14.6 11.8 5.4 
Total 42 111 232 212 223 229 395 492 419 421 216 246 85 3323 
 
Panel B: Distribution of cases across ownership 
The panel presents the distribution of different types of cases across SOEs and non-SOEs. P/D ratio is the 
ratio of the number of plaintiffs over the number of defendants..  
Suit type SOE     non-SOE     Total 
 
Plaintiff Defendant P/D ratio Plaintiff Defendant Combined   
1 2 673 0.30% 3 730 0.41% 1408 
2 119 201 59.20% 46 171 26.90% 537 
3 452 428 105.61% 80 237 33.76% 1197 
4 66 63 104.76% 30 22 136.36% 181 
Total 639 1365 46.81% 159 1160 13.71% 3323 
 
Panel B of Table 1 shows the distribution of cases, classified by state ownership status. 
The SOEs tend to be plaintiffs more often, and non-SOEs are more likely to be involved in the 
loan suits as defendants. We see good presences of both SOEs and non-SOEs in each suit type.  
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1.3.2 Control variables 
Our choice of control variables follows the literature convention. The control variables 
include the firm size, leverage ratio, cash-to-asset ratio, profitability as measured by operating 
profit (EBIT), whether the disclosing firm was the plaintiff, whether the disclosing firm was 
involved in more than four other litigations in our sample, whether the case was tried at a 
higher level court, and the disputable amount.  
Larger firms may have more abundant resources, such as better legal staff to help them 
win the case. Leverage ratio and cash ratio are used as proxies for the firms’ solvency. Cutler and 
Summer (1988) and Bhagat (1994) both concluded that the risk of financial distress may be 
exacerbated around the time of litigation. Profitability is controlled because the court may favor 
firms that make pivotal contributions to the regional economy. A plaintiff dummy is included 
because previous literature (Klein and Priest 1994, Hylton 1993, 2002) indicated that the 
plaintiff usually has an information advantage in case merits, which leads to a higher probability 
of winning. We control for whether the firms are repeated players in court because we want to 
make sure that our result is not driven by the firms’ familiarity with the legal procedure. The 
choice of four repetitions is somewhat arbitrary. Using ten as the threshold does not change our 
results.  
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Table 2 Summary statistics 
This table gives summary statistic of the main variables in the paper. Win is a dummy which equals 1 if the 
disclosing firm wins the case. Plaintiff is a dummy that equals 1 if the disclosing firm is the plaintiff. 
Ln(asset) is the natural log of the firm's total book asset as measured in RMB. Leverage is the leverage 
ratio calculated by total leverage/total asset. Cash ratio and operating profit are measured likewise. 
Otherparty_nonSOE is a dummy that equals 1 if the counterparty is a non-SOE. Repeated_player is a 
dummy that equals 1 if the disclosing firm is involved in more than 4 other litigations. High court is a 
dummy that equals 1 if the case is tried at a higher level court. Amount is the disputed amount measured 
in 10,000 RMB. 
*The maximum and minimum of the dummy variables are not presented here since it is always 1 and 0. 
  
  Full Sample Non-SOE subsample 
  
SOE non-SOE connected 
CEO/Director 
Unconnected 
CEO/Director 
number of observation 2004 1319 1020 299 
Win Mean 0.37 0.18 0.19  0.17  
 
Stdev 0.48 0.18 0.39  0.38  
Plaintiff Mean 0.32 0.14 0.10  0.30  
 
Stdev 0.46 0.35 0.36  0.35  
Ln(asset) Mean 20.79 20.15 20.19  20.14  
 
Max 24.87 22.80 22.41  22.80  
 
Min 14.94 12.31 17.36  12.31  
 
Stdev 1.00 0.99 0.82  1.04  
Leverage Mean 0.93 2.54 1.77  2.82  
 
Max 8.50 82.55 43.08  82.55  
 
Min 0.02 0.05 0.05  0.07  
 
Stdev 0.96 2.63 3.46  28.82  
Cash Over Asset Mean 0.10 0.07 0.07  0.07  
Ratio Max 0.64 0.59 0.54  0.59  
 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  
 
Stdev 0.09 0.82 0.08  0.08  
Operating Profit  Mean 0.002 0.01 0.006  0.006  
Over Asset Max 0.75 1.06 0.45  0.64  
 
Min -0.22 -2.51 -0.54  -0.25  
 
Stdev 0.61 0.16 0.10  0.17  
Otherparty_nonSOE Mean 0.40 0.35 0.40 0.34 
 
Stdev 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.47 
Repeated_Player Mean 0.69 0.62 0.64 0.53 
 Stdev 0.50      0.48 0.48 0.50 
High Court Mean 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.12 
 Stdev 0.33 0.32 0.28 0.33 
Disputable Amount Mean 3635.71 3095.56 3059.02 3291.94 
 Max 1197464 152000 152000 150000 
 Min 0.06 1.00 2.58   1.00 
 Stdev 30702.42 8111.62 7344.23 11407 
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A variable for the higher level court is included because the court level is associated with 
unobserved case characteristics. For a similar reason, the disputable amount of a case is 
included. Under the Chinese law, cases involving high monetary damages, or cases deemed as 
influential or complicated are stipulated to be tried at a higher level court. A case can be 
considered "complicated” for many reasons, such as the involvement of a sensitive industry or 
firms located in multiple cities. We also include the ownership status of the counterparty in the 
litigation. If there is judicial bias, then the disclosing firms are more likely to win if they face a 
non-SOE. To control for the regional development, we include the fixed effect for provinces 
where the trial takes place. Finally, we control for the fixed effects for industry, year, and suit 
types.  
Table 2 shows summary statistics of SOEs and non-SOEs in the first two columns. Our 
sample consists of more SOEs than non-SOEs. Consistent with the conventional belief, SOEs are 
of slightly larger size, but the difference in size is not significant. The average firm size as 
measured by book asset is 152 million USD in our sample, which is also the average size of listed 
firms in China during the sample period. Not surprisingly, SOEs have a higher win rate, and are 
more likely to be plaintiffs. They are also more likely to be repeated players in courts, probably 
due to their comfort with the legal system. Non-SOEs have higher leverage, lower cash-to-asset 
ratios, and higher profits. Finally, SOEs are more likely to face a non-SOE counterparty in the suit, 
and are slightly more likely to have their cases tried at a higher level court with larger disputable 
amount. Neither of the above two discrepancies is statistically significant. 
The last two columns of Table 3 divide the non-SOE subsample to firms with and 
without politically connected CEOs/directors. Less than 20% of non-SOEs do not have a 
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connected CEO/director. The proportion of connected CEOs/directors in our sample is higher 
than that reported in Fan et al. (2007). The discrepancy can be explained by a different sample 
period and different set of firms covered by the study. Moreover, Fan et al. (2007) only 
considered the political connection of the CEOs, while our data include the directors as well. In 
our sample, the unconnected non-SOEs are comparable to the connected ones in most financial 
measures, except that they have higher leverage ratios. Firms with politically connected 
CEOs/directors have a higher win rate, and are more likely to be repeated players. However the 
average win rate of non-SOEs with politically connected CEOs/directors is still lower than the 
average win rate of SOEs.  
 
1.4 Empirical Results  
In this section, we first use the state ownership as a proxy for political connections to 
show that connected firms have higher win rates than unconnected ones. We apply several tests 
to draw the conclusion that the difference in the win rates is driven by court’s political bias 
rather than parties’ information asymmetry about case merits. We find that the advantage of 
the connected firms diminishes if the case is tried in provinces with better local legal 
environments. The local SOEs owned by the provincial governments receive additional benefits 
in court if they have the cases tried locally, and suffer a drop in the win rate if the cases are tried 
during periods of weak local connections. Using the subsample of non-SOEs, we then illustrate 
that our results hold when the personal political ties of CEOs/top directors are used as an 
alternative measure of political connections. However, the personal connections of 
CEO/director cannot serve as a perfect substitute for state ownership. Finally, we demonstrate 
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that winning firms enjoy higher cumulative abnormal stock returns than losing firms when the 
verdict is announced.  
 
1.4.1 Judicial Bias and Case Merits  
This subsection uses state ownership as a proxy for political connection. We first 
examine whether political connections are associated with higher win rates, using state 
ownership as a proxy for  political connections. We regress the trial outcome on the ownership 
status of the firm. Though the dependent variable is binomial, we choose a linear model over a 
logit model, because the linear model is unbiased and imposes much fewer restrictions on the 
data structure. More importantly, a linear model enables us to get a clear interpretation of the 
coefficients of interaction terms, while a logit model would not allow us to measure the average 
marginal effect of a variable in the interaction term (Norton et al. 2004).  
Our base line regression is: 
)1('1 iiii ControlsSOEWin εββα +++=
 
where i is the unique case id number. ε is the noise term estimated using clustered standard 
error at a province level. Win is a dummy variable that equals one when the disclosing firm wins. 
We define plaintiff winning as the plaintiff firm getting the full or partial amount of the 
compensation it requests11
                                                          
11 We define defendants winning when the plaintiff loses the case. There are very few partial compensation 
cases. 
. SOE is a dummy variable that equals one when the firm's ultimate 
owner is the government. The control variables have been discussed in the previous section. The 
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coefficient 1β  measures the average difference in the win rates between the SOEs and the non-
SOEs.
 
Table 3, Panel A presents the regression result in the first column under Model 1. The 
main finding is that SOEs have a win rate that is 8.6% higher than non-SOEs, confirming our 
conjecture that SOEs enjoy a higher probability of winning in courts than non-SOEs.  
The results on control variables are mostly in line with our expectations. Larger firms 
and plaintiff firms are more likely to win. Leverage ratio enters insignificantly. Firms with a high 
cash-to-asset ratio or profitability have a higher winning probability, since the court may want to 
favor the firms which make significant contributions to the regional economy. Interestingly, 
repeated players have a lower probability of winning, for they may bring weaker case to court 
due to their comfort with the legal system or their over-confidence in favorable trial results. 
Whether a case was appealed, the court level, and the disputable amount have no impact on 
the win rate. A final important observation is that the disclosing firm is more likely to win if the 
counterparty is a non-SOE, further confirming the claim that non-SOEs are at disadvantage in 
court.  
Having established that SOEs win more often, we need further evidence that the higher 
win rate of SOEs are pursuant to the political preference of courts. The major challenge is to 
distinguish the claim of judicial bias from the alternative explanation that the SOEs bring 
stronger cases to court. When a firm is faced with a potential dispute as a plaintiff or as a 
defendant, it has the choice to settle. If the SOEs can choose the best cases based on case merits 
to take to court and settle the rest while the non-SOEs cannot, then the SOEs will have a higher 
win rate in the absence of the judicial bias. Indeed, Panel B of Table 1 shows that the 
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distribution of suit types is different across SOEs and non-SOEs, implying that the choice of tried 
cases is not random. An ideal way to deal with that is controlling for every aspect of case 
characteristics, which are often unobservable. Hence, we propose an alternative test to 
distinguish the story of judicial bias from the explanation that the SOEs are more capable of 
spotting the stronger cases.  
Specifically, we investigate judicial bias on cases with different levels of potential 
information asymmetry about merits. A case is only taken to trial if the two conflicting parties 
have a big enough divergence in the expectations on the trial outcome. Without judicial bias, 
the divergence in expectation stems from information asymmetry about the case merits 
between the two parties. Namely, the two parties possess different information or different 
interpretations of the information on case facts, which leads to their divergent expectations 
over a ruling. Some firms may have a superior ability to collect and process information to 
others, which enables them to predict the trial outcomes more precisely. On the other hand, 
firms will only agree to go to trial if they think there is a reasonable chance of winning. If the 
SOEs have better information on case merits in general, they can present a higher proportion of 
favorable cases to the court, resulting a higher win rate in the absence of judicial bias. Moreover, 
this difference in the win rates caused by an information advantage should be the greatest on 
cases whose facts are complicated and hard to retrieve, for a superior ability to acquire 
information would make the greatest difference in those cases. On the other hand, the 
difference in the win rates should diminish when the case merit is straight-forward, which does 
not require either party to devote resources in information collection. In fact, in the absence of 
judicial bias, if parties have little information asymmetry on the case merit, they would settle 
instead of litigate, as in the Priest/Klein model. Cases with clear-cut facts tend to be settled 
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before they reach the court. 
Judicial bias, however, has drastically different implications. When judicial bias is 
present, cases may be taken to court due to different information over case merits, or different 
expectations over a judge's bias. If the two parties are not symmetrically informed on the 
direction and degree of judicial bias, the party with informational advantage on judicial bias will 
have a more rational estimate about the likelihood of success at trial, and consequently has a 
higher chance of winning than the opposite party does. Especially for those cases with clear-cut 
facts, the only reason to bring such a case to court instead of settling is that one party is relying 
on the judge's bias to get a ruling in its favor, while the other party does not fully realize the 
existence or the extent of the judicial bias. On the other hand, even when there is no judicial 
bias, a complicated case may still be brought to court purely because of the divergent 
information on intrinsic case merits. Empirically, this means that among all of the cases that are 
taken to trial, we should observe judicial bias to be more prevalent among cases with more 
straightforward case merits. 
The existing law and economics literature has attributed the types of suit (e.g., property 
rights, contract, tort, etc.) to the extent of information asymmetry between parties on case 
merits (Waldfogel 1995, Shavell 1996, Siegelman and Waldfogel 1999). Parties may 
systematically have different information about facts of a dispute, in ways that vary across suit 
types. For example, it is commonly argued that information asymmetry on infringements case is 
large because defendants know their own actions, while plaintiffs do not. This type of 
information asymmetry makes less sense in a contracts case, since the relevant actions by the 
defendant are typically observed by both parties. Following this strand of thought, we propose 
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to use the types of suits as a proxy for the levels of potential information asymmetry about 
intrinsic case merits. For the empirical test, we first eliminate the 67 cases in the sample that 
involve countersuing, because those cases may have specific complications that are 
independent of the suit type. This leaves us with a sample of 3,256 suits. 
We then categorize the four types of suits into three case levels, according to how 
straightforward the case facts are or, in other words, according to the level of potential 
information asymmetry about case merits. The contract-based cases (suit types 1-3) in general 
have less information asymmetry about merits than the tort cases (suit type 4). Unlike a tort 
case, in a contract case, the two parties involved in contracts must have had previous 
interactions with each other before the trial. There is also more hard information available for 
inspection, such as the content of the contract, the balance sheets of the firms, and product 
certificates. Among the contract cases, we define suit type 1 and 2, the loan cases as Case Level 
1, which are the cases with the most straightforward case facts. In the loan cases, the obligation 
of repayment only falls on one party. The performance of repayment is clearly defined and easy 
to prove. Both parties know exactly what happened, and there is little room for unknown 
information.  
We define suit type 3, the purchase/sale and other contract cases, as Case Level 2. The 
potential level of information asymmetry of this category falls between the loan cases and right 
infringement cases. Other types of contracts are usually less complete than a loan contract. 
They may involve agreements on different aspects of the product quality, or the maintenances 
of an office building, which cannot be specified comprehensively. Moreover, in those cases 
obligations fall on both parties. One party's fulfillment of obligation is dependent on the other 
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party's performance of the contract. There is usually more hidden information compared with a 
loan case.  
Finally, we define right infringement and other tort cases (suit type 4) to be Case Level 3 
with the largest potential information asymmetry about case merits. The tort cases involve a 
breach of civil duties, but not contract duties. It requires the proof that the existence of duty is 
reasonable, and that the causation between the duty and the damage is direct. Without explicit 
contracts, the implicitly assumed duties are hard to prove and open to interpretation. Moreover, 
a major proportion of tort cases in our sample are right infringement cases. Those cases are 
often the so-called "stranger" cases in the sense that the plaintiffs usually do not have any 
interaction with the defendant until the dispute arises. It is hard for the plaintiffs to retrieve 
information on what the defendant did, or for the defendant to retrieve information on what 
the plaintiff is able to prove, especially given the fact that most of the information is internal. 
Without judicial bias, information advantage on intrinsic case merit would make a significant 
difference in predicting the trial outcomes for Case Level 3. We also control for whether the 
case was appealed, since the decision to appeal for a case is related with the potential 
complication of the case facts.   
Applying our previous argument, we expect to observe that cases with clear-cut facts to 
exhibit higher judicial bias, which is positively correlated with the favored party’s win rate. On 
the other hand, if the difference in the win rates is caused by information asymmetry on case 
merits, we should see the information advantage to be magnified on cases with more 
complicated facts. To test the hypothesis we run the following regression: 
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where Case_level_1 is a dummy variable that equals one if the case is of Case Level 1. 
Case_level_2 is defined likewise and Case_level_3 is omitted. 1β  measures the average 
difference in the probability of winning between the SOEs and the non-SOEs for the cases with 
the most potential information asymmetry on case merits. 2β  and 3β measure how the 
difference in the win rates is affected when we switch from Case Level 3 to Case Level 2 and 
Case Level 1, respectively. If the story of judicial bias is true, both 2β  and 3β  are expected to 
be greater than 0. 
In Table 3, Panel A, Model 2, we present the result corresponding to Equation 2. Both 
Case_level_2 and Case_level_1 have positive coefficients when they are interacted with SOE. By 
switching from tort cases to contract cases, the difference in the win rates between the SOEs 
and the non-SOEs has an additional increase of 2.4%. The additional bias associated with 
switching from tort cases to loan cases is even larger at 5.1%. A t-test on the coefficients of the 
interaction terms finds that their difference of 2.7% is statistically significant at a 5% level. The 
SOEs enjoy larger advantages on cases with less potential information asymmetry about merits, 
which supports the story of judicial bias and goes against the alternative explanation that SOEs 
are better at identifying strong cases based on case merits. The control variables keep the same 
signs as in Table 3 Panel A, Model 1. 
There is the legitimate concern that the above result is driven by the lender 
characteristics in the loan suits, since the loan suits account for the majority of the sample. If the 
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lenders tend to win regardless of the judicial bias, and our sample consists of mostly state 
owned banks which are lenders, then we would observe a higher win rate of SOEs for Case Level 
1. To rule out this possibility, we run the same regression with the subsample of only defendant 
firms, and include a bank dummy that equals one if a bank is involved in the suit. Since lenders 
are almost always on the plaintiff side, using the defendant subsample ensures that our result is 
not driven by state-owned lenders winning the case.  
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 3, Panel A present the results. Again, the SOEs have a higher 
win rate than the non-SOEs. The bias is more prominent on cases with less potential information 
asymmetry about merits. The difference between the coefficients of Case_level_1*SOE and 
Case_level_2*SOE is positive and statistically significant.  
Another related concern is that bank loans may have special characteristics. For example, 
if some of the bank loans are policy loans made to support certain SOEs, those SOEs may get 
preferential treatments in courts.  To deal with the problem, we eliminate all the bank loans and 
repeat the same test. Columns 5 and 6 in Table 3, Panel A present the result. Our main findings 
from the full sample stay unchanged. The SOEs have an average win rate that is 8% higher than 
the non SOEs. The advantage of the SOEs is the largest on the loan cases, creating a difference in 
the win rates of more than 10% (calculated as 0.062+0.042). 
Finally, we refine the case categories to get clearer contrasts on the level of potential 
information asymmetry about case merits. Based on our four suit types, we further divide the 
loan cases into cases that only involve banks either as lenders or borrowers (very rarely), and 
cases involving guarantor companies or loan cases between two non-bank companies. The 
lender-borrower cases involve the simplest type of obligations, and bank loans have well-
27 
 
defined repayment schedules. A case with guarantor companies may be more complicated 
because it involves a third party other than the lender or the borrower.  
We then exclude all of the tort cases that are not infringement cases from Case Level 3, 
because the infringement cases are more likely to be "stranger" cases in which there is no 
previous interaction between the plaintiff and the defendant. On the other hand, in a tort case 
such as a trade secret leakage case by a former employee, the two parties have some past 
relationships, and it is less clear whether those cases are exposed to more information 
asymmetry on case merits than the contract cases.    
Using refined Case Level 1 to include only bank loan cases and refined Case Level 3 to 
include only infringement cases and leaving the Case Level 2 intact, we run the regression 
specified in Equation 2 again with a bank dummy. The results are presented in Table 3, Panel B. 
The SOE still has a positive and significant coefficient. The two interaction terms between the 
case categories and SOE are of larger magnitudes as compared to the coefficients in Panel A. In a 
bank loan case, an SOE can have a win rate which is 17% higher than that of a non-SOE. One 
factor that might have contributed to such a significant discrepancy is that banks are more 
reluctant to fight an SOE due to its connection to the government. As we refine the case 
categories, the message from the previous regressions stay the same.  
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Table 3 Judicial bias and information asymmetry on case merit 
The two panels report how the state ownership affects the trial outcomes. The dependent variable is the trial 
outcome, which equals 1 if the disclosing firm wins. SOE is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm is state owned. 
Case_level_n (where n=1, 2, or 3) is a measure for the potential information asymmetry on case merits. Case_level_1 
consists of loan cases. Case_level_3 consists of tort cases which has the highest level of potential information 
asymmetry. Case_level_2 consists of other contract cases. The control variables include the firm size (ln(asset), unit: 
RMB), leverage ratio, cash-to-asset ratio, profit ratio, whether the disclosing firm is the plaintiff, whether the firm is 
involved in more than 4 other litigations (Repeated_player), whether the case is tried at a higher level court, and the 
disputable amount. We also include dummies for appeal, whether the counter-party is a non-SOE 
(Otherparty_nonSOE), the fixed effects of province, industry, year, and suit types. We estimate the robust standard 
errors clustered by the provinces. 
Panel A 
  Full Sample               Defendant subsample Non-bank loan subsample 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 Win Win Win Win Win Win 
SOE 0.086*** 0.050*** 0.052*** 0.039*** 0.084*** 0.062** 
(0.014) (0. 016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.032) (0.018) 
Case_level_2*SOE 
 
0.024***  0.063***  0.027** 
  
(0.007)  (0.014)  (0.013) 
Case_level_2  
0.016  -0.296*   -0.034 
 
(0.029)  (0.140)   (0.047) 
Case_level_1*SOE 0.051***  0.083***  0.042***  
  
(0.016)  (0.014)   (0.006) 
Case_level_1  
-0.054*  -0.221*   0.004 
 
(0.029)   (0.117)   (0.043) 
Bank Dummy -- -- -0.163 -0.060 -- -- 
 
-- -- (0.169) (0.149)  -- -- 
Ln(asset) 0.036** 0.018***  0.005 0.005  0.015** 0.019* 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.008) (0.011) 
Leverage 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)  (0.0003) (0.0002) 
Cash ratio 0.575*** 0.594*** 0.418*** 0.355**  1.022***  0.669*** 
(0.054) (0.078) (0.085) (0.084)  (0.076) (0.189) 
Operation profit 0.109*** 0.098*** 0.025 0.056 0.034 0.021 
 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.038) (0.039) (0.036) (0.093) 
Plaintiff Dummy 0.447*** 0.331*** -- -- 0.575*** 0.390*** 
(0.014) (0.013) -- -- (0.021) (0.020) 
Repeated_player -0.073 -0.049*** -0.073 0.017 -0.041*** -0.042*** 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) 
Appeal 0.039 0.004 0.049** 0.024 -0.038 0.019 
 
(0.027) (0.807) (0.024) (0.016) (0.027) (0.016) 
Otherparty_nonSOE 0.195*** 0.152*** 0.094*** 0.045*** 0.117*** 0.113*** 
 
(0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.031) 
Suit type Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Other controls* X X X X X X 
Observation 3323 3256 2528 2496 1897 1863 
R-square 0.38 0.42 0.18 0.19 0.44 0.38 
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Panel B Subsample with refined case categories 
This panel refines the three case categories presented in panel A. Case_level_1_R consists of loan cases only involving 
banks as either the lenders or the borrowers. All the cases that involve guarantor companies are deleted. 
Case_level_2_R consists of other contract cases. Case_level__3_R consists of infringement cases only. Case_level_3_R 
is omitted. The rest of the variables are defined as in Panel A. 
 
 Model 1  Model 2 
 Win  Win 
SOE 0.061***  0.058** (0.017)   (0.029) 
Case_level_2_R*SOE 
 
  0.091* 
  
 
  (0.049) 
Case_level_2_R     -0.083* 
    (0.045) 
Case_level_1_R *SOE     0.110* 
      (0.061) 
Case_level_1_R     -0.061 
    (0.047) 
Bank Dummy 0.073 
 
0.036 
 
(0.121) 
 
(0.113) 
Ln(asset) 0.016**   0.019** 
  (0.008)   (0.008) 
Leverage 0.0002   -0.0001 
(0.0003)   (0.0003) 
Cash ratio 0.870***   
0.828***  
(0.073)   (0.074) 
Operation profit 0.101*** 
 
0.101*** 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.041) 
Plaintiff Dummy 0.458***   0.291*** 
(0.021)   (0.016) 
Repeated_player -0.042***  
-0.039*** 
(0.015)   (0.015) 
Appeal 0.027   0.037 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.028) 
Otherparty_nonSOE 0.136***   0.148*** 
(0.019)   (0.019) 
Suit type Yes 
 
No 
Other controls* X 
 
X 
Observation 2768   2768 
R-square 0.36   0.37 
In both  panels, ***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The numbers in parentheses are clustered 
standard errors.  
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1.4.2 Judicial Bias and Legal Environments  
In the following sections we go beyond each case idiosyncrasy to present more 
empirical evidence in support of our claim of judicial bias. The first set of tests we run are 
concerned with the development of provincial-level legal institutions. We conjecture that the 
local legal institutions affect the extent of judicial bias against unconnected firms, because poor 
property rights protection is the fundamental reason that the SOEs enjoy unjustified benefits. If 
the difference in the winning probability is caused by a bias against non-SOEs, then it should be 
less prominent when the case is tried in a region with a better legal environment. Moreover, the 
alleviation of the judicial bias should be more significant on cases with more straightforward 
case facts, as those are the cases with the largest potential for judicial bias. 
To our advantage, China’s economic reform in the past 30 years has necessitated the 
establishment of an almost entirely new set of economics institutions. These institutions have 
been developed at a varying pace across different regions of China (Xu 2009, Ayyagari et al. 
2010), partly due to divergent regional economic policies and the significant autonomous power 
of the local governments. Such heterogeneities in the legal institution developments across time 
and regions in China have offered unique opportunities for us to examine the connection 
between legal institutions and judicial bias in a panel-like setting12
The variable we use to measure the development of the local legal institutions is the 
Producer Property Rights Protection Index at the provincial level taken from the Marketization 
Index for China’s Provinces. It is a widely used index that measures province-level market and 
.  
                                                          
12 Technically speaking, we do not have a panel data set here; we only have observations of firms which are 
involved in litigations. There are multiple observations in each province each year, but a particular firm 
may only appear once. 
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legal developments and is jointly published by the National Economic Research Institute and 
China Reform Foundation annually. The Producer Property Rights Protection Index is 
constructed based on three components: the number of economics cases filed every year 
normalized by the regional GDP, the extent to which the local regulations emphasize the 
protection of non-SOEs, and some firm level survey evidences. A high score in the index 
indicates a better regional legal environment. We choose this specific measure instead of the 
more widely used overall marketization measure because our study puts an emphasis on the 
court’s discrimination based on the ownership status of the firm. In regions of better property 
rights protection, the non-SOEs face less government exploitation, which might translate to a 
more fair court system.  
 
 
Figure 2 Average Producer Property Rights Protection Index, 1997-2007 
This figure gives a summary of the Producer Property Rights Protection Index across the provinces. A higher index 
score means the province has better property rights protection.  
Source: Marketization Index for China's Provinces (1997-2008), published by National Economic Research Institute 
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The most updated Marketization Index covers all of the provinces from 1997 to 2007. 
We match the cases after 2008 with the index value of 2007. Using the average index value 
between 1997 and 2007 instead does not have a significant impact on our results. Figure 2 gives 
a summary of the average Producer Property Rights Protection Index across the provinces. 
There is regional heterogeneity even within the more developed regions. Beijing, Shanghai and 
Guangdong have high Index scores while places like Chongqing have a low score, consistent with 
the anecdotal evidence that the Chongqing autonomous city has suffered from abuse of 
administrative power. 
We match the Producer Rights Protection Index from the previous year to the year 
when the case was tried and the province where the case was tried 13
 
, and run the following 
regressions: 
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where lag_legal is the lagged Producer Rights Protection Index from the province where the 
case was tried. In Regression 3.2, our variable of main interest is the triple interaction term of 
SOE, lagged legal index, and case category, which allows us to test whether the alleviation of 
bias varies with different levels of potential information asymmetry on case merits.   
                                                          
13 Under most circumstances it's the location of the defendant. Sometimes the plaintiff may be able to have 
the case tried in its home province. 
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Table 4 Judicial bias and legal institutions 
This table reports how the local legal institutions affect the win rate of the SOEs. The dependent variable is the trial 
outcome. SOE is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm is state owned. Case_level_n (where n = 1, 2, or 3) is a measure for 
the potential information asymmetry on case merit. Case_level_1 consists of cases with the lowest level of potential 
information asymmetry. We use two proxies for local legal environments (the legal variable). In the first two columns, 
we use Lag_legal, which is the lagged producer rights protection index. In the last two columns, we use  port_lease, 
which is a dummy that equals 1 if a province was forced to open to foreigners as a treaty port or leased territory.  
  legal  proxy 1: Lag_legal legal  proxy 2: port_lease 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Win Win Win Win 
SOE 0.073*** 0.063** 0.057** 0.024* 
(0.014) (0.026) (0.024) (0.013) 
legal  0.042 0.061 0.011 -0.021 
 
(0.045) (0.040) (0.039) (0.025) 
SOE* legal -0.019* -0.021 -0.043* -0.055** 
 
(0.008) (0.018) (0.024) (0.025) 
Case_level_2*SOE  0.034**  0.006 
 
 (0.014)  (0.041) 
Case_level_2  -0.077  0.093 
 (0.132)  (0.078) 
Case_level_1*SOE  0.041**  0.013 
 
 (0.017)  (0.013) 
Case_level_1  -0.041  -0.048 
 
 (0.168)  (0.050) 
Case_level_2* legal  0.015  -0.011 
 
 (0.024)  (0.105) 
Case_level_1* legal  -0.016  -0.058 
 
 (0.029)  (0.104) 
Case_level_2* Legal*SOE  -0.006*  -0.021* 
 
 (0.003)  (0.011) 
Case_level_1* Legal*SOE  -0.009**  -0.043 
 
 (0.003)  (0.031) 
Ln(asset) 0.021*** 0.019* 0.033*** 0.027*** 
 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 
Cash ratio 0.795*** 0.631*** 0.317*** 0.660*** 
(0.065) (0.187) (0.058) (0.179) 
Operating profit 0.118*** 0.036 0.123*** 0.013 
 
(0.046) (0.092) (0.046) (0.009) 
Plaintiff Dummy 0.488*** 0.396*** 0.471*** 0.394*** 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) 
Repeated_player -0.062*** -0.045*** -0.052*** -0.039** 
(0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.018) 
Otherparty_nonSOE 0.177*** 0.106*** 0.136*** 0.111*** 
 
(0.015) (0.031) (0.016) (0.030) 
Suit type Yes No Yes No 
Province fixed effects Yes Yes No No 
Other Controls* X X X X 
Observation 3323 3256 3323 3256 
R-square 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.42 
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The control variables include the firm size (ln(asset), unit: RMB), leverage ratio, cash-to-asset ratio, profit ratio, 
whether the disclosing firm is the plaintiff, whether the firm is involved in more than 4 other litigations 
(Repeated_player), whether the case is tried at a higher level court, and the disputable amount. We also include 
dummies for appeal, whether the counterparty is a non-SOE (Otherparty_nonSOE), and the fixed effects of industry, 
year,  suit types, and province (or regional GDP). We estimate the robust standard errors clustered by the provinces. 
***, **,* are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. The numbers in parenthesis are clustered standard errors.  
 
We use the lagged index to mitigate the concern of reverse causality. Even though our 
measure of the legal index does not explicitly take into account judicial bias at the court level, it 
is possible that the behaviors of the courts may have an impact on the regional legal index. For 
instance, if the court becomes unbiased, the SOEs may be more reluctant to bring up a suit, 
because they are less confident of winning. The number of economics cases would drop as a 
result, which affects the legal index. We do not claim to completely solve the issue of reverse 
causality by using the lagged index. We argue that, as the main purpose of this paper is to prove 
that the high win rate by the SOEs is caused by the bias, the reverse causality here is not our 
major concern. The fact that a smaller win rate of the SOEs may have translated into a better 
legal index but not the other way around still lends support to our claim that the high win rate 
of the SOEs is associated with court bias. Nevertheless, we will tackle the problem of reverse 
causality directly later in the section. 
The first two columns in Table 4 present the regression results. Model 1 corresponds to 
Equation 3.1. As we expected, the SOEs have less chance of winning if the case is tried in 
provinces with higher Producer Property Rights Index scores. The interaction term has a 
significant coefficient of -1.9%, indicating that the difference in the winning probabilities 
between the SOEs and the non-SOEs decreases by 1.9% if the trial province’s legal environment 
index increases by 1, which is the difference between Guangdong province and Heilongjiang 
province, and is slightly smaller than one standard deviation of the legal environment index 
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across provinces. As the legal environment improves, the court becomes more independent in 
decision making, which in turn alleviates the discrimination against unconnected firms. The 
negative bias on the non-SOEs is less prominent in the regions with better legal environment, 
though it is not fully corrected. Moreover, Model 2 shows that the drop in the win rate is more 
prominent for cases with straightforward case merits, further distinguishing our story of judicial 
bias from the competing explanation of information asymmetry about case merits.    
To formally address the problem of reverse causality, we employ an exogenous proxy 
for the local legal environments inspired by Fan, Wang, Zhang (2010): whether a province was 
forced to open to foreigners as a treaty port or a leased territory after the first Opium War in 
the Qing dynasty. After the first Opium War in 1842, China was forced to sign several treaties 
with foreign countries to establish treaty ports or setup leased territories in some of its 
provinces14
We create a dummy variable port_lease that equals one if the province was forced to 
. The setup of the treaty ports and leased territories increased China’s openness and 
promoted business contact with the rest of the world. Foreign courts were set up in those areas 
to handle disputes involving foreigners, and the local court’s jurisdiction was restricted. Since 
these treaty ports and leased territories were opened over 100 years ago, how a court rules an 
individual case now cannot have had any direct relation to their creation. However, as Fan, 
Wang, and Zhang (2010) argued, the establishment of these ports and territories is likely to have 
long-term impacts on the local legal institution development.  
                                                          
14The treaty ports are located in Anhui, Chongqing, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Hubei, Jiangsu, 
Liaoning, Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Xinjiang, Zhejiang. The locations of the leased territories 
include Tianjin (1860), Shanghai (1845), Jiangsu (1863), Zhejiang (1896), Anhui (1877), Jiangxi (1861), 
Fujian (1861), Shandong (1889), Guangdong (1857), Chongqing (1901) and Hubei (1861). (Taken from Fan, 
Wang, and Zhang 2010). 
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open as a port or became a leased territory, and use the port_lease dummy directly in place of 
the legal index by running the regression: 
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The underling theory is that the opening of the treaty ports and leased territories had a 
positive impact on the local legal environment by introducing the Western-style laws at an early 
stage. The port_lease dummy has a positive correlation of 0.539 with the legal index. We use 
the opening of ports and leased territories as an exogenous positive shock to the regional legal 
environments. It is a noisy proxy in the sense that though these provinces on average have 
higher legal indices, some of them (such as Xinjiang province) may have relatively poorer legal 
environments today due to other historical reasons. 
The results are presented in Table 4, Model 3 and Model 4. Here we take out the province 
fixed effects because the port_lease dummy is a province-level variable that is not time-varying. 
Provincial gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is included as a control of regional economic 
development. The win rate of the SOEs drops by 4.3% in the provinces that were forced to open 
as treaty ports and leased territories. The decrease is larger on cases with more straightforward 
case facts, as demonstrated in Model 4. Both of the triple interaction terms between SOE, case 
category, and the port/leased territory dummy have the right negative signs. The interaction 
term Case_level_2*port_lease*SOE is significant, but Case_level_1*port_lease*SOE is 
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insignificant due to the noise. The regression results support our previous argument that the 
judicial bias is reduced in regions with better local legal environments.  
As a further robustness check, we also employ a two stage least square (2SLS) method. 
In the first stage, the Producer Rights Index of a province is regressed on two instruments: the 
port_lease dummy, and the latitude of the province. We interact the two instruments with the 
SOE dummy and use the variables to instrument for the interaction term of the Producer Rights 
Index and SOE. Latitude of a province (measured at the center of the province's capital city) is 
included as an instrumental variable to capture the geographic feature of a region, since a 
region's latitude has a great effect on its climate and weather. It has been argued that natural 
environment puts restrictions on the institution development (Acemoglu 2005). The 2SLS leaves 
our findings largely unchanged15
1.4.3 Judicial Bias and Local Connections   
.  
The second set of tests makes use of the distinction between national SOEs and local 
SOEs. A national SOE is owned by the central government, while a local SOE is owned by a 
provincial or city level government. There are 1,089 cases involving local SOEs in our sample. 
Compared with the national SOEs, the local SOEs’ political connections are constrained by their 
geographic locations. A local SOE in one province is likely to be favored by the local court, but 
may not necessarily enjoy the same benefit if the trial takes place elsewhere. Thus, we should 
observe more bias favoring a local SOE if the case is tried in its home province. The related 
regression is: 
                                                          
15 Results are not reported here for conciseness. Tables are available upon request.  
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where LSOE is a dummy variable for local SOE and Home_province is a dummy which equals one 
if the case is tried in the home province of the disclosing firm.   
Furthermore, the strength of local political connections is likely to be affected when 
there is a turnover of the provincial governor. A change in the provincial governor is usually 
followed by turnovers of other provincial and city level officials, since new governors would 
want to promote people closer to them. The governor turnover thus significantly weakens, if not 
destroys, the existing connection a local SOE has with the current local government. During this 
period, the control of the old political power has dissolved while the influence of the new 
political power has yet to be established. Even if the governor turnover is expected, there are 
only limited things a local SOE can do to secure a new connection in advance, since there is 
uncertainty over who will be the successor. The national SOEs are less exposed to this problem, 
because they can rely on the central government.  
Under normal circumstances, such turnovers of governors would again expose us to a 
reverse causality problem. The decision of the reappointment of a governor can depend on 
various political and economic factors during the governor's tenure. However there are a few 
exceptions; sudden death is an obvious one. Moreover, according to the regulation on the 
appointment and selection of party leaders in China, provincial governors have a term of 5 years 
and can be reappointed only once. By the end of the 10th year in office, governors have to be 
transferred to a different position. Another regulation is that government leaders have to step 
down once reaching the age of 65. These are the three exceptional circumstances where the 
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turnovers can be considered to be exogenous. In particular, we denote that a province has an 
exogenous regime shift if its governor or its provincial party secretary leaves the office for the 
following reasons: sudden death, reaching the 10th year of tenure, and surpassing the age of 65. 
Among the 173 total governor turnovers we document across the provinces between 1997 and 
2010, 46 of them are defined as exogenous. There are 255 cases in 14 provinces which 
happened during the exogenous regime shifts. 
Exogenous reappointment of new provincial leaders represents a shock to the local 
political environment. This is a period when the local government has the least interference 
over court decisions, and when the local SOEs benefit the least by having the trial in their home 
provinces. In fact, the average number of locally tried cases involving local SOEs drops from the 
sample average of 6 per year per province to 2.5 per year per province during the exogenous 
leader changes, indicating that the local SOEs are indeed more reluctant to participate in 
litigations during the governor turnovers. Eliminating the cases which are tried during 
endogenous leader changes, we are left with a sample of 2,038 cases to run the following 
regressions: 
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where LSOE and Home_province are defined as before. The variable Leader_change is a dummy 
variable that equals one whenever there is an exogenous province leader change. In Equation 
5.3, our main interest is in the triple interaction term of Home_province, LSOE, and 
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Leader_change. We test whether the leader switch has a larger detrimental impact on the local 
SOEs when the case is tried in the local SOE's home province. 
Table 5 Judicial bias and local connections 
This table reports the regression results of how the local state-owned enterprises enjoy additional benefits when the 
cases are tried in their home provinces. The dependent variable is the trial outcome. The independent variables 
include the following: a SOE dummy for state owned firms, a LSOE dummy for firms owned by the provincial or lower 
level government. Home_province is a dummy that equals 1 if the case is tried in the disclosing firm's home province. 
Leader_change is a dummy that equals 1 whenever there is an exogenous provincial governor turnover.  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Win Win Win 
SOE 0.064** 0.038** 0.043** 
(0.029) (0.019) (0.020) 
LSOE 0.005 0.011 0.031 
 
(0.029) (0.028) (0.030) 
LSOE*Home Province 0.028**  0.030 
(0.014)  (0.026) 
Home Province -0.016  0.026 
 
(0.020)  (0.017) 
Leader Change 
 
0.017 -0.018 
  
(0.036) (0.051) 
LSOE* Leader Change 
 
-0.048** -0.053 
  
(0.023) (0.050) 
Leader Change*Home Province 
 
 0.067 
  
 (0.053) 
LSOE*Home Province* Leader Change 
 
 -0.047* 
  
 (0.025) 
Ln(asset) 0.035*** 0.023** 0.025** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Leverage 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Cash ratio 0.669*** 0.512*** 0.107*** 
(0.063) (0.066) (0.047) 
Operating profit 0.124** 0.098** 0.097** 
 
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Plaintiff Dummy 0.396*** 0.349*** 0.342*** 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Repeated_player -0.067*** -0.054*** -0.050*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Appeal -0.007 -0.006 -0.003 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Otherparty_nonSOE 0.195*** 0.196*** 0.196*** 
 
(0.014) (0.017) (0.014) 
Other controls X X X 
Observation 3323 2038 2038 
R-square 0.36 0.37 0.38 
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The control variables include the firm size, leverage ratio, cash-to-asset ratio, operating profit, whether the disclosing 
firm is the plaintiff, and whether the disclosing firm is involved in more than 4 other litigations (Repeated_player). We 
also include the ownership status of the counterparty (Otherparty_nonSOE) and the appeal status of a case. We 
estimate the robust standard errors clustered by the provinces. Other control variables include: high court dummy, 
disputable amount, type of suits, province dummy, industry, and year controls. None of these are significant. 
***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors. 
 
Regression results are presented in Table 5. Model 1 shows that besides the average 
favor a SOE receives, a local SOE enjoys a 2.8% increase in the win rate when the case is tried in 
its home province. Model 2 demonstrates that the judicial favor on the local SOEs diminishes by 
4.8% as a result of local political regime switches. Model 3 includes the triple difference term 
with a negative coefficient, implying that the local SOEs having their cases tried at the local 
provinces suffer higher than average drops in the win rates during the provincial leader 
turnovers, which is what we would expect if the advantage of the SOE is caused by judicial bias. 
The interaction term between LSOE and Home_province is still positive in Model 3. The 
interaction term between local SOE and leader change remains negative, but becomes 
insignificant. The impact of leader changes on the local SOEs is concentrated on the cases tried 
in their home provinces.  
 
1.4.4 Self-Established Political Connections by Non-SOE and Judicial Bias  
Up to this point in our research, we have used only the state ownership as a proxy for 
political connections and have shown that the non-SOEs suffer discrimination in court decisions.  
Facing such a disadvantage, the non-SOEs seek other means to compete with the SOEs. One of 
the most widely used methods is to rely on the personal networks of their top managers. To be 
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specific, the non-SOEs can hire CEOs or directors who have previously held positions as leading 
government officials. This kind of personal tie helps firms establish some insider connections 
with the government and gain political advantages, and is commonly observed in emerging 
markets. Faccio (2006) studied listed firms in 47 countries and found that political connections 
are prevalent among listed firms. Both Cull and Xu (2004) and Li et al. (2008) did work 
specifically on China and found that in regions with a less developed market and weaker legal 
system, firms are more likely to have connected CEOs/directors.  
Based on our previous observations, we conjecture that the non-SOEs with CEO/director 
connections have an advantage in court compared with those non-SOEs without connections. 
The CEO/director connection here is only defined within the subsample of non-SOEs because 
the SOEs are connected by default through their ownership statuses. Tests in this section only 
involve the subsample of non-SOEs, proposing an alternative measure of political connections 
and at the same time mitigating the potential concern that the difference in the win rates 
between SOEs  and non-SOEs is caused by some unobserved dissimilarities, but not by political 
connections. 
We first re-estimate the regressions as in Table 3 using the subsample of all the non-SOEs, 
replacing the SOE dummy with a dummy of CEO/director connection, which equals one if the 
firm’s top official (CEO or director) is previously affiliated with the government.  
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Table 6 Non-SOE subsample: Judicial bias and case merit information asymmetry  
This table reports the regression results of how the personal connection in a non-SOE affects the trial outcomes. The 
dependent variable is the trial outcome. The independent variables include the following: CEO/DIR connection is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the non-SOE has a CEO/director who was previously connected to the government. 
Case_level_n (where n = 1, 2, or 3) is a measure for the potential information asymmetry on case merit. Case_level_1 
consists of loan cases, which has the lowest level of potential information asymmetry. Case_level_3 consists of tort 
cases, which has the highest level of potential information asymmetry. Case_level_2 consists of purchase/sales 
contract cases which lie in between. Case_level_3 is omitted. We also include the interaction terms of Case_level_n 
with CEO/DIR connection.  The control variables include the firm size (ln(asset) with asset measured in RMB), leverage 
ratio, cash-to-asset ratio, profitability, whether the disclosing firm is the plaintiff, whether the firm is involved in more 
than 4 other litigations in our sample (Repeated_player), and whether the case was appealed. We also include the 
ownership status of the counterparty (Otherparty_nonSOE). Other control variables include: high court dummy, 
disputable amount, type of suits, province dummy, industry and year controls. None of those are significant. 
  Full sample Only Defendant 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Win Win Win Win 
CEO/DIR connection 
 
0.089** 0.026*** 0.063** 0.039* 
(0.041) (0.001) (0.028) (0.020) 
Case_level_2  0.065***  0.019** *CEO/DIR connection  (0.026)  (0.008) 
Case_level_2  0.039  0.004 
 (0.091)  (0.010) Case_level_1 0.137***  0.081*** 
*CEO/DIR connection  (0.024)  (0.024) 
Case_level_1  -0.067**  -0.035 
 (0.024)  (0.054) Bank Dummy   -0.130 -0.140  
   (0.151) (0.171)  Ln(asset) 0.017* 0.035 0.007 0.008  
 (0.010) (0.024) (0.009) (0.009)  
Leverage 0.0002 0.0002 0.000 -0.0000 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)  
Cash ratio 0.590*** 0.731*** 0.033*** 0.112**  
(0.135) (0.295) (0.019) (0.050)  
Operating profit 0.105* 0.066 -0.027 -0.030 
 (0.064) (0.131) (0.051) (0.050) 
Plaintiff Dummy 0.489*** 0.366*** -- -- 
(0.027) (0.041) -- -- 
Repeated_player 0.190 0.200 -0.008 -0.001 
(0.142) (0.141) (0.011) (0.017) 
Appeal 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.063*** 0.065*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.019) (0.020) Otherparty_nonSOE 0.077*** 0.076* 0.075*** 0.041** 
 (0.021) (0.045) (0.025) (0.021) Suit type Yes No Yes No 
Other Controls X X X X 
Observation 1319 1304 954 947 
R-square 0.32 0.33 0.07 0.08 
***, **,* are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors.  
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Table 6 presents the test results, using the first definition of Case Levels. Non-SOEs with 
connected CEOs/directors win with higher probabilities. The bias is more significant on cases 
with less potential information asymmetry, which is demonstrated by the positive coefficients of 
the terms Case_level_2*CEO/Dir_Connection and Case_level_1 *CEO/Dir_Connection in Model 2. 
Model 3 and Model 4 use subsamples of defendant firms. As seen previously, the results in the 
first two columns are not driven by the lenders winning the cases. A t-test confirms that 
Case_level_2*CEO/Dir_Connection has a coefficient that is smaller than the coefficient of 
Case_level_1 *CEO/Dir_Connection in both Model 2 and Model 4. We also perform the test 
under the refined definition of Case levels, and the results still hold16
Next we test the implications of local legal environments. As before, we expect the 
judicial bias to be alleviated in regions with more developed legal institutions. In the first column 
of Table 7, improved legal environment exerts a correcting force on the bias and makes the 
connected firms less advantageous, though the magnitude of correction is not as big as in the 
full sample case. In Model 2, the decrease in the win rate of the connected firm is the greatest 
on cases with the most straightforward case facts (Case Level 1). In Model 3 and Model 4 we 
directly add the dummy for the opening of ports or leased territories in place of the legal index 
to confirm the results. The difference in the win rates drops by 5.8% in the provinces that were 
forced to open as treaty ports or leased territories. We also perform a 2SLS and the results are 
largely unchanged. Results are not presented here for conciseness.  
. The control variables keep 
the original signs, though some of them become insignificant.  
 
                                                          
16 Results are available upon request.  
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Table 7 Non-SOE subsample: Judicial bias and legal institutions 
This table reports how the local legal environments affect the connected non-SOEs' win rate. The dependent variable 
is the trial outcome. CEO/DIR connection is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the non-SOE has a CEO or a director who 
was previously connected to the government. Case_level_n (where n=1,2,or 3) is a measure for the potential 
information asymmetry on case merit. Case_level_3 consists of cases with the highest level of information asymmetry. 
We use two proxies for local legal environments (legal variable). In the first two columns, we use Lag_legal, which is 
the lagged producer rights protection index. In the last two columns, we use  port_lease, which is a dummy that 
equals 1 if a province was forced to open to foreigners as a treaty port or leased territory.  
  legal  proxy 1: Lag_legal legal  proxy 2: port_lease 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Win Win Win Win 
CEO/DIR conn. 0.011* 0.039* 0.072** 0.056** 
(0.007) (0.016) (0.026) (0.027) 
legal  0.008*** 0.009*** 0.052*** 0.027 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.020) (0.065) CEO/DIR conn.* legal -0.006*** -0.007** -0.058* -0.057 
 (0.002) (0.002） (0.031) (0.069) Case_level_2* CEO/DIR conn.  0.015  0.034** 
  (0.016)  (0.015) 
Case_level_2  0.191  -0.096 
 (0.134)  (0.184) 
Case_level_1* CEO/DIR conn.  0.023**  0.094 
  (0.010)  (0.064) Case_level_1  0.042  0.211 
  (0.090)  (0.158) Case_level_2* legal  -0.047  0.076 
  (0.041)  (0.054) Case_level_1* legal  0.021  -0.024 
  (0.041)  (0.089) Case_level_2* Legal* CEO/DIR conn.  -0.015***  -0.013 
  (0.002)  (0.017) Case_level_1* Legal* CEO/DIR conn.  -0.069***  -0.029*** 
  (0.023)  (0.008) Ln(asset) 0.012 0.023** 0.019*** 0.024** 
 (0.015) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
Cash ratio -0.003 0.004 0.736*** 0.477*** 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.062) (0.121) 
Operating Profit 0.104* 0.088* 0.075* 0.102* 
 (0.057) (0.029) (0.040) (0.058) 
Plaintiff Dummy 0.335*** 0.276*** 0.487*** 0.287*** 
(0.020) (0.027) (0.016) (0.027) 
Repeated_player -0.062*** -0.037** -0.068*** -0.029 
(0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.020) 
Otherparty_nonSOE 0.067*** 0.121*** 0.077* 0.132*** 
 (0.028) (0.035) (0.061) (0.018) Province fixed effects Yes Yes No No 
Other Controls: X X X X 
Observation 1319 1304 1319 1304 
R-square 0.37 0.38 0.35 0.36 
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The control variables include the firm size (ln(asset), unit: RMB), leverage ratio, cash to asset ratio, profit ratio, 
whether the disclosing firm is the plaintiff, whether the firm is involved in more than 4 other litigations 
(Repeated_player), whether the case is tried at a higher level court, and the disputable amount. We also include 
dummies for appeal, whether the counter-party is a non-SOE(Otherparty_nonSOE), the fixed effects of industry, year, 
suit types and province (or regional GDP). We estimate the robust standard errors clustered by the provinces. 
***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors. 
 
We further divide the sample to firms whose CEOs or directors are locally connected and 
whose CEOs or directors have political connections outside their local provinces. There are 625 
cases involving locally connected non-SOEs. We expect the firms with local connections to enjoy 
extra benefits if their cases are tried locally. We also expect the exogenous local governor 
turnovers to have a negative impact on the win rate of locally connected firms. Within the non-
SOE subsample, we have 167 cases tried during exogenous provincial leader changes.  
Table 8 presents the results. Model 1 shows that the locally connected firms receive 
extra favors from the courts when the cases are tried locally. Model 2 demonstrates that the 
change in the local governor has a negative impact on the win rate of the locally connected non-
SOEs. During the regime switch, the difference in the probabilities of winning between locally 
connected and unconnected non-SOEs drops by 7.1%. Column 3 shows that the additional 
advantage enjoyed by the locally connected firm in the local courts diminishes during the time 
of leader change, consistent with our full sample results. 
The impacts of other control variables are of the same direction and comparable 
magnitude with the full sample case. However, the Leader_change dummy has a significant 
negative coefficient now, as contrary to the full sample case. During the regime switch, an 
average non-SOE is less likely to win in court. This can be explained by an overall uncertainty 
caused by the governor turnover, which affects non-SOEs more severely than SOEs. 
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Table 8 Non-SOE subsample: Judicial bias and local connections 
This table reports the regression results of how the local state-owned enterprises enjoy additional benefits when the 
cases are tried in their home provinces. The dependent variable is the trial outcome. The independent variables 
include the following: a CEO/DIR connection dummy for connected firms, a LConnection dummy local connection. 
Home_province is a dummy that equals 1if the case is tried in the disclosing firm's home province. Leader_change is a 
dummy that equals 1 whenever there is an exogenous provincial governor turnover.  
The control variables include the firm size, leverage ratio, cash-to-asset ratio, operating profit, whether the disclosing 
firm is the plaintiff, and whether the disclosing firm is involved in more than 4 other litigation (Repeated_player). We 
also include the ownership status of the counterparty (Otherparty_nonSOE) and the appeal status of a case. Other 
control variables include: high court dummy, disputable amount, province dummy, industry, and year controls. None 
of those are significant.  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Win Win Win 
CEO/DIR connection 0.071* 0.028* 0.013*** 
(0.033) (0.011) (0.004) 
LConnection 0.022 0.032 0.043 
 (0.042) (0.022) (0.032) 
LConnection * home province 0.045**  0.032** 
(0.021)  (0.015) 
home province -0.023  0.038 
 (0.026)  (0.023) Leader Change  -0.087*** -0.084 
  (0.031) (0.063) LConnection* Leader Change  -0.071** 0.071 
  (0.031) (0.051) Leader Change* home province   -0.078 
   (0.058) LConn. * Leader Change* home province    -0.025** 
   (0.012) Ln(asset) 0.021**  0.013 0.022** 
 (0.012)  (0.012) (0.013) 
Leverage 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0005 
(0.000)  (0.0003) (0.002) 
Cash ratio -0.961***  -0.412*** -1.153*** 
(0.102)  (0.004) (0.117) 
Operating profit 0.111** 0.111** 0.106** 
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.048) 
Plaintiff Dummy 0.478*** 0.386*** 0.575*** 
(0.027) (0.028) (0.031) 
Repeated_player -0.022 0.011 -0.019 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.023) 
Appeal 0.015 0.022 0.022 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) Otherparty_nonSOE 0.072*** 0.087*** 0.074*** 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.028) Other Controls X X X 
Observation 1319 919 919 
R-square 0.38 0.41 0.64 
***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors. 
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1.4.5 Self Established Political Connections vs. State Ownership  
The question asked next is whether the CEO/director connections of non-SOEs can 
completely eliminate their disadvantages against the SOEs. If this is the case, then the non-SOEs 
are able to level the playing field without any formal policy interference. Since the majority of 
the non-SOEs have some form of political connections, we may conclude that only a small 
fraction of the privately owned firms suffer the judicial bias. To test this, we use the subsample 
of all of the SOEs and politically connected non-SOEs to re-run the main regression Equations 1, 
2, and 3.1. We find that the connected non-SOEs are still more likely to lose compared to the 
SOEs, though the coefficient is of a smaller magnitude (6.8%) compared to the full sample case. 
The non-SOEs' disadvantages still diminish as potential information asymmetry on case merits 
gets smaller, but the local legal index no longer has a significant impact on the win rate of the 
SOEs. We do not present the full table here for conciseness. The overall message is that our 
main findings hold in the subsample only including connected non-SOEs, but the impact of 
political connections is weaker due to the self-established political ties.  
 
1.4.6  Effect of Litigation Outcomes on Stock Performances  
Previous literature has shown that litigation announcements have negative impacts on 
listed firms' stock prices (Bhagat et al.1994, Firth et al. 2010) due to the potential financial 
distress. Among others, Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) and Garber and Adams (1998) analyzed the 
impacts of product liability verdicts on firm values in the United States. However, no existing 
literature has looked at the wealth impact of the court rulings across all suit types. Like product 
liability cases, most inter-corporation lawsuits involve considerable monetary compensations. If 
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the market reacts to the potential financial distress brought by litigation announcements, it 
should also react to the realized losses of the losing firms once the uncertainty in the verdict is 
resolved. 
In this section, we provide a succinct test to examine the effect of trial outcomes on the 
firm's stock prices. We show that market responds differently to favorable and adverse rulings. 
The judicial bias against unconnected firms has a real wealth impact on the firms.   
To examine the market impact of court rulings, we employ an event study method and 
collect the dates on which the disclosing firms announces the trial outcome and treat it as the 
event date. The announcement date is usually within a couple months after the verdict date. 
Though the verdict is already made, the court makes no effort to make the information 
publically available. Given that many lower level courts do not have well maintained websites, 
the best most courts can do is to post the verdicts on the bulletin boards outside, which makes it 
essentially impossible for the non-local investors to get timely information. Moreover, under 
certain circumstances,17
Using a market adjusted model, we calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
over an event window of (1,5), which means that the CARs are measured from the day after the 
 listed firms are allowed to postpone revealing their involvements in 
pending litigations until the verdicts come out. Some firms choose to do so. Not able to know 
that firms are involved in litigation, the investors are unlikely to pay attention to particular 
courts’ bulletin boards. As a result, while insiders may hear about the ruling right after (or even 
before) the formal verdicts are released, most people learn about rulings from the disclosing 
firms’ announcements.  
                                                          
17 E.g., when the compensation amount is below a threshold.  
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announcement to 5 trading days afterward. The market beta of the stocks is calculated using 
daily returns from the fiscal year just prior to the year in which the event occurs.  
Table 9 reports the summary statistics of the CAR on different subgroups. We divide our 
sample to winning and losing firms. There are more losing firms in the sample. The winning firms 
have an average CAR(1,5) of 0.12%, and the losing firms have an average CAR(1,5) of -0.47%. 
Though as in Column 2,the t-test cannot reject the hypothesis that the winning/losing firm has a 
higher/lower-than-0 CAR, a one tail t-test rejects the null hypothesis that the winning firm's CAR 
is smaller or equal to that of a losing firm at a 5% level (Column 5). The test confirms our 
conjecture that the winning firm enjoys a better return. To take into consideration the possible 
information leakage before the verdict announcement date, we also try an alternative event 
window of (-2,2) (results not reported here). The difference between the mean CARs of winning 
and losing firms is of the same sign and similar magnitude. However the standard error is larger, 
and the one tail test is only significant at a 10% level. 
 
Table 9 t-test on CAR(1,5) 
This table compares the five-day CARs of the winning and losing firms after the firms’ verdict announcement date. 
Column 1 is the number of observations. Column 2 is the equal weighted CAR. Columns 3 and 4 are the minimum and 
maximum CARs. Column 5 is the t-test result of whether the CAR is statistically different between the two groups. 
***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
 
 
1 2 3 4   5 
 
Obs. Mean Min Max   diff. in mean  
            (winning-losing) 
Winning  939 0.12% -17% 26% 0.59%** 
(Win=1) 
 
(0.04) 
  
   (0.10) 
Losing 2384 -0.47% -23% 38% 
 
(Win=0) 
 
(0.08) 
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To formally test the market impact of the trial outcomes, we employ an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression: 
 
iiiii ControlsConnPolwinCAR εβββα ++++= '_21     (6) 
where Pol_Conn is a dummy for politically connected firms, measured by the state ownership 
status of a firm or the CEO/director's personal connections in a non-SOE. The dependent 
variable is CAR(1,5) around the event date. We run the test for both measures of political 
connection. We also run separate tests for loan cases because those are the cases with the most 
direct impact on firms' financing decisions.   
The first column (all suit types) of Table 10 presents the results for the full sample. We 
include the trial outcomes and other firm level control variables in the regression, while 
controlling for province, suit type, industry, and year fixed effect as before. Consistent with our 
t-test result from the summary statistic table, the win variable has a positive coefficient of 
0.0053, which is significant at a 10% level. A 0.53% difference in stock returns translates to a 5.2 
million RMB (0.66 million USD) difference in the shareholder wealth if multiplied by the average 
total market value of all the firms in our sample. The ownership status, size, leverage, cash ratio 
and profitability do not have significant impacts on the CAR, which should be expected as the 
financial situation of a firm is observable before the trial outcome gets revealed. In the second 
column we run the regression with only loan cases. The coefficient of win is again positive and of 
comparable magnitude. A win on the loan cases generates a 5-day CAR that is 45 basis points 
higher. 
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Column 3 and 4 of Table 10 present the result within the non-SOE subsample. Again, the 
winning firms have a 5 day CAR that is on average 0.5% higher than the losing firms have. The 
result holds for the loan cases as well.  
In conclusion, the trial outcome has a real impact on firms’ shareholder value. The 
unconnected firms endure economic losses as a direct result of their lower chances of winning. 
We report a new channel through which the unconnected firms could suffer a financial loss. 
 
Table 10 Regression analysis on CAR(1.5) 
The dependent variable CAR is the market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns of 5 days after the verdict 
announcement. Win is the trial outcome, which equals 1 if the disclosing firm wins. SOE is a dummy variable, which 
equals 1 if the firm is state owned. CEO/DIR connection is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the non-SOE has a 
CEO/director who is connected to the government. The control variables include the firm size, leverage ratio, 
operating profit, and cash-to-asset ratio. We also control for the fixed effects of province, suit types, industry, and 
year.  
***, **, * are significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors.  
 
 
Full Sample  Non-SOE only  
 
All suit type Loan Cases All suit type Loan Cases 
 
CAR(1,5) CAR(1,5) CAR(1,5) CAR(1,5) 
Win 0.0053* 0.0045** 0.0049* 0.0046*** 
 
(0.0022) (0.002) (0.003) (0.0011) 
CEO/Dir Connection 
 
 0.0011 0.0018 
  
 (0.070) (0.0019) 
SOE -0.0011 -0.0017 
 
 
 
(0.002) (0.009) 
 
 
lnasset -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) 
leverage -0.0004 -0.002 -0.0003 -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
cash ratio 0.002 0.0064 -0.0005 0.0083 
 
(0.035) (0.0052) (0.002) (0.009) 
Operating Income 0.011 0.007 0.001 -0.005 
 
(0.022) (0.024) (0.027) (0.005) 
suit type Yes No Yes No 
Other controls X X X X 
Observation 3323 1954 1319 784 
R squared 0.005 0.008 0.004 0.003 
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1.5 Robustness Check 
To alleviate possible omitted-variable bias, we add other control variables such as sales 
growth, receivable/asset ratio, and whether the two parties involved in a suit were from the 
same province. Our findings remain unchanged: sales growth enters insignificantly; receivable 
ratio has a negative impact on the probability of winning for both SOEs and non-SOEs; and 
having the two parties come from the same province does not have significant impact. 
Additionally, we try different measures for the local legal environment. In particular, we 
use an index of financial intermediary development and legal institution (Marketization Index 
No. 7) instead of the Property Producer Rights Index. The results remain quantitatively 
unchanged, and we will not report the results here for conciseness.  
We also use leverage from bank loans as a proxy for firms’ political influence, following 
Calomiris, Fisman, and Wang (2010). Generally, higher leverage ratios imply that the SOEs are 
more subject to soft budget problems, which signals firms’ close relationships with banks. Only 
when SOEs have strong ties with banks or the government can they get loans with ease. 
However, as in Calomiris, Fisman, and Wang (2010), our regression with leverage yields mixed 
results. High leverage ratios, which signal firms’ political strength, are also an indicator for high 
bankruptcy risk. It is hard to separate these two effects. Using short leverage encounters the 
same problem. 
The last step taken is to use a logit model instead of a linear model to run the main 
regressions in the paper. The means of the coefficients of the interaction terms are of the right 
signs and significant, but of different magnitude. 
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1.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we document firm-level empirical evidence on judicial bias against 
politically unconnected firms in China. Using state ownership as a natural form of political 
connection, we find the SOEs have a winning probability that is 8.6% higher than the non-SOEs, 
based on a hand-collected sample of 3,323 corporate litigations during 1998-2010. Since 
winning firms are shown to receive higher cumulative abnormal returns around the verdict 
announcement, the judicial bias against non-SOEs has a real wealth impact on firms. The effect 
of political connection in predicting the litigation outcome is more pronounced when the case 
merit is more straightforward, which distinguishes our story of judicial bias from the alternative 
explanation that SOEs win more often in an unbiased court due to their superior information on 
the case merits. We further find that the biases against the unconnected firms in trial are 
alleviated in regions with improved local legal institutions, during times of provincial leader 
switches, and when the case is not tried in the home province of the SOE.  
Moreover, the non-SOEs can partially correct the judicial biases by establishing political 
ties through top managers. Using the personal ties of the top managers in the non-SOEs as a 
second proxy for political connections, we find that the connected non-SOEs fare better than 
the unconnected ones in court rulings. The difference between their win rates is similarly 
influenced by the local legal institution development, provincial leader switches, and whether 
the case is tried locally. However, the connected non-SOEs still will less often compared to the 
SOEs. The overall evidence is consistent with the judicial bias against unconnected firms in China, 
which has a negative effect on the firms’ shareholder wealth. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
STERILIZATION IN CHINA: EFFECTIVENESS 
AND COST 
 
2.1 Introduction 
    Due to growing exports and speculative capital inflows, China has experienced twin 
surpluses on both the capital and current accounts since 2001. The current account has been 
positive since the 1990s and grew substantially after 2005. In order to maintain the crawling peg 
exchange rate system it adopted in 2005, China has to keep purchasing the excess supply of 
foreign currencies to prevent its domestic currency the RMB from abrupt appreciations. As a 
result the country has been accumulating foreign reserves at a rapid pace. It surpassed Japan in 
2006 to become the largest foreign reserves holder in the world, holding more than $2.85 
trillion of reserves as in Dec., 2010 and more than $ 3 trillion in the first quarter of 2011. Figure 
3 plots monthly foreign reserves as shown on the balance sheet of China's central bank, People's 
bank of China (PBC). The stock of foreign reserves has been increasing for every month since 
2004 except for one month in 2008, one month in 2009 and May 2010. Some people attribute 
these drops to foreign capital outflows. 
   A large stock of foreign reserves has both pros and cons. On the plus side, abundant 
foreign reserves enable a country to maintain a stable exchange rate and to meet its foreign 
debt obligations. It can also be used to cushion the sudden shocks on a country's current and 
capital account. On the other hand, an increase in foreign exchange reserves leads to an 
accumulation of foreign assets, which is a component of the reserve money (i.e. the money 
base). Without intervention, this can translate into an expansion of the domestic monetary base. 
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Table 11 shows a typical balance sheet of the central bank of China. The asset side consists of 
foreign assets and claims on domestic government and other intuitions. Foreign assets are 
mainly composed of foreign exchange and gold. On the liability side, reserve money (the money 
base) consists of currency issued and deposits as reserves. From the balance sheet, one can 
calculate the net foreign assets (NFA) and net domestic assets (NDA) of the monetary authority. 
The bottom of the table shows how those two variables are defined. By definition, Reserve 
Money=NFA+NDA. An increase in NFA directly contributes to the increases in the reserve money, 
which then affects the broad money supply M2 through the identity M2=Reserve Money × 
money multiplier 
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Figure 3 Foreign Exchange reserves flows and stocks 
 
     Thus an increase in foreign reserves, ceteris paribus, causes monetary expansion and 
puts inflationary pressures on the economy, resulting in an appreciation of the real exchange 
rate. For those reasons, the accumulation of foreign reserves poses a challenge for domestic 
macroeconomic management. Many East Asian countries have experienced similar problems 
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induced by large private capital inflows that started in the late 1980s. This quickly drew 
attention from the literature on open economy macroeconomics. Montiel, Peter J (1998, 1) 
refers to it as the "capital inflow problem". 
Table 11 Balance Sheet 
 
    To offset the expansionary effect of the increasing foreign reserves, the central bank 
can sterilize the foreign assets by taking opposite actions with the domestic assets, or 
implement other contractionary monetary policies. As Takagi, Shinji and Esaka, Taro (1999) 
documents, sterilization is a common practice for monetary authorities of East Asian countries 
such as Indonesia, Korea and Malaysia, during the capital inflow episode of 1987 -- 1997. It is 
widely believed, as previous literature points out, that China has sterilized at least some of its 
rising foreign reserves. However, the exact effectiveness of sterilization is unclear. Since China 
Total Asset Total Liability
Foreign assets Reserve money
Claims on government Deposits of financial corporations
excluded from Reserve Money
Claims on depository corporations Bond outstanding
Claims on other financial and non Foreign liabilities
-financial corporations
Other assets Other liabilities
Deposits of government
Net Foreign Assets  Foreign assets - foreign liabilities
Net Domestic Assets  Claim on depository corporations
 Claims on other financial and non-financial corporationsClaim on government
 Other assets - Deposits of financial corporations excluded from Reserve Money
- Bond outstanding - Deposits of government - Other liabilities
 Reserve Money = Net Foreign Assets
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has applied different methods at different times, "it is not straightforward to assess exactly how 
much sterilization has taken place" (Prasad, Eswar and Goodfriend, Marvin. 2006, 24). 
    Despite China's effort to neutralize the expansionary effect of increasing foreign 
reserves, there are reasons why sterilization may not be as effective as the central bank wishes 
it to be. The famous "Trilemma" states that it is impossible for a country to achieve the following 
three goals simultaneously: monetary independence, exchange rate stability and financial 
integration. While choosing a combination of managed exchange rate and monetary 
independence, China has to impose effective capital controls. Nevertheless it has been 
documented that capital controls in China are somewhat porous. For example, Prasad, Eswar 
and Wei, Shangjin (2005, 440) documented large swings in the errors and omissions category 
under foreign reserves of China, which is "indicative of unrecorded capital flows into China". If 
this is the case, then a change in domestic assets will induce further capital inflows or outflows, 
which undermine domestic monetary policies such as sterilization. 
    The changes in domestic assets and foreign reserves thus have a contemporaneous 
relationship. Changes in one variable induce changes in another. A simple OLS would lead to a 
biased estimation due to endogeneity. Furthermore, since domestic monetary conditions are 
controlled by the central bank and are affected by many other factors besides foreign exchange 
reserves, it is necessary to estimate some monetary reaction functions of the central bank. 
    Prior work examining the effectiveness of monetary sterilization of China has 
employed different methods to circumvent the problems above. Wu, Ying (2006) performed a 
Johansen cointergration test on changes in NFA and NDA. He found that the coefficient of NDA 
in response to one unit change in NFA is -0.41. This is called the sterilization coefficient and a 
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coefficient of -1 implies complete sterilization, since a unit increase in NFA is then fully offset by 
a contemporaneous decrease in NDA. A coefficient of 0, on the other hand, indicates zero 
sterilization. Wu's result thus implies incomplete sterilization. This method, while 
straightforward to understand, ignores all the other monetary factors that may have affected 
NFA and NDA. He, Dong et al (2007) estimated a reduced VAR model with interest rate and 
domestic credit as controls, and gained a sterilization coefficient of -1. A VAR model uses lagged 
variable and has a clear advantage of circumventing the endogeneity problem. Nevertheless, 
VAR can only identify coefficients of lagged variables, making it impossible to detect the 
contemporaneous impact. 
    Among others, Ouyang, Alice Y., Rajan, Ramkishen S. and Willett, Thomas D. (2007a) 
applied two-stage least squares (2SLS) to estimate two simultaneous equations. The major 
challenge here is to find valid instruments that help to separately identify NDA and NFA. They 
used government expenditure as an instrument for NDA and the real effective exchange rate for 
NFA. The estimated sterilization coefficients ranged from -0.5 to -0.92 for the period of 1999 to 
2005, which implies a close to full sterilization. However their argument of government 
expenditure having no direct effect on capital inflows is not very convincing. It is easy to imagine 
a scenario where fiscal expansions have an effect on the interest rates, which triggers outflows 
of capital. Kim, Woochan (2003) also documents empirical evidence that a high budget deficit 
has a negative effect on capital account liberalization using OECD data. 
    Following Ouyang, Rajan and Willett (2007a), in this paper I apply 2SLS to estimate the 
degree of recent sterilization in China, but with different instruments and updated data. This 
paper confirms their result that China has been able to carry out an almost complete 
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sterilization up to the first half of 2010. The coefficients of capital mobility in this paper are 
comparable to those of Ouyang, Rajan and Willett (2007a). However unlike their paper, I find no 
obvious trend of increase in the degree sterilization, lending no support to the claim that 
sterilization has become harder over the years. 
    The question that naturally comes next, which is also a question that has been 
drawing a lot of attention recently (e.g. Prasad and Wei 2005, Green, Stephen 2006, Ouyang, 
Rajan and Willett 2007, Zhang, Ming 2009), is whether the cost of sterilization can be fully 
covered by the PBC's income from foreign reserve investment. If not, the sterilization cost is 
likely to soon become too high for the central bank to sustain. Consequently the central bank 
may lose its control of the domestic monetary base. The answer here is not an obvious one. 
Some people have argued that China has been earning a premium from its foreign reserves 
accumulation due to a low domestic rate (Prasad and Wei 2005), while others are worried that 
the increasing issuance of PBC bills, which is the central bank's main sterilization tool, will soon 
impose too big a burden on the PBC (Zhang 2009). 
    In the second part of the paper, I compare the PBC's cost of sterilization and its 
income from foreign reserves investment. As Prasad and Wei (2005) conjecture, the PBC's 
income from foreign reserves investment has exceeded its sterilization cost consistently from 
2003 to 2010. To my knowledge this is the first study to calculate and compare the actual 
sterilization cost of the PBC and its income from foreign reserves investment. I also make some 
simple linear projections of those costs and income. The projection shows that there is no sign 
of unsustainability in the near future. However, the continuous appreciation of the RMB may 
have a profound negative impact on the PBC's income from foreign reserves in domestic 
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currency terms. 
    The next section briefly documents crucial background information on China's foreign 
reserves management and the evolution of the country's foreign exchange reserves, clarifying 
the concept and process of sterilization. It also discusses China's major sterilization tools: open 
market operation and raising required reserves. Section 2.3 explains the 2SLS method applied in 
this paper, describes the data and the empirical results. Section 2.4 shows the calculation and 
projection of the PBC's cost of sterilization and its income from foreign reserves investment. The 
final section concludes the paper. 
 
2.2 Overview of foreign exchange reserves and sterilization tools in China 
 
2.2.1 China's foreign reserves management and evolution  
    Traditionally, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), which is a 
subsidiary of the PBC, is responsible for managing foreign reserves held by the central bank. The 
foreign reserves are recorded on the PBC's balance sheet and invested in low risk assets such as 
long term government bonds. In recent years however, the PBC has been making other uses of 
its foreign reserves. 
    Some foreign reserves were used to recapitalize the large state owned financial 
institutions. As a part of financial reforms, the Central Huijin Investment Company Limited was 
established in December 2003 as an investment subsidiary to improve the capital quality of the 
big state owned banks to prepare them for IPOs. The purpose of the Central Huijin is to improve 
corporate governance and initiate reforms of the banking sector, by creating an organizational 
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structure where the PBC and the China government can operate as shareholders of the state 
owned banks. It had a registered capital of 50 million RMB which came from the Ministry of 
Finance, but its investment fund came from the PBC. From 2003 to 2008, the PBC made a few 
capital injections through Huijin to different state owned commercial banks and insurance 
companies, some of which came out of the foreign exchange reserves. For example, it took a 
total of $45 billion from foreign reserves to invest in the Bank of China, the China Construction 
Bank and its subsidiary at the end of 2003. It made a capital injection of $15 billion to The 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China in 2005. 
Table 12 Huijin's investment 
 
Source: CEIC 
 
    Table 12 shows a list of capital injections of the Central Huijin Investment Company to 
Institutions Date Amount (billions) Miscellaneous
Bank of China Dec. 2003 22.5 $US
China Construction Bank Dec. 2003 20 $US
Jianyin Investment Company Dec. 2003 2.5 $US
Bank of communication June 2004 3 RMB
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China April 2005 15 $US
Galaxy Security Company June 2005 10 RMB
Shenyin & Wanguo Security Company Aug. 2005 2.5 RMB Plus 1.5 Billion RMB in loan
Guotai Junan Securities Co Aug. 2005 1 RMB Plus 1.5 Billion RMB in loan
China Galaxy Financial Holding Co. Aug. 2005 5.5 RMB
China reinsurance (group) Co. April 2007 2 $US
China Everbright Banks Nov. 2007 20 RMB
National Development Bank Dec. 2007 20 $US
Agricultural Bank of China Oct. 2008 19 $US
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state owned companies18. Some of the capital injection came from the foreign reserves directly 
(i.e. those amounts denominated in US dollars), some were said to come from repaid central 
bank loans (i.e. the 3 billion RMB injection to the Bank of Communication)19
    In September 2007, the China Investment Corporation (CIC) was established with the 
intent of utilizing the accumulating reserves for the benefit of the state. Special Treasury bonds 
of 1.5 trillion yuan ($207.91 billion) were issued by the Ministry of Finance to create the capital 
that the CIC needed. The Ministry of Finance then used the proceeds to purchase foreign 
exchanges from the PBC and put them under the management of the CIC. The CIC later acquired 
the Central Huijin Company from the PBC with $ 67 billions and made it a full subsidiary. As a 
result, many of CIC's investments and capital injections are still made under the name of Huijin. 
The net effect of the establishment of the CIC on the PBC's balance sheet is a total reduction of 
$140.9 billion in foreign reserves. 
. If I assume that all 
the capital injections are completed within a month and use the exchange rate at the month 
end to convert the RMB amount to dollars, Huijin has injected an overall of $108.4 billion into 
state owned banks and the Galaxy Security company. As described above, some of the injections 
are taken from the foreign reserves. If one wants to consider the foreign exchange held by China 
as a country, this amount should be added back. 
    The CIC makes occasional announcements about its investment, but the overall 
transparency of its investment strategy is low. Compared with the SAFE, the CIC makes more 
aggressive investments in equities. Table 13 shows an (incomplete) list of its investment projects. 
                                                          
18 In September 2007, Huijin had effectively become a subsidiary of the CIC, which will be covered later. 
However it keeps operating and serving its purpose of recapitalizing stated owned banks. 
19 See the introduction of Huijing in Chinese: http://www.mecin.cn/Invest/Invest20080919000619.htm 
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Besides the PBC and its subsidiaries, financial firms and individuals of China are also 
allowed to make investments in foreign markets and thus hold some foreign exchange. Since 
2001, domestic investors, including individual residents, have been allowed to invest their own 
foreign exchange in B-shares20
 
. Starting from 2002, qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) 
have been allowed to invest in the domestic capital market. Since 2004, insurance companies 
have been allowed to use their own foreign exchange to invest in the international capital 
market. When restrictions on qualified domestic institutional investors (QDII) were lifted in April 
2006, domestic fund management companies (asset management companies) began to 
establish and sell products (mutual funds) to invest in the international capital market, first in a 
trial run by Hua An Fund Management in September 2006, and then in earnest from September 
2007, after the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) established a new set of rules. In 
2007, firms were allowed to hold foreign exchange in a current account at their discretion. In 
the same year, annual foreign exchange purchases and sales quotas for individuals were raised 
to US$ 50,000 to meet their needs for holding and using foreign exchange 
Table 13 CIC's incomplete list of investment 
 
                                                          
20 China B shares are virtually the same as common shares (which are referred to as A shares), except that 
they were originally developed as stock shares for foreign investors. They are listed on Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges and are denominated in RMB, but are payable in foreign currency. Before 2001, 
only foreign investors were allowed to purchase B shares. 
 
Institutions Date Amount ($billions) Type of investment
The Blackstone Group May 2007 3.0 Pre-IPO, 9.4% equity
China Railway Group Nov. 2007 0.1 Pre-IPO, equity
Morgan Stanley Dec. 2007 5.0 mandatory convertible securities , 9.9% equity
Visa Mar. 2008 0.1 Pre-IPO, equity
JCFlowers April 2008 3.2 Private Equity Fund
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    As China is moving to a more liberal foreign exchange policy, the PBC and state banks 
are no longer the only institutions that can hold foreign exchange legally. However, since 
monetary sterilization is solely implemented and managed by the PBC, and I am interested in 
whether the PBC's foreign reserves investment return is enough to cover its sterilization cost, I 
only take into consideration the foreign reserves listed on the balance sheet of the PBC in this 
paper. All the other foreign exchange not currently held by the central bank are ignored in the 
estimation. 
    China has experienced a rapid increase in foreign reserves since 2003, due to the 
recorded twin surpluses in the current and capital accounts. Figure 4 shows the evolution of 
China's balance of payments. The current account surplus clearly contributes the most to the 
huge growth in foreign reserves. It was $12 billion in 1990. It grew rapidly and reached $249.9 
billion in 2006, then $426.1 billion in 2008 and dropped back to 297.1 billion in 2009 due to a 
slowdown in exports. A closer look reveals that the current account surplus has come mainly 
from the trade surplus, the share of which in the current account surplus was 84% in 200921
                                                          
21 CEIC database, 2009 
. At 
the same time, net exports grew from 2.5% of GDP in 2004 to 8% of GDP in 2008 and then 5% in 
2009. The contribution of net exports to GDP growth also increased dramatically from an 
average of 3% from 2001 through 2004 (0.36 percentage points of GDP growth), to an average 
of 21% from 2005 through 2007 (2.4 percentage points of GDP growth). It dropped to 8% in 
2008 due to a change in the economic conditions abroad. The capital account, mainly coming 
from FDI, was mostly positive during the period 1995 to 2009 as well, implying a net capital 
inflow. Since 2001, China has received annual FDI in excess of USD 40 billion. However the error 
and omission term was mostly negative before 2002, implying a net unrecorded capital outflow. 
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The sign was reversed after 2002 and before 2009, when the global financial crisis took place. 
 
   
Figure 4 Balance of Payment of China 
 
    The rapid accumulation of foreign reserves, combined with China's crawling peg 
exchange rate, calls for sterilization. Sterilization happens when the monetary authority tries to 
gain control of the reserve money in face of an exogenous increase in the NFA, by taking 
opposite actions with the net domestic assets. In other words, as the NFA increases, we may see 
the NDA decrease as a result of sterilization. Reserve money is kept unchanged in this way, 
preventing the broad money supply from soaring. However, an increase in the reserve money or 
the broad money supply per se does not necessarily mean that the PBC has lost control. The 
central bank may want the monetary base to increase anyway to keep up with economic growth, 
as in China's case. Figure 5 shows that both the reserve money and the broad money supply have 
been increasing in China as foreign reserves accumulate. Nevertheless the reserve money 
increases at a slower pace especially after 2005, indicating the operation of sterilization. The 
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following section gives an overview of China's major sterilization tools. 
 
Figure 5 reserve money and the broad money supply in China, 
 
2.2.2 Major sterilization tools  
    According to the monetary report published quarterly by the PBC, the main 
sterilization methods of China are open market operations (OMO) and raising required reserve 
ratios. Table 14 gives a summary of how the two methods work. OMO reduces the domestic 
assets by taking the excess liquidity out of the system, while raising required reserves reduces 
the money multiplier. From a central bank's point of view, however, increasing the level of 
required reserves as an attempt to sterilize affects the liability side of its balance sheet in a 
similar way that open market operations do. If the interest paid on required reserves is equal to 
the interest on central bank bills, the two methods have the same impact on the central bank. 
Generally the cost of sterilization using required reserves is lower than open market operations, 
since the central bank pays minimum interest on required and excess reserves. 
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Table 14 Sterilization process 
 
    Open market operations in China mainly include bond issuance and short term 
repurchase operations (repos, usually within 91 days). There are also non-market tools such as 
transferring the deposits from the commercial banking system to the central bank and "window 
guidance"(moral suasion). In recent years, the PBC also started making foreign exchange swaps 
with big commercial banks as a tool of controlling liquidity. In November 2005 it was reported 
that the PBC made its first one-year swap of a total amount of $6 billion with 10 domestic 
commercial banks22
                                                          
22From Xinhua News:  
. Unfortunately, the PBC usually doesn't make public announcements on 
swaps. Since 2005, the amount and timing of the PBC swaps remain secretive. Partial 
information can only be inferred from the annual reports of those commercial banks which are 
involved in the swaps with the PBC and are publicly listed. For example, China Construction Bank 
revealed a foreign exchange swap of $9 billion with the PBC in its 2006 annual report. Bank of 
China and the National Development Bank also revealed swaps of $41.5 billion and $22.9 billion 
http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2007-04/17/content_5987783.htm 
Method Steps
OMO 1. NFA increases by NFA.
bond issuance 2. RM  NFA  NDA increases by NFA.
or repo 3. NDA decreases by NDA, and RM is back to previous level.
4. M2  RM  mm in unchanged.
Raise required 1. NFA increases by NFA.
reserve ratio 2. RM increases.
3. mm decrease.
4. M2  RM  mm in unchanged as a net effect.
where RM is reserve money, and mm is the money multiplier.
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respectively with the PBC in 200623
    Before 2002, open market operations are mainly done by issuing government bonds. 
In September 2002 the PBC replaced the outstanding Treasury securities with central bank bills, 
when the stock of government bonds available shank to a low level. The first new PBC bill was 
issued in April 2003. Since then the PBC has been issuing bills on a weekly basis. There have 
been 265 total issuances by Aug. 2010 and the volume of PBC bond outstanding is RMB 4.6 
trillion up to April 2010
. 
24, exceeding the volume of currency issue. PBC bills usually have a term 
of less than 1 year. The most frequently issued bills are the 3 month bills and the 1 year bills. 
Occasionally the PBC has also issued 3-year bills for urgent sterilization need (in late 2004 and 
early 2005, also at the beginning of 2007 and 2010) and 6 month bills (mostly before 2006). The 
PBC bills are issued as zero coupon bonds and are auctioned off to banks and other financial 
institutions at some discounted values in each issuance. They are traded in the interbank bond 
market, and are usually held by financial institutions such as commercial banks and money funds. 
Ever since their issuance, the central bank bills have replaced the Treasury and become the main 
tool in sterilization25
Figure 6
. In May 2004, the PBC also announced the start of repo sales to depositary 
institutions (Green, Stephen 2005).  shows the net central bank bill issuance since 2000, 
and figure 7 shows the total PBC bonds outstanding as a percentage of foreign reserves from 
2000 to 2010. Both figures show an increasing trend in sterilization especially after 2006, using 
the amount of PBC bills as an indicator. 
                                                          
23 Banks are not required to reveal swap transactions in their annual reports. Even if they do, they may 
choose not to reveal the name of the counterparty. For example Bank of Communications revealed a swap 
of $5 billion in 2006 without giving the name of the other party. Thus it is very hard to get a good estimate 
of the PBC's swaps. 
24 http://fc.fund123.cn/Content.aspx?ArticleID=1671                                                                                                                                                      
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Figure 6 Issuance of PBC bill 
 
Figure 7 Bond outstanding as % of foreign reserves from Balance sheet of PBC 
                                                                                                                                                                             
25The government keeps issuing Treasury notes, of course. Those notes are no longer used as OMO tools. 
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    In general, altering reserve requirements as a tool of monetary control is always dealt 
with cautiously since it's considered to have too drastic an effect on the money supply through 
changing the money multiplier (Feinman, Joshua N. 1993). For example, the Federal Reserve has 
left reserve requirements essentially unchanged since the passage of the MCA in 198026
    China has been gradually raising the required reserve ratios since the third quarter of 
2003, corresponding to an increase in foreign reserves inflows. The required reserve ratio was 
raised from 6% and reached its peak value of 18.5% in December 2010
. One 
change happened in April 1992 to lower the requirement on transaction deposits from 12 
percent to 10 percent. It is not uncommon for emerging economies in Asia to raise required 
reserve ratios as a method of sterilization though. Countries like Malaysia, Korea and Philippines 
have all used the method during the capital inflow episode (Takagi and Esaka 1999). 
27
                                                          
26 The Monetary Control Act, which mandated universal reserve requirements to be set by the Federal 
Reserve for all depository institutions. For more description on MCA, see J Feinman, "Reserve 
Requirements: History, Current Practice, and Potential Reform". 
. However, in practice 
the effect of changing required reserve ratios may be limited in China's case, since depository 
institutions tend to maintain high excess reserve ratios (usually the same or even higher than 
the required ratio in the early years) due to a lack of alternative investment channels as the PBC 
has traditionally paid interest on both required and excess reserves. It was also believed that 
part of the excess reserves is used for interbank settlement and liquidity management purposes 
(Goodfriend and Prasad 2005). An increase in the required reserve ratio may simply lead to a 
decline in the excess reserve ratio, leaving the money multiplier unchanged. To discourage the 
holding of excess reserves, China has decreased the interest on excess reserves from 1.62% 
27 China has introduced differentiated reserve requirements into the banking system in 2004. The second-
tier banks, including the joint stock commercial banks which do not meet certain standard in terms of 
capital adequacy are subject to a higher reserve requirement than what is cited here. 
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(which was the same as the interest on required reserves) in 2003 to 0.72% in 2008. 
 
Figure 8 plots the sum of required and excess reserve ratios. As described before, there 
is a trend of increase in required reserve ratio since 2003. However the total reserve ratio was 
actually dropping slowly until the end of 2006, when the increase in required reserve ratio 
started to accelerate. Before 2006 a large part of the effect of increases in required reserve 
ratios was offset by drops in excess reserves. This may be the reason for the PBC to have 
increased its bond issuance throughout the years to conduct a more effective sterilization. To 
get an idea of the effectiveness of sterilization, figure 9 plots quarterly changes in NFA and NDA 
of China. Here foreign assets are calculated using the product of foreign reserves denominated 
in US dollars and exchange rates (RMB/US$). The changes in net foreign assets are adjusted for 
exchange rates to exclude the revaluation effect (see section 2.3 for the details on data and 
adjustment). Net domestic assets are defined as reserve money minus net foreign assets. The 
plot shows that China's net domestic assets have been declining since 2002, corresponding to a 
simultaneous increase in net foreign assets. Both figure 5 and figure 9 imply sterilization to 
some degree, but the implication is far from clear. 
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Source: PBC, author's calculation 
 
Figure 8 required reserve ratio 
 
 
Source: IFS, author's calculation 
Figure 9 Quarterly Change in Net Foreign Reserve and Net Domestic Reserve of Central Bank of China 
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2.3 Sterilization coefficient estimation: data, methodology and empirical results 
2.3.1 2SLS description  
    In this paper, I estimate the sterilization effect with 2SLS with innovative instrumental 
variables for NDA and NFA. Namely I propose to use the dummy variable for the 4th quarter as 
an instrument for NDA, and the past twelve month RMB/US$ exchange rate volatility as an 
instrument for NFA. As will be explained later, unlike government expenditure, the dummy 
variable for the 4th quarter is unambiguously exogenous to the changes in NFA. The twelve 
month exchange rate volatility is also highly correlated with NFA. 
    One concern with this regression is the lack of theoretical foundation for the choices 
of control variables. Among a rich literature on monetary reaction functions, Brissimis, 
Sophocles N. et al (BGT) (2002) explicitly derives two simultaneous equations used to estimate 
NFA and NDA from minimizing a simple loss function of the monetary authority, subject to some 
constraints. Ouyang, Alice et al. (2006) modified the BGT model and applied it to several Asian 
economies. Largely based on the BGT model and Ouyang et al (2007a)'s modified model, I 
specify a set of two simultaneous equations as follows: 
 
    NFA and NDA are adjusted28
                                                          
28 Meaning adjusted to exclude the revaluation effect. Method of adjustment will be described later. 
 net foreign assets and net domestic assets respectively. 
Those are the main variables of concern. The control variables include mm (the money 
multiplier), CPI (price levels), NX (net exports), G (government expenditure), r* (3-month US 
NFAt  0  1NDAt  2mmt  3CPIt1  4NXt1  5rt  Etet1
 6yct1  7ex_vol t12,t  8Gt  t
NDAt  0  1NFAt  2mmt  3CPIt1  4NXt1  5rt  Etet1
 6yct1  7IQ4,t  8Gt  t
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Treasury annual rate), e (nominal exchange rate RMB/US$), and finally yct-1 (cyclical GDP). The 
first difference of the data is employed here to avoid a unit root problem. 
    α1 is the offset coefficient. It measures how foreign capital inflow responds to a 
change in domestic monetary environment. My main interest lies in the sterilization coefficient 
β₁, which measures how domestic assets respond to a change in net foreign assets. A β1 of -1 
would indicate complete simultaneous sterilization. An α₁ of -1 implies perfect capital mobility. 
    In BGT, both α₁ and  β₁ are predicted to be negative. An increase in NDA implies an 
expansionary monetary policy, suppressing the domestic interest rate. This will result in a 
foreign capital outflow, which leads to a decrease in NFA. When capital controls are present, as 
in the case of China, capital mobility may be less than perfect, which translates into an α₁ 
greater than -1. The sterilization coefficient β₁ should be negative too, as long as the central 
bank is trying to mitigate the expansionary effect of an increase in NFA. 
    The set of equations can be estimated with two-stage least squares (2SLS). The two 
equations are separately identified by exvolt-12,t, which is the past twelve month 
RMB/US$ exchange rate volatility calculated by month-end exchange rate in the first equation 
and IQ4,which is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if it's the 4th quarter, and 0 otherwise in 
the second equation. The choice of IQ4,t is an innovation. It is due to the fact that Chinese 
commercial banks tend to hold significantly more reserves in each 4th quarter in preparation for 
large withdrawals before the Chinese New Year, according to the quarterly monetary report of 
the PBC. The New Year follows the lunar calendar and usually falls in February. It is a tradition 
for people to exchange gifts, buy new clothing and decorations, and repay their loans in the 
New Year. Children also receive cash from parents and relatives (the red packets). The NFA, 
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however, should not be significantly impacted by the arrival of the Chinese New Year. In fact, 
the correlation between ΔNDAt  and I Q4 is 0.53, while the correlation between ΔNFAt and I Q4 is  -
0.005. 
    The choice of exvolt-12,t follows Brissimis, Gibson and Tsakalotos(2002), which claims 
that exchange rate deviation only affects the change in NFA but not NDA. Though China has 
maintained a fixed exchange rate until July 2005, we are still able to observe small fluctuations 
of the RMB/US$ rate during the whole sample period. In any month t (since I use quarterly data, 
t can only be March, June, September or December here), exvolt-12,t is calculated as the standard 
deviation of monthly exchange rate from t-12 to t. The correlation between exvolt-12,t and ΔNFAt 
is 0.52, while it is -0.08 between exvolt-12,t and ΔNDAt. The other alternative instrument real 
effective exchange rate only has a correlation of less than 0.03 with ΔNFAt. 
    The rest of control variables in the equations are chosen according to existing 
empirical literature in the area29
    For some control variables in the above equations, it is obvious that their coefficients 
should take certain signs. Other coefficients require more detailed discussion. 
. Those are the variables that motivate foreign capital flows in 
or out of the country, and variables that are important to monetary policy decisions. In 
particular, the use of the lagged terms in price change, cyclical income and net export further 
alleviates the endogeneity problem. 
    The coefficients of the money multipliers in both equations, α₂ and β₂ are expected to 
be negative. A high mmt indicates an overall expansionary policy and a low total reserve ratio. 
                                                          
29 E.g. see Brissimis, Gibson and Tsakalotos(2002), He.D., C.Chu, C.Shu and A. Wong(2005), Ouyang, 
Rajan and Willett(2006). 
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Expansionary policy leads to a drop in interest rate which induces capital outflow. A low total 
reserve ratio leads to a low level of reserve money and thus a smaller NDA component on the 
central bank's balance sheet. 
    Both coefficients of price change should be negative, since a higher inflation leads to 
reduced capital inflows as well as a contractionary monetary policy. However there may exist a 
time lag between inflation and policy responses. In that case it is hard to predict which way the 
coefficients of price changes would go. The coefficients of net export is expected be positive for 
NFA, since an increase in NX contributes to NFA, ceteris paribus.  
   Δ(rt∗ + Etet+1)  is a measurement of foreign interest rate adjusted by exchange rate. 
α₅ is negative since both an increase in foreign interest and an expected depreciation of 
domestic currency signal better investment opportunities abroad. β5 is also expected to be 
negative since the uncovered interest parity implies that the central bank would want to raise 
the domestic interest rates as a response to a positive Δ(rt∗ + Etet+1). 
    The coefficient of cyclical income, α6, may be negative since an increase in real GDP 
worsens the balance of payments. However a high GDP may induce more capital inflows as it is 
a sign of overall economy strength. Similarly, the government usually decides to take a counter-
cyclical monetary policy which leads to a negative β6. On the other hand it is also possible that 
the government wants to stimulate the economy even more after economic growth, making β₆ 
positive. Similar arguments can be applied to α8 and β8, where government expenditure may 
have an ambiguous effect on NDA and NFA. 
    Finally, α7 is expected to be negative since a more volatile exchange rate impedes 
capital inflows. However it is also possible that a more flexible exchange rate regime induces 
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more speculative capital inflows. β7 is expected to be positive since NDA increases with the 
arrival of Chinese New Year. 
 
2.3.2 Data and Empirical results 
 2.3.2.1 Data summary 
    Most literature points out (both qualitatively and quantitatively) that sterilization did 
not become an issue in China until around 2000. This paper employs quarterly data from Q1 
1995 to Q2 2010. Ideally data of high frequency should be used, however, monthly GDP of China 
are not available. I recognize the sample size is small, thus the estimated coefficients should be 
viewed with caution. All the data are from the CEIC database, IFS and the PBC's website, taken 
at the end of each period. 
    ΔNFAt, ΔNDAt, ΔNXt and ΔGt are scaled with the GDP of the corresponding period. The 
change in money multipilers and interest rates are expressed in logs. The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 
method is applied to find the trend of the real GDP. Cyclical income is then calculated using the 
formula ln(Real GDP)-HP trend
HP trend
. Following Ouyang, Rajan and Willett (2007a), the expected 
nominal exchange rate Etet+1  is approximated in two ways: perfect foresight and static 
expectation. In perfect foresight, Etet+1 equals lnet. With static expectation, Etet+1equals lnet+1. 
    A standard ADF test is applied to test the stationarity of all the variables. The null 
hypothesis is that the variable has a unit root. Table 15 shows the summary statistics of the ADF 
test. All the variables are stationary at 5% significant levels. 
    The net foreign assets are calculated as the difference between foreign reserves 
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minus gold and foreign liability. Foreign reserves data is from IFS and is dollar denominated. 
Foreign liability is taken from the PBC's balance sheet and is recorded mark-to-market in 
domestic currency (RMB). Thus net foreign assets are calculated as follows: 
t(    e )   t t tNFA foreign reserves foreign liability= × −  
where et is the exchange rate of RMB against $US. 
It is obvious that the value of NFA may change due to fluctuations in exchange rate. This 
type of change is not caused by an inflow of foreign assets and is irrelevant to the study. To 
exclude the revaluation effect, I follow Aizenman, Joshua and Glick, Reuven. (2009) and 
calculate the adjusted NFA at time t-1 as 1
1
( )tt
t
eNFA
e− −
 
Table 15 ADF test result 
 
Therefore the change in net foreign assets excluding the revaluation effect is 
                ∆NFAt = NFAt − NFAt−1( etet−1) 
Variable Test Stat (t) Type of Test
NFAt t 5.496 ** (0.000) with trend
NDAt -8.367 ** (0.000) without trend
mmt -9.206** (0.000)
CPIt1 -6.285** (0.000)
NXt1 -11.756** (0.000)
rt
Etet1  -3.217** (0.002) for perfect foresight
-3.391**(0.001) for static expectation
yct1 -10.143** (0.000)
Gt -15.151** (0.000)
ex_vol t12,t -1.748** (0.04)
Note: (**)denotes significanceat 5% level.
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    Here I make a simplistic assumption that all the foreign reserves are in US dollars. 
Ideally, if the exact currency composition of China's foreign reserves is known, the revaluation 
effects should be adjusted for each currency. However no data is available on the exact 
composition of China's foreign reserves. In section 2.4 of the paper some approximations of the 
composition of China's foreign reserves are proposed, however as will be shown later in this 
section, a robustness check with a different currency composition does not change the major 
findings. Previous literature30
 
  also suggests that estimation results on sterilization are usually 
robust to different currency compositions of reserves. 
Table 16 Summary statistics of the variables. 
NFA and NDA are adjusted31
 
 net foreign assets and net domestic assets respectively. Other variables include mm (the 
money multiplier), CPI (price levels), NX (net exports), G (government expenditure), r* (3-month US Treasury annual 
rate), e (nominal exchange rate RMB/US$), and finally yct-1 (cyclical GDP). ex_vol is the past twelve month 
RMB/US$ exchange rate volatility 
 
                                                          
30 Ouyang et al. (2006), Prasad and Wei (2005) 
31 Meaning adjusted to exclude the revaluation effect. Method of adjustment will be described later. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
NFAt 62 0.0619 0.048 -0.001 0.201
NDAt 62 -0.026 0.081 -0.205 0.158
mmt 62 0.0076 0.060 -0.123 0.149
CPIt1 62 0.031 0.052 -0.021 0.238
NXt1 62 0.006 0.010 -0.021 0.025
rt
Etet1  62
Perfect insight -0.005 0.010 -0.05 0.001
Static expectation -0.004 0.010 -0.05 0.001
yct1 62 0.000 0.019 -0.033 0.048
Gt 62 -0.005 0.095 -0.204 0.129
ex_vol t12,t 62 0.038 0.061 0.000 0.257
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   Finally the change in NDA is calculated as the residual under the identity:  ∆NDAt =
∆RMt− ∆NFAt 
where RM stands for reserve money and is taken from the balance sheet of the PBC. 
Table 16 gives the summary statistics of all the variables. 
 
2.3.2.2 Empirical results 
    I use 2SLS to estimate the set of simultaneous equations. To avoid potential problems 
of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in residuals, Newey-West covariance is computed up 
to 3 lags. Small sample correction is performed for all the estimations. Table 17 presents 
summary statistics of the regression result. The numbers in the parentheses are standard errors. 
  The sterilization coefficient is between -0.934 and -0.793, indicating a high level of, but 
less than full sterilization by the PBC during my estimation period. This number is smaller than 
the estimated coefficients in Aizenman and Glick (2008). The reason for the divergence may lie 
in the fact that they used a simple OLS instead of 2SLS. The offset coefficient is between -0.650 
and -0.649, implying some degree of capital mobility despite strict capital controls in China. This 
is related to the speculative "hot money" that flows into China under an expectation that the 
RMB will appreciate. As Goodfriend and Prasad (2006,5)pointed out, "the effectiveness of 
capital controls (in China) inevitably erodes over time" since domestic and international 
investors find channels such as exaggerating export invoices to evade them. This offset 
coefficient here is comparable to and slightly smaller than the estimation obtained in Ouyang, 
Rajan and Willett (2007a). 
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Table 17 Regression results. 
NFA and NDA are adjusted32
 
 net foreign assets and net domestic assets respectively. Other variables include mm (the 
money multiplier), CPI (price levels), NX (net exports), G (government expenditure), r* (3-month US Treasury annual 
rate), e (nominal exchange rate RMB/US$), and finally yct-1 (cyclical GDP). ex_vol is the past twelve month 
RMB/US$ exchange rate volatility 
 
      The coefficients of Δmmt are significant and of the right sign. The coefficients of 
ΔCPIt−1 are at least marginally significant, and has a significant positive impact on ΔNDA t  and 
ΔNFAt. This can be due to the fact that both the monetary authorities and foreign investors need 
some time to react to a change in domestic price conditions, while the price change affects 
domestic assets more directly. Moreover, while NFA and NDA are relatively volatile, CPI are 
stable (with quarterly changes usually less than 2%) for most periods covered by the study, with 
the exception of the last three quarters of 2003, the last quarter of 2007 and first two quarters 
                                                          
32 Meaning adjusted to exclude the revaluation effect. Method of adjustment will be described later. 
Perfect Foresight Static Expectation
Explanatory Var NFAt NDAt NFAt NDAt
Constant 0.024 (0.023) 0.027* (0.015) 0.023 (0.024) 0.034*** (0.012)
NFAt __ -0.793** (0.340) __ -0.934*** (0.232)
NDAt -0.650** (0.312) __ -0.649** (0.313) __
mmt -0.689** (0.303) -1.01*** (0.179) -0.683** (0.303) -1.00*** (0.181)
CPIt1 0.175* (0.103) 0.219*** (0.054) 0.187* (0.107) 0.208*** (0.051)
NXt1 0.292 (0.313) 0.514 (0.557) 0.283 (0.316) 0.553 (0.567)
rt
Etet1  -0.137 (0.298) 0.198 (0.464) -0.276 (0.359) -0.402 (0.402)
yct1 -0.075 (0.432) 0.553 (1.64) -0.063 (0.435) 0.589 (1.57)
Gt -0.030 (0.103) 0.122 (0.345) -0.027 (0.104) 0.127 (0.331)
IQ4,t __ -0.012 (0.039) __ -0.012 (0.036)
ex_vol t12,t 0.064 (0.105) __ 0.039 (0.119) __
Excluded Instruments IQ4,t ex_vol t12,t IQ4,t ex_vol t12,t
R-square 0.93 0.86 0.93 0.88
Centered R-square 0.81 0.84 0.81 0.86
(*), (**), (***) denotes significance at 10%,5% and 1% level
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of 2008. This may cause statistical difficulties to detect the true relationship between the 
variables. ΔNXt−1 is of the right sign and Δ(rt∗ + Etet+1)has the wrong sign in one specification, 
but both are insignificant. 
    Surprisingly, IQ4,t is of the wrong sign and both IQ4,t  and ex_volt−12,t are insignificant. 
The first stage F-stat for ex_volt−12,t are 8.05 and 11.38 for the two cases. The first stage F-stat 
for IQ4,t is comparable. Those values are smaller than the conventional critical value of 10.3 for 
weak instrument test33
    As a robustness check, lagged control and dependent variables are added to the right 
hand side of the equation, as independent variables. The coefficients of CPIt-2 are of the right 
negative sign but insignificant, this lends some support to the previous explanations on positive 
coefficients of price changes. The offset coefficients are largely unchanged, while the 
sterilization coefficients remain negative but become significant only at a 10% level. The reason 
behind this is probably that NDA responds to contemporaneous changes as well as lagged 
changes in NFA. Sterilization may be completed over a couple of quarters. With a small sample 
size, it is harder to obtain significant coefficients for every lagged NFA. In fact as the next section 
shows, a simple VAR implies that the sterilization is mostly completed within the next two 
periods. The result is also robust to a different composition of the foreign reserves, namely 70% 
. This suggests that the use of  IQ4,t  and ex_volt−12,t  might be exposed 
to a weak instrument problem, which can lead to biased results in 2SLS. However Angrist, 
Joshua D. and Pischke, Jorn-Steffen (2008) point out that a Monte-Carlo simulation shows that 
just identified IV is approximately unbiased unless the instrument is extremely weak. This 
provides me with some confidence in interpreting the results. 
                                                          
33 See, for example, Stock, James H and Yogo, Moto (2005) 
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US dollars and 30% Euros34
Inspired by Aizenmand and Glick (2008), I estimate the sterilization coefficients with 
2SLS using 40-quarter rolling samples. The sample period begins with 1995 Q1 to 2004 Q4, 
moves to 1995 Q2 to 2005 Q1 and ends with 2000 Q3 to 2010 Q2. There are 23 rolling periods in 
total. 
.    
Figure 10 and Figure 11 shows a plot of the rolling coefficients with 95% confidence 
intervals. The x-axis corresponds to the end of the 40th quarter of each rolling sample. The 
coefficients are steady but with a slight downward trend, suggesting an increase in the degree of 
sterilization. However no definite conclusion can be reached given the large standard errors. 
This is not a direct contradiction to the findings in Aizenman and Glick (2008) or Ouyang, Rajan 
and Willett (2007a) though, since the two studies cover different sample periods. 
 
Figure 10 Sterilization Coefficients from rolling regression 
Perfect foresight  
                                                          
34 Results are not reported here to ensure conciseness of the paper. 
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Figure 11 Sterilization Coefficients from rolling regression 
Static Expectations  
    To further check the robustness of the result, I replace NDA by M2 and estimate the 
following equation: 
 
Here ΔNFAt-1 is used instead of ΔNFAt to break the mechanical relationship between NFA and 
contemporaneous money supply. The regression gives a λ₁ of .630 with a standard error of 0.616 
for static expectation, and 0.669 with a standard error of 0.602 for perfect foresight. In both 
cases the λ₁ coefficient is not significantly different from 0. This implies that NFA from previous 
period has no significant impact on current M2. 
 
2.3.2.3 Robustness check: VAR to detect the effect of NFA on the price levels 
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If China has been successfully sterilizing the inflows of foreign capital, it should be able 
to insulate its domestic monetary conditions from the increase in NFA to a large degree. Figure 
12 plots the percentage change in China's quarterly CPI and NFA from 1994 to 2010. Despite a 
continuous increase in NFA, CPI seems to be quite stable after 1997 except for the spikes in late 
2003 and early 2008. To take a closer look at the problem, I study the direct impact of the 
changes in net foreign assets on domestic price levels by applying the following reduced form 
VAR: 
ΔNFAt =  Φ1 + �Φ11,iΔNFAt−ik
i=1
+ �Φ12,iΔNDAt−ik
i=1
+ �Φ13,iΔCPIt−ik
i=1
+ ε1t 
ΔNDAt =  Φ2 + �Φ21,iΔNFAt−ik
i=1
+ �Φ22,iΔNDAt−ik
i=1
+�Φ23,iΔCPIt−ik
i=1
+ ε2t 
ΔCPIt =  Φ3 + �Φ31,iΔNFAt−ik
i=1
+ �Φ32,iΔNDAt−ik
i=1
+�Φ33,iΔCPIt−ik
i=1
+ ε3t 
where NFA, NDA and CPI are defined as before. The VAR measures the transmission of an 
impulse from net foreign assets to net domestic assets, as well as to the price levels. If the result 
from the section above is true, the change in NFA should have limited effects on CPI. 
    This is a very simple VAR with only 3 variables. It is appropriate in this setting because 
I want to focus on the effect of net foreign assets on the price levels. Moreover, it is well known 
that the Cholesky decomposition used to orthogonalize the variance-covariance matrix of the 
VAR residuals imposes a recursive causal structure from the top variables to the bottom 
variables. Including too many control variables makes it harder to decide on a sensible order of 
all those variables. Here it is assumed that NFA affects the other two variables 
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contemporaneously but not vice versa. This ordering is based on the previous 2SLS result, which 
shows that an increase in NFA triggers the change in NDA in the opposite direction. On the other 
hand, the inflow of foreign capital is not so much induced by a change in domestic assets. Both 
the foreign assets and domestic assets are assumed to affect price levels contemporaneously. 
 
Figure 12 Change in NFA VS. CPI 
 
Based on the Akaike Information Criterion, 4 is selected as the optimum lag number. 
Figure 13 shows the orthogonalized impulse response function. From the graph, NDA responds 
significantly to a change in NFA. Namely NDA drops when NFA increases and most of the 
changes are completed within the first two following quarters. Shocks to net foreign assets have 
little influence on price levels. The responses of NDA and CPI can be interpreted as the impact of 
changes in net foreign assets has been effectively neutralized, which restates the previous result 
that the PBC's sterilization operations have been successful. 
A Granger causality test indicates that ΔNFAt Granger causes ΔNDAt, not the other way 
around. ΔNFAt does not Granger cause ΔCPIt. This suggests that the sterilization is effective in 
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the sense that change in NFA does not have a positive effect on the price levels. The magnitude 
of ΔCPIt response to changes in lagged ΔNFAtis also at the minimum as Figure 13 shows. Over all, 
the VAR results support my conclusion from the previous section that the PBC is carrying out a 
high degree of sterilization. 
 
           Figure 13 VAR: Impulse Response Function 
 
 
2.4 The Sterilization cost born by the PBC 
    The aforementioned section concludes that China has been capable of carrying out an 
almost complete sterilization. In spite of a rapid increase in foreign reserves, China is able to 
maintain a relatively independent monetary policy. 
    However, the sterilization comes at a cost. As the foreign reserves keep accumulating, 
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the PBC has to issue more debt for sterilization purpose, which may drive up the interest rates 
on the PBC bills. Eventually the cost may become too high for the central bank. The appreciation 
of the RMB against the US dollar can also contribute to a net capital loss in domestic currency 
terms, since the PBC bills are denominated in RMB and the foreign reserves are denominated in 
US dollars and other foreign currencies. On the other hand, the foreign reserves have been 
increasing consistently. The growing investment return from the foreign reserves helps to offset 
the cost and sustain the sterilization operation. 
    In the following section I estimate the PBC's cost of sterilization and compare it with 
its income from the foreign reserves investment from the period 2003 to 2010, taking exchange 
rate fluctuation into consideration. A back-of-the-envelope calculation indicates that at the 
current interest and exchange rate, China's foreign exchange reserves have to drop around 36% 
( or to put it in another way, the RMB has to appreciate by more than 50% against the US dollar) 
before it fails to cover the sterilization cost of the PBC. A projection of the sterilization cost and 
the income from foreign reserves investment also indicates no sign of unsustainability in the 
near future. 
2.4.1 Comparison of the sterilization cost and the PBC's investment income  
    The cost of sterilization is generated from two categories on the liability side on the 
PBC's balance sheet: the interest payments on the outstanding PBC bonds and on the total 
(required and excess) reserves. Since repos usually have terms of less than 91 days and are of a 
much smaller scale compared to PBC bonds, the interest payments on them are small and thus 
are ignored here. 
    The volume, term and final price of each bond issuance are published by the PBC 
94 
 
every week. From this data, the interest expenses associated with each issuance can be 
calculated. The expense is then distributed evenly into each month until the bond reaches 
maturity (the same concept as amortization in accounting). The total cost of PBC bills in a certain 
month can be calculated by summing up the interest expenses associated with all of the 
currently outstanding bonds. Figure 14 plots the weighted monthly interest rate of the PBC bills 
with different terms. Contrary to popular belief, though the interest rate peaked in 2008 there is 
no obvious trend of a continuous increase in the interest rates over the years. 
 
Figure 14 PBC bill: weighted monthly average  
 
    Unlike many other countries, China pays interest on both required reserves and 
excess reserves. The current annual interest rate is 1.62% for required reserves and 0.72% for 
excess reserves. Historically the interest rates have been higher. Table 18 shows the historical 
adjustments of reserve interest rates. 
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Table 18 Interest rate of required and excess reserves 
 
    Month-end data of total reserve amount can be found on the PBC's balance sheet, 
starting from 2000. Since the bond interest payment is calculated as an average amount over 
the month, I also replaced the month-end reserve data by the month-average reserve amount 
(calculated by taking the average of previous and this month-end data). However the PBC's 
balance sheet does not distinguish between required reserves and excess reserves, which makes 
the precise calculation of interest payment on reserves impossible. To deal with the problem, I 
calculate the upper (and lower) bound of the monthly interest payments, corresponding to the 
extreme cases where all reserves are required reserves (or excess reserves). The actual interest 
payments on reserves must lie somewhere in between. The total cost of sterilization is 
calculated by adding up the interest payments on both the PBC bonds and the total reserves. 
    There is one caveat in the method mentioned above. Not all the interest paid on 
reserves by the PBC can be categorized as sterilization cost, since the commercial banks are 
time of required excess
adjustment reserve reserve
1996.05.01 8.82 8.82
1996.08.23 8.28 7.92
1997.10.23 7.56 7.02
1998.03.21 5.22
1998.07.01 3.51
1998.12.07 3.24
1999.06.10 2.07
2002.02.21 1.89
2003.12.21 1.62
2005.03.17 0.99
2008.11.27 1.62 0.72
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always required to hold some reserves. Strictly speaking, the lower bound calculated here 
should be higher than the "true" lower bound if we assume the repo costs are negligible. This 
wouldn't hurt my result though, since this overestimated lower bound is exceeded by the 
income from foreign reserves investment as a result. 
    The estimation of the PBC's income from foreign reserves investment is less 
straightforward. China has been very cautious in revealing information on the compositions of 
its international reserves and no public information is available. It is widely believed, however, 
that China's foreign reserves mainly consist of US dollars, Japanese Yen and Euros. To get a 
rough approximation of the composition of China's foreign reserves, I use quarterly 
international reserves composition of emerging markets from IMF Currency Composition of 
Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER) database, only taking into account assets 
denominated in US dollars, Euros and Japanese Yen. This approximation is consistent with the 
conventional belief that around 70% of China's foreign reserves are in US dollars (Morrison, 
Wayne M. and Labonte, Marc. 2008). The composition is expressed in percentage terms and has 
already taken into consideration of the exchange rate between Yen/Euro and dollar. Thus even 
though foreign reserves in China are expressed in dollars, there is no need to worry about the 
exchange rate change between Yen/Euro and dollar when calculating the average yields. 
    Yields on these assets are approximated by five-year government bonds issued by the 
corresponding national governments (for Euro assets, it's an average of the bonds of several 
national governments in the Euro area). Those data are published by the respective central 
banks and are the average values over the month. Long-term bonds are used in the 
approximation because according to the data published by the Federal Reserve, only 6.7% of 
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China's holding of US Treasury securities (official and unofficial combined) are short term 
Treasury bills during the period from 2003 to 2009. The rest are all some forms of long term 
securities. The Fed's data does not distinguish between private or institutional investors and the 
monetary authorities. However, foreign reserves account for a majority of China's US Treasury 
holdings. It is safe to conclude that the PBC holds mostly long term bonds as its investment. The 
Treasury securities alone, long term and short term combined, account for 36% of China's 
foreign reserves35
    The approximation results in an average annual return of 3.39% for the period from 
April 2003 to June 2010, which is used to further calculate PBC's total income from foreign 
reserves. Liu, Liya (2008) estimated the annual yield on China's foreign reserves to be between 
3.6% and 4.3%, for the period from 2000 and 2007. My estimation is lower than that in Liu 
(2008), most likely due to a drop in the US treasury rate after 2007. Using yields on two-year and 
ten-year government bonds as a benchmark would result in an average annual yield of 2.74% 
and 4.03% respectively. 
. The monthly yield on foreign reserves is then calculated as the average of 
yields on assets denominated in those three currencies, weighted by the percentage 
composition implied by COFER. In addition, the gain/loss caused by monthly exchange rate 
changes is taken into account when converting dollar income to RMB. 
    The total income from the foreign reserves investment is calculated as 
Incomet=(Average Foreign Reservet×Average[et]-Incomet-1)×yieldt, where the subscript t stands 
for the values at time t. Since the foreign reserves and exchange rates data from IFS are at the 
                                                          
35 According to the statistics on foreign net purchase of US securities published by Fed, China's total 
purchase includes U.S government bonds, some cooperate bonds and very little U.S. cooperate stocks. 
However the term structure of the bonds or the exact break down of China's holding of US assets are not 
available. Here I use the long term government bond as a proxy. 
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end of month, average monthly values are calculated using data from this and the previous 
month. Income from the previous month is deducted from this month's average foreign 
reserves stocks to get the principle amount for this month. I here make the simple assumption 
that the income earned from foreign reserves each month is not re-invested and can indeed be 
used to cover the sterilization cost. In this way, there is no double counting the interest earned. 
   Figure 15 plots the PBC's estimated monthly income from foreign reserves investment 
using ten-year and five-year bonds respectively and its cost of sterilization, starting from April 
2003, when the first new PBC bill was issued. From the graph one can see that the positive gap 
between income and cost has been growing since 2005, but has recently taken a downturn at 
the end of 2008 and widened again afterwards, mainly due to a drop in long term foreign 
interest rates. Due to a combination of rapid increases in foreign reserves and high yields on 
reserves investment, the PBC's income from foreign reserves investment calculated from both 
types of bonds have been exceeding the upper bound of sterilization cost consistently, with the 
only exception in December 2008, where the income from five-year yields falls below the upper 
bound on cost but still stays above the lower bound. At the current exchange rate and keeping 
the PBC's cost constant, China's foreign reserves will have to drop 36% before the income from 
five-year bonds hits the lower bound. Another way to look at it is that the RMB would have to 
appreciate by more than 50% against the US dollar before the income from five-year bonds fails 
to cover the lower bound, assuming the exchange rates stay constant. 
    If foreign interest rates keep dropping, China will suffer a more drastic decrease in its 
income from foreign reserves, especially if its investment is of a shorter term than that 
estimated. Figure 16 plots the same graph as before but with five-year and two-year bond yields 
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as proxies instead. Since the short/medium term foreign interest rate has dropped sharply, 
investment yields from two-year government bonds cannot cover PBC's interest expenses after 
late 2008. Moreover, China holds some of the US ABS (Asset-Backed Securities). Though the 
exact amount is unknown, the ABS may be another source for the losses in foreign reserves. 
Figure 15 PBC's income VS. Sterilization Cost, long term bonds 
 
 
Figure 16 PBC's income VS. Sterilization Cost, medium term bonds 
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    Using different foreign exchange compositions leaves the conclusion largely 
unchanged. Especially, in one experiment all the Euros are replaced with Japanese Yen, leaving 
the proportion of US dollars unchanged. Since Japanese government bonds have much lower 
yields than their US and European counterparts, this experiment leads to a lower value of the 
investment income from foreign reserves. In this case, the income from the 10-year bond still 
exceeds both the upper and lower bounds on sterilization cost in every month except for 
December 2008. The yields from 5-year bonds exceeds the cost lower bound except for 
December 2008. 
 
2.4.2 Linear Projections 
    As a thought experiment, I also performed simple linear projections of the sterilization 
cost and the income from foreign reserves investment. Figure 17 shows the projected values 
from July 2010 through June 2015 using COFER compositions. The projected values and 
standard errors of the upper/lower bound on sterilization costs are calculated using OLS based 
on the data from July 2005 to June 2010. Foreign reserves denominated in dollars are projected 
under a linear regression based on the values from the same period and the investment yield is 
assumed to stay constant at the June 2010 level. Future exchange rates of RMB against US$ are 
also projected linearly, based on the values between July 2005 and June 2010. The projected 
income from foreign reserves investment is calculated as Incomeproj,t+j=(Average Foreign 
Reserveproj,j×Average[eproj,j]-Incomeproj,j-1)×yieldJune2010, where the subscript stands the projected 
value at time j after June 2010. Standard errors of the income from foreign reserves investment 
are calculated using delta methods assuming the covariance matrix of foreign reserves and 
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exchange rates is diagonal. As before, I convert the month-end data of foreign reserves and 
exchange rates to month-average. Those data are then used in the projection. 
    We can see that even with RMB appreciating, according to Figure 17 the ten-year 
bond income still stays well above the upper cost bound. The upper cost bound only start to 
catch up with the 5 year bond income in the end of 2012. I also did a similar experiment with 
the exchange rate fixed at the June 2010 level. Without the appreciation, even the five-year 
bond income stays above the upper cost bound. Using two-year bond income produces a 
drastically different picture in the projection, of course. As the previous section indicates, the 
foreign exchange investment income estimated from two-year government bond always stays 
below the lower cost bound (graph is not shown here). However it is quite unlikely that China 
will switch massively to a shorter term investment in the near future, since the SAFE has never 
expressed any concern on the liquidity of its current foreign exchange investment. 
 
Figure 17 Linear projection (projected exchange rate) 
 
    Admittedly this projection is very parsimonious. Nevertheless it sends an important 
message that among all the things, the appreciation of the RMB and the terms of the invested 
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Treasuries have profound impacts on the PBC's income from foreign reserves. This does not 
mean that the PBC's sterilization is not sustainable, though. Firstly, there is no reason why China 
would want to switch to a short investment horizon in terms of foreign reserves. Secondly, as 
the RMB appreciates, the speculative capital inflow into the country will be reduced. In that case, 
the PBC will no longer need to engage in such massive sterilizations. I thus conclude that as long 
as China is able to keep a stable interest rate paid on the PBC bills and experiences no sudden 
drop in foreign reserves, there is no obvious reason why the PBC will lose its capacity of 
extensive sterilizations in the near future. 
    Having said that, I recognize that sterilization might have other unobserved costs 
besides interest payments. For example, it was argued that domestic interest rates on the PBC 
bills were artificially kept low by the central bank, in order to sustain low interest payments on 
bonds. This so-called financial repression environment hinders the financial market from 
working efficiently. Furthermore, raising the required reserve ratio posts a cost on domestic 
commercial banks by lowering their profit margin. The cost of those is, however, hard to 
quantify. Moreover, there is little definite evidence showing that the PBC bond is indeed 
overpriced. It is obvious that the PBC bills should have a lower rate than other corporate bonds 
since the bills are implicitly backed by the Chinese government and thus are considered to be 
default free. The only comparable security here is probably the Treasury bond of similar terms 
issued by the Ministry of Finance, which is also auctioned off and is traded in the interbank 
markets and at the exchanges. The average annual yields of China's one year government bond 
traded at the exchanges are 2.84% and 3.13% in 2007 and 2008 respectively36
                                                          
36 Data from Bloomberg, index GCNY1YR 
, which are 
actually lower than the PBC bill rates in the same period. Since the Treasury bonds are traded at 
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the exchanges and thus are accessible by the general public, their yields should better reflect 
the market expectations. The fact that the PBC bills have a higher rate sheds some doubts on 
the claim that the PBC bills rates are intentionally suppressed. Of course one can always argue 
that the PBC suppresses the domestic rates on RMB denominated assets in general. The 
validation of this claim is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
    This paper studies the degree of sterilization and capital mobility in China in the 
recent episode of a crawling peg exchange rate and rapid foreign reserve accumulation. The 
results suggest a sterilization coefficient between -0.8 and -0.9, and an offset coefficient of 
around -0.6. This implies that the PBC has been carrying out a almost full sterilization, and the 
capital controls in China are somewhat porous but still effective. In spite of a continuous inflow 
of foreign exchange, China seems to be able to maintain a steadily increasing monetary base 
and a stable price level. A reduced form VAR confirms the result that the impact of changes in 
net foreign assets has been effectively neutralized. The sterilization coefficients in this paper lie 
within the wide range offered by Aizenman and Glick (2008). They are smaller than those 
obtained by He et al. (2005) and greater than those of Wu (2006) and Ouyang, Rajan and Willett 
(2007a). The offset coefficients in the paper are comparable to those of Ouyang, Rajan and 
Willett (2007a). Unlike in Aizenman and Glick (2008), rolling regressions show that there is no 
obvious increasing trend in sterilization coefficients from 2004 to 2008. A small sample size in 
this paper and a different time frame and method may have contributed to the differences. 
    Secondly, I estimate the lower and upper bounds on PBC's cost of sterilization and 
compare them with the income the PBC earns from investing foreign exchange reserves in long 
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term foreign government bonds. Calculation shows that so far the PBC's sterilization cost can be 
fully covered by its income from foreign reserves, which provides support to Prasad and Wei 
(2005)'s claim that there are in fact net marginal benefits to a combination of large reserves 
holding and continuous sterilization in China's case. Projections of future sterilization cost and 
foreign reserves investment income also show no sign that sterilization will become 
unsustainable in the near future. However further appreciation of RMB and a switch to short 
term bond may have a profound negative impact on the PBC's income from foreign reserves 
investment in domestic currency terms. As China is moving towards a more liberal exchange 
rate policy, it will probably suffer a capital loss on its foreign exchange reserves in RMB terms. 
Nevertheless, in this case the resulting decrease in the speculative capital inflows will mitigate 
the need for sterilization. 
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3.1 Introduction 
In this paper we provide a comprehensive review of China’s financial system and 
extensive comparisons with other countries.  Almost every functioning financial system includes 
financial markets and intermediaries (e.g., a banking sector), but how these two standard 
financial sectors contribute to the entire financial system and economy differs significantly 
across different countries.  In this regard, we discuss what has worked and what has not within 
the two sectors, and consider the effects of further development on the entire economy.  We 
also examine a non-standard financial sector, which operates outside the markets and banking 
sectors and consists of alternative financing channels, governance mechanisms, and institutions.  
Finally, we provide guidelines for future research on several unresolved issues, including how 
China’s financial system can integrate into the world’s markets and economy without being 
interrupted by damaging financial crises.  Although there is no consensus regarding the 
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prospects for China’s future economic growth, a prevailing view on China’s financial system 
speculates that it is one of the weakest links in the economy and it will hamper future economic 
growth.       
We draw four main conclusions about China’s financial system and its future 
development.   
First, when we examine and compare China’s banking system and financial markets with 
those of both developed and emerging countries, we find China’s financial system has been 
dominated by a large banking system.  Even with the entrance and growth of many domestic 
and foreign banks and financial institutions in recent years, China’s banking system is still mainly 
controlled by the four largest state-owned banks.  All of these ‘Big Four’ banks have become 
publicly listed and traded companies in recent years, with the government being the largest 
shareholder and retaining control.  This ownership structure has served these banks well in 
terms of avoiding major problems encountered by major financial institutions in developed 
countries that are at the center of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis.  Moreover, the level of 
non-performing loans (NPLs) over GDP has been steadily decreasing after reaching its peak 
during 2000- 2001.  Continuing improvement of the banking system, including further 
development of financial institutions outside the Big Four banks and extending more credit to 
productive firms and projects, can help stabilize China’s financial system in the short run, given 
the uncertainties in the Chinese and global economies.   
Our second conclusion concerns China’s financial markets.  Two domestic stock 
exchanges, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE hereafter) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) 
were established in 1990.  Their scale and importance are not comparable to the banking sector; 
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and they have not been effective in allocating resources in the economy, in that they remain 
speculative and driven by insider trading.  In recent years the stock market has witnessed 
significant development. Going forward, financial markets are likely to play an increasingly 
significant role in the economy.  We discuss several issues and potential problems related to 
increasing the size and scope and improving the efficiency of the stock and other financial 
markets.   
Third, in an earlier paper, Allen, Qian and Qian (2005, AQQ hereafter) find that the most 
successful part of the financial system, in terms of supporting the growth of the overall economy, 
is not the banking sector or financial markets, but rather a sector of alternative financing 
channels, such as informal financial intermediaries, internal financing and trade credits, and 
coalitions of various forms among firms, investors, and local governments.  Many of these 
financing channels rely on alternative governance mechanisms, such as competition in product 
and input markets, and trust, reputation and relationships.  Together this alternative financial 
sector has supported the growth of a “Hybrid Sector” with various types of ownership structures.  
Our definition of the Hybrid Sector includes all non-state, non-listed firms, including privately or 
individually owned firms, and firms that are partially owned by local governments (e.g., 
Township Village Enterprises or TVEs).37
                                                          
37 We include firms partially owned by local governments in the Hybrid Sector for two reasons. First, 
despite the ownership stake of local governments and the sometimes ambiguous ownership structure and 
property rights, the operation of these firms resembles more closely that of a for-profit, privately-owned 
firm than that of a state-owned firm. Second, the ownership stake of local governments in many of these 
firms has been privatized. 
  The growth of the Hybrid Sector has been much higher 
than that of the State Sector (state-owned enterprises or SOEs, and all firms where the central 
government has ultimate control) and the Listed Sector (publicly listed and traded firms with 
most of them converted from the State Sector). The Hybrid Sector contributes most of China’s 
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economic growth, and employs the majority of the labor force.  The co-existence of the 
alternative financial sector with banks and markets can continue to fuel the growth of the 
Hybrid Sector.   
Finally, a significant challenge for China’s financial system is to avoid damaging financial 
crises that can severely disrupt the economy and social stability.  These crises include traditional 
financial crises: a banking sector crisis stemming from an accumulation of NPLs and a sudden 
drop in banks’ profits; or a crisis/crash resulting from speculative asset bubbles in the real estate 
market or stock market.  There are also other types of financial crises, such as a “twin crisis” 
(simultaneous foreign exchange and banking/stock market crises) that struck many Asian 
economies in the late 1990s.  Since its entrance to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, 
the integration of China’s financial system and overall economy with the rest of the world has 
significantly sped up.  This process introduces cheap foreign capital and technology, but large 
scale and sudden capital flows and foreign speculation increase the likelihood of a twin crisis.  At 
the end of 2007, China’s foreign currency reserves surpassed US$1.5 trillion, overtaking Japan to 
become the largest in the world; they increased to about US$3.2 trillion as of June 2011 with a 
large fraction invested in U.S. dollar denominated assets such as T-bills and notes.38
                                                          
38 According to the U.S. Treasury Department, China’s holding of U.S. treasury securities reached $ 1.17 
trillion in July 2011. Morrison and Labonte (2008) estimate that around 70% of China’s foreign reserves 
are invested in dollar denominated assets. 
  The rapid 
increase in China’s foreign exchange reserves suggests that there is a large amount of 
speculative, “hot” money in China in anticipation of a continuing appreciation of the RMB, 
China’s currency, relative to all other major currencies, especially the US dollar.  Depending on 
how the government and the central bank handle the process of revaluation, especially when 
there is a large amount of capital outflow, there could be a classic currency crisis as the 
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government and central bank try to defend the partial currency peg, which in turn may trigger a 
banking crisis if there are large withdrawals from banks.   
The remaining sections are organized as follows.  In Section 3.2, we briefly review the 
history of China’s financial system development, present aggregate evidence on China’s financial 
system, and compare them to those of developed and other developing countries.  In Section 
3.3, we examine China’s banking system and changes over time.  In Section 3.4, we briefly 
examine the growth and irregularities of financial markets, including the stock market, real 
estate market, and listed firms, and consider the effects of several initiatives to develop new 
markets and further develop existing markets, as well as changes in corporate governance 
among listed firms.  In Section 3.5, we examine the non-standard financial sector, including 
alternative financial channels and governance mechanisms.  Motivated by the success of this 
financial sector and firms in the Hybrid Sector, we also compare the advantages and 
disadvantages of using the law as the basis of finance and commerce.  We then examine 
different types of financial crises and their potential effects on China’s financial system in 
Section 3.6.  Finally, Section 3.7 concludes the paper.  In terms of converting RMB into US dollar, 
we use the exchange rate of US$1 = RMB 8.28 (yuan) for transactions and events occurring 
before 2005, and the spot rate at the end of each year for those activities during and after 2005 
(Figure 25-A provides a graph of the exchange rates between the US dollar and the RMB). 
 
3.2 Overview of China’s Financial System 
3.2.1 A Brief Review of the History of China’s Financial System 
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China’s financial system was well developed before 1949.39  One key finding in reviewing 
the history of this period, including the rise of Shanghai as one of the financial centers of Asia 
during the first half of the 20th Century, is that the development of China’s commerce and 
financial system as a whole was by and large outside the formal legal system.  For example, 
despite the entrance of Western-style courts in Shanghai and other major coastal cities in the 
early 1900s, most business-related disputes were resolved through mechanisms outside courts, 
including guilds (merchant coalitions), families and local notables.40
After the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, all of the pre-1949 
capitalist companies and institutions were nationalized by 1950.  Between 1950 and 1978, 
China’s financial system consisted of a single bank − the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), a central 
government owned and controlled bank under the Ministry of Finance, which served as both the 
central bank and a commercial bank, controlling about 93% of the total financial assets of the 
country and handling almost all financial transactions.  With its main role to finance the physical 
production plans, the PBOC used both a “cash-plan” and a “credit-plan” to control the cash 
flows in consumer markets and transfer flows between branches.   
  In Section 3.5.3 below, we 
argue that modern equivalents of these nonlegal dispute-resolution and corporate governance 
mechanisms are behind the success of Hybrid Sector firms in the same areas in the 1980s and 
1990s, and that these alternative mechanisms may be more responsive in adapting to changes 
in a fast-growing economy like China than the law and legal institutions. 
                                                          
39 For more descriptions of the pre-1949 history of China’s financial system, see AQQ (2008); for more 
anecdotal evidence on China’s financial system in the same period, see, for example, Kirby (1995) and Lee 
(1993).  
40 See, e.g., Chung (2005), for descriptions on family- and community-based mechanisms for contract 
enforcement.  Looking at how disputes were resolved in and outside courts, Goetzmann and Köll (2005) 
conclude that the passing of China’s first Company law in 1904, which was intended to provide a better 
legal environment for business and commerce, did not lead to actual changes in corporate governance and 
better protection of (minority) shareholder rights. 
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The first main structural change began in 1978 and ended in 1984.  By the end of 1979, 
the PBOC departed the Ministry and became a separate entity, while three state-owned banks 
took over some of its commercial banking businesses: The Bank of China41
For most of the 1980s, the development of the financial system can be characterized by 
the fast growth of financial intermediaries outside of the “Big Four” banks.  Regional banks 
(partially owned by local governments) were formed in the Special Economic Zones in the 
coastal areas; in rural areas, a network of Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs; similar to credit 
unions in the U.S.) was set up under the supervision of the ABC, while Urban Credit Cooperatives 
(UCCs), counterparts of the RCCs in the urban areas, were also founded.  Non-bank financial 
intermediaries, such as the Trust and Investment Corporations (TICs; operating in selected 
banking and non-banking services with restrictions on both deposits and loans), emerged and 
proliferated in this period.  
 (BOC) was given the 
mandate to specialize in transactions related to foreign trade and investment; the People’s 
Construction Bank of China (PCBC), originally formed in 1954, was set up to handle transactions 
related to fixed investment (especially in manufacturing); the Agriculture Bank of China (ABC) 
was set up (in 1979) to deal with all banking business in rural areas; and, the PBOC was formally 
established as China’s central bank and a two-tier banking system was formed.  Finally, the 
fourth state-owned commercial bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) was 
formed in 1984, and took over the rest of the commercial transactions of the PBOC. 
The most significant event for China’s financial system in the 1990s was the inception 
and growth of China’s stock market.  Two domestic stock exchanges (SHSE and SZSE) were 
                                                          
41 BOC, among the oldest banks currently in operation, was originally established in 1912 as a private bank, 
and specialized in foreign currency related transactions.  
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established in 1990 and grew very fast during most of the 1990s and in recent years in terms of 
the total market capitalization and trading volume.  In parallel with the development of the 
stock market, the real estate market also went from nonexistent in the early 1990s to one that is 
currently comparable in size with the stock market.42
These patterns are in part due to the fact that the development of a supportive legal 
framework and institutions has been lagging behind that of the markets.  For example, China’s 
first bankruptcy law (governing SOEs) was passed in 1986 on a trial basis, but the formal 
Company Law did not become effective until the end of 1999.  This version of the Company Law 
governs all corporations with limited liability, publicly listed and traded companies, and 
branches or divisions of foreign companies, as well as their organization structure, securities 
issuance and trading, accounting, bankruptcy, mergers and acquisitions (for details see the 
website of China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), 
  Both the stock and real estate markets 
have experienced major corrections during the past decade, and are characterized by high 
volatilities and speculative short-term behaviors by many investors.   
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/).  In August 
2006, a new bankruptcy law was enacted, and it became effective June 1, 2007.  We provide a 
brief analysis of the status and problems of the stock market and real estate market in Section 
3.5 below.  
Following the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, financial sector reform has focused on state-
owned banks and especially the problem of NPLs (the China Banking Regulation Committee  
(CBRC) was also established to oversee the banking industry).  We will further discuss this issue 
in Section 3.3.  China’s entry into the WTO in December 2001 marked the beginning of a new era, 
                                                          
42 At the end of 2007, the total market capitalization of the two domestic exchanges (SHSE and SZSE) was 
around $1.8 trillion, whereas total investment in the real estate market was around $3.12 trillion. 
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as we continue to observe increasing competition from foreign financial institutions and more 
frequent and larger scale capital flows.  While increasingly larger inflows of foreign capital and 
the presence of foreign institutions may continue to drive further growth of the financial system 
and economy, larger scale capital flows can also increase the likelihood of damaging financial 
crises.  We will discuss these issues in Sections 3.4 and 3.6.    
A developed financial system is characterized by, among other factors, the substantial 
role played by institutional investors.  In China, institutional investors began to emerge in the 
late 1990s: the first closed-end fund, in which investors cannot withdraw capital after initial 
investment, was set up in 1997, and the first open-end fund, in which investors can freely 
withdraw capital (subject to share redemption restrictions), was established in 2001.  By 
November 2009, there were 65 fund companies managing 551 funds with 520 open-ended 
funds and the rest close-ended.  The total net assets value (NAV) increased from RMB11 billion 
(or US$ 1.3 Billion) in 1998 to RMB 2.26 trillion (or $328 billion) in November 2009, which is still 
small compared to the assets within the banking sector.  In 2003, a few Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors (QFII) entered China’s asset management industry, and they have been 
operating through forming joint ventures with Chinese companies.  On the other hand, China 
allowed Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors (QDII) to invest in overseas markets beginning 
in July 2006.  At the end of 2008, the ten QDII funds had a total of $109.4 billion assets under 
management.   
At the national level, the China Investment Corporation (CIC) was established in 
September 2007 with the intent of utilizing the accumulated foreign reserves for the benefit of 
the state and $207.91 billion foreign reserves were placed under management at the 
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establishment.  CIC makes occasional announcements about its investment, but the overall 
transparency of its investment strategy is low.  Since inception, CIC has made some aggressive 
investment decisions, including the well publicized $3 billion (pre-IPO) investment in private 
equity group Blackstone, and the $5 billion investment in Morgan Stanley (this took the form of 
mandatory convertible bonds that can be converted into almost 10% of the firm’s equity).  
 Endowed with limited capital and given problems with the administration of the 
pension system, pension funds have not played a significant role in the stock or bond market.43
                                                          
43 While there is a nationwide, government run pension system (financed mainly through taxes on 
employers and employees), the coverage ratio of the pension system varies significantly across regions and 
is particularly low in rural areas.  Moreover, there is a very limited amount of capital in individual accounts 
and most of the capital has been invested in banks and government projects with low returns. See, for 
example, Feldstein (1999, 2003) and Feldstein and Liebman (2006), for more details on China’s pension 
system.  
  
With a fast aging population and the growth of households’ disposable income, further 
development of a multi-pillar pension system, including individual accounts with employees’ 
self-contributed (tax exempt) funds that can be directly invested in the financial markets, can 
lead to the development of both the financial system and the fiscal system as well as social 
stability.  At the top of the pension fund system, China’s National Social Security Fund (NSSF) 
was established in August 2002 and is administered by the National Council for Social Security 
Fund.  This (sovereign) fund is mainly financed by capital and equity assets derived from the 
listing of state-owned companies, fiscal allocations from the central government, and other 
investment proceeds.  It has recently shifted its core investment strategy of focusing on the 
domestic A-share and bond markets to a more diversified basket of assets, including 
investments in emerging markets and Europe.  At the end of 2008, the fund had a total of $89.2 
billion in assets; it grew to RMB856.7 billion ($142.8 billion) at the end of 2010 according to the 
annual report of NSSF.  Finally, there are very few hedge funds that implement “long-short” 
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strategies, as short selling has been prohibited until recently.44
 
  
Figure 18 Overview of China’s Financial System 
 
Figure 18 depicts the current structure of the entire financial system.  In what follows 
we will describe and examine each of the major sectors of the financial system.  In addition to 
the standard sectors of banking and intermediation and financial markets, we will document the 
importance of the non-standard financial sector.  Due to space limitation, we do not cover 
China’s “foreign sectors” in this chapter; for discussions on the history and the role of these 
sectors in supporting the growth of the economy, see, for example, Prasad and Wei (2007) for a 
review. 
                                                          
44 Along with the introduction of an index future (for A shares) in April 2010, a trial program on short 
selling began for selected institutional investors (security companies; see, e.g., www.wsj.com, 3/31/2010). 
The impact of introducing these new programs and products on the financial market is yet to be seen. 
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3.2.2 Size and Efficiency of the Financial System: Banks, Markets, and Alternative 
Finance   
In Table 19, we compare China’s financial system to those of other major emerging 
economies, with measures for the size and efficiency of banks and markets taken from Levine 
(2002) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001) and data from the World Bank Financial Database.  
We present average figures over the period 2001-2007 for each country as well as the average 
of all the other emerging economies (excluding China).  We first compare the size of a country’s 
banks and equity markets relative to that country’s gross domestic product (GDP).  In terms of 
total market capitalization, China’s stock market, at 64% of its GDP over the period 2001-2007, is 
slightly larger than the 58% of GDP average of the other major emerging economies.  “Value 
Traded” is perhaps a better measure of the actual size of the market than “market 
capitalization,” because the latter includes non-tradable shares or tradable shares that are 
rarely traded.  In this regard, the size of China’s stock market (62% of GDP) is significantly larger 
than the average of other emerging economies (with an average of 37% of GDP).  Similarly, the 
size of China’s banking system, in terms of total bank credit to non-state sectors, is 116% of its 
GDP over 2001-2007, and considerably larger than the average of other major emerging 
economies (with an average of 65% of GDP).  However, the majority of the bank credit goes to 
state-owned firms in China and only a small fraction goes to firms in the Hybrid Sector (more 
evidence of this is given below).  In addition, NPLs account for a larger fraction of all the loans in 
China than the average of other emerging economies (16% vs. 10%), indicating that its banking 
sector still has scope to improve its efficiency.45
                                                          
45 Levine (2002) uses bank overhead cost/total assets to measure banking sector efficiency, and used this 
measure to construct the “Structure Efficiency” and “Finance Efficiency” measures. However, the World 
Bank Financial Database no longer reports the overhead cost/assets ratio; we replace this with NPLs/loans 
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Table 19 Comparing financial systems: Banks and Markets (average 2001-2007) 
This table compares financial markets and banking sector of China with those of other large emerging 
economies. All the measures on the size and efficiency of banks and markets are based on Levine (2002) 
and Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001), and data is from the World Bank Financial Database.  We present 
the 2001-2007 average figures for all countries (except for “Structure Regulatory,” which are based on 
2005 figures). Average of other emerging economies are (simple) averages across other emerging 
economies excluding China.  
  Size of Banks and Markets Structure Indices:  Markets vs. banks* 
Financial 
Development**(banking 
and market sectors) 
Measure 
Bank 
credit/
GDP 
NPL/ 
Total
Loans 
Value 
traded
/GDP 
Market 
cap./ 
GDP 
Activity Size Effic-iency 
Regul-
atory Activity Size 
Effici-
ency 
China 1.16 0.16 0.62 0.64 -0.62 8.88 2.32 16 8.88 8.91 5.97 
Argentin
  
0.14 0.10 0.04 0.48 -1.32 3.93 1.59 7 3.93 6.50 3.60 
Brazil  0.34 0.04 0.19 0.53 -0.61 6.45 0.72 10 6.45 7.49 6.17 
Egypt  0.52 0.21 0.19 0.60 -1.02 6.88 2.54 13 6.88 8.04 4.48 
India 0.37 0.07 0.57 0.64 0.44 7.65 1.50 10 7.65 7.76 6.71 
Indonesia 0.24 0.12 0.12 0.28 -0.69 5.66 1.23 Na 5.66 6.51 4.60 
Malaysia  1.15 0.12 0.43 1.45 -0.98 8.51 2.85 10 8.51 9.72 5.89 
Mexico 0.18 0.03 0.06 0.26 -0.99 4.74 -0.26 12 4.74 6.11 5.38 
Pakistan  0.26 0.14 0.72 0.28 1.01 7.55 1.36 10 7.55 6.61 6.26 
Peru  0.21 0.08 0.03 0.44 -1.96 4.10 1.22 8 4.10 6.81 3.63 
Philippin
  
0.34 0.15 0.07 0.47 -1.54 5.50 1.97 7 5.50 7.36 3.85 
Russian  0.26 0.04 0.27 0.65 0.06 6.54 0.96 Na 6.54 7.41 6.52 
S. Africa  1.38 0.02 0.88 2.06 -0.45 9.40 1.43 8 9.40 10.2
 
8.38 
Sri Lanka 0.31 0.15 0.03 0.18 -2.33 4.52 1.00 7 4.52 6.31 2.97 
Thailand  1.02 0.11 0.50 0.63 -0.72 8.52 1.95 9 8.52 8.77 6.10 
Turkey  0.20 0.10 0.39 0.28 0.67 6.65 1.05 12 6.65 6.32 5.93 
Ave. for 
EMs 
0.46  0.10 0.30  0.62  -0.70  6.44  1.41  9.46  6.44  7.46  5.36  
 
Notes: *: Structure indices measure whether a country’s financial system is market- or bank-dominated; the 
higher the measure, the more the system is dominated by markets. Specifically, “structure activity” is equal to 
log(value traded/bank credit) and measures size of bank credit relative to trading volume of markets; “structure 
size” is equal to log(market cap/bank credit) and measures the size of markets relative to banks; “structure 
efficiency” is equal to log(market cap ratio×bank NPL ratio) and measures the relative efficiency of markets vs. 
banks; finally, “structure regulatory” is the sum of the four categories in regulatory restriction, or the degree to 
which commercial banks are allowed to engage in security, firm operation, insurance, and real estate: 1- 
unrestricted; 2-permit to conduct through subsidiary; 3-full range not permitted in subsidiaries; and 4-strictly 
prohibited. 
**: Financial development variables measure the entire financial system (banking and market sectors 
combined), and the higher the measure, the larger or more efficient the financial system is.  Specifically, 
“finance activity” is equal to log (total value traded ratio×private credit ratio), “finance size” is equal to log 
(market cap ratio×bank private credit ratio), and “finance efficiency” is equal to log (total value traded 
ratio/bank NPL ratio). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
ratio as an alternative measure of efficiency and use this variable to define other efficiency measures in 
Table 19.   
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The next two columns of Table 19 (“Structure indices”) compare the relative importance 
of financial markets vs. banks, with a lower score indicating that banks are more important 
relative to markets.  China’s score for “Structure size” (Log of the ratio of Market 
Capitalization/Total Bank Credit) is positive, suggesting that the size of total market 
capitalization is actually larger than that of bank credit, and the score is greater than the average 
of other emerging economies; its score for “Structure Activity” (Log of the ratio of Float supply 
of market cap/Total Bank Credit) is negative, indicating that float supply fraction of the market 
cap is still smaller than bank credit, and it is similar to the average of other emerging economies.  
Taken together these numbers suggest that the financial system of most emerging economies, 
including that of China, remains bank-dominated.  In terms of “Structure efficiency” (Log of 
product (Market capitalization/GDP) × (bank NPLs/bank total loans)), which denotes the relative 
efficiency of markets vs. banks, China has a higher score than most other developing countries, 
suggesting that its banks are relatively less efficient than markets compared to other countries.  
“Structure regulatory” measures (based on 2005 data) the extent to which commercial banks 
are restricted to participate in activities outside commercial lending, and China’s score of 16 is 
higher than most other countries, suggesting that by law commercial banks in China face tight 
restrictions in operating in other areas. 
We also compare the development of the financial system (“Financial Development”), 
including both banks and markets (the last three columns of Table 19).  China’s overall financial 
market size, in terms of both “Finance Activity” (Log of product of (Float supply of market/GDP) 
× (Bank credit/GDP)) and “Finance Size” (Log of product of (Market capitalization/GDP) + (Bank 
credit/GDP)), are larger than the averages of other emerging countries.  In terms of “Finance 
Efficiency” (Log of (Total floating supply/GDP)/Bank NPLs Ratio), China’s measure is slightly 
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higher than the average of other emerging countries.  Based on the evidence from the past 
decade, we can conclude that China’s banks and markets, or the formal sectors of the financial 
system, are as large as or larger than other major emerging economies (relative to its size of the 
economy).  However, the banking sector does not lend much to the Hybrid Sector, which as we 
will see in Section 3.5, is the dynamic part of the economy. 
A related question to the size of banks and markets is where do most firms get the 
capital and funds?  As shown in AQQ (2005, 2008), the four most important financing sources 
for all firms in China, in terms of firms’ fixed asset investments, are, (domestic) bank loans, firms’ 
self-fundraising, the state budget and FDI, with self-fundraising and bank loans carrying most of 
the weight.  Self-fundraising, falling into the category of alternative finance (non-bank, non-
market finance), includes proceeds from capital raised from local governments (beyond the 
state budget), communities and other investors, internal financing channels such as retained 
earnings and all other funds raised domestically by the firms.  The size of total self-fundraising of 
all firms has been growing at an average annual rate of 23.6% over the period of 1994-2009, and 
reached $2,213.2 billion at the end of 2009, compared to a total of $565.7 billion for domestic 
bank loans for the same year. It is important to point out that equity and bond issuance, which 
are included in self-fundraising (but fall into the category of formal external finance), apply only 
to the Listed Sector, and account for a small fraction of this category.   
While the Listed Sector has been growing fast, SOEs are on a downward trend, as 
privatization of these firms is still in progress.  Around 30% of publicly traded companies’ 
funding comes from bank loans, and this ratio has been very stable.  Around 45% of the Listed 
Sector’s total funding comes from self-fundraising, including internal financing and proceeds 
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from equity and bond issuance.  Moreover, equity and bond sales, which rely on the use of 
external markets, only constitute a small fraction of total funds raised in comparison to internal 
financing and other forms of fundraising.  Combined with the fact that self-fundraising is also 
the most important source of financing for the State Sector (45% to 65%), we can conclude that 
alternative channels of financing are important even for the State and Listed Sectors. 
Not surprisingly, self-fundraising plays an even more important role for firms in the 
Hybrid Sector, accounting for close to 60% of total funds raised, while individually owned 
companies, a subset of the Hybrid Sector, rely on self-fundraising for 90% of total financing.  
Self-fundraising here includes all forms of internal finance, capital raised from family and friends 
of the founders and managers, and funds raised in the form of private equity and loans.  Since 
firms in this sector operate in an environment with legal and financial mechanisms and 
regulations that are probably poorer than those available for firms in the State and Listed 
Sectors, financing sources may work differently from how they work in the State and Listed 
Sectors, and those in developed countries.  In Allen, Chakrabarti, De, Qian, and Qian (ACDQQ, 
2008), the authors argue that alternative finance channels, substitute for formal financing 
channels through banks and markets, and expand the capacity of financial systems in emerging 
countries such as China and India. 
 
3.3 The Banking and Intermediation Sector 
In this section, we examine the status of China’s banking and intermediation sector.  
After reviewing aggregate evidence on bank deposits and loans, we analyze the size and time 
trend of NPLs.  Finally, we review evidence on the growth of non-state banks and financial 
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intermediaries. 
 
3.3.1 Aggregate Evidence on Bank Deposits and Loans  
As in other Asian countries, China’s household savings rates have been high throughout 
the reform era.  Given the growth of the economy, the sharp increase in personal income, and 
limited investment opportunities, it is not surprising that total bank deposits from individuals 
have been growing fast since the mid-1980s.  From Figure 19-A, residents in metropolitan areas 
contribute the most to total deposits beginning in the late 1980s (roughly 50%), while deposits 
from enterprises (including firms from all three sectors) provide the second most important 
source.  The role of deposits from government agencies and organizations (including non-profit 
and for-profit organizations, not shown in the figure) has steadily decreased over time.  
 
 
Figure 19-A  Sources for Bank Deposits in China 
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Figure 19-B  Comparing Total Bank Credit extended to private/hybrid sectors 
 
 
Table 20-A  Comparisons of Total Savings and Deposits (in US$ billions) 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
China 
Demand depositsa 320 391 465 533 647 777 899 1030 1265 1671 1931 2683  
Savings depositsb 606 674 722 820 961 1143 1445 1748 2069 2363 3187 3811  
Time depositsc 100 114 136 171 199 253 307 410 676 878 1205 1661  
Time & Savings Dep/GDP 68% 73% 72% 75% 80% 85% 91% 95% 101% 92% 100% 114% 
Japan 
Demand depositsa 1793 2259 2073 1838 2567 3523 3795 3541 3523 3683 4560 - 
Time, savings & foreign 
currency deposits 
7921 8997 8059 5351 5383 5416 5448 4642 4536 4778 6160 - 
Time & Savings Dep/GDP 181% 185% 184% 142% 131% 118% 114% 109% 106% 106% 110% - 
South Korea 
Demand depositsa 18 22 23 27 36 38 46 54 67 66 50 63  
Time, savings & foreign 
currency deposits 
185 251 289 315 383 410 467 485 546 543 471 574  
Time & Savings Dep/GDP 46% 54% 61% 64% 63% 64% 58% 57% 56% 52% 58% 63% 
India 
Demand depositsa 24 28 31 32 35 44 60 71 89 114 96 119  
Time, savings & foreign 
currency deposits 
140 161 175 198 235 277 333 368 460 647 653 800  
Time & Savings Dep/GDP 34% 36% 39% 42% 46% 46% 46% 46% 49% 54% 59% 60% 
Source: IMF and CEIC database  
Notes: a: Demand deposits, balance of the accounts can be withdrawn on demand of customers (e.g., check-writing); b: 
Savings deposits, interest-bearing accounts that can be withdrawn but cannot be used as Money (e.g., no checking 
writing); c: Time deposits, savings accounts or CD with a fixed term. 
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Table 20-B  Breakdown of Bank Loans (end-of-year figures in RMB billions) 
Year Total  
Loans 
Short- 
term   
Loans  
Industrial 
Loans 
Commercial 
Loans  
 
Infrastructure 
Construction 
Loans 
Agricultural 
Loans  
 
Loans 
to 
TVEs  
Privately 
Owned 
Firms  
Joint 
Ventures, 
Cooperative 
Firms  
1994 3,997.60 2,694.8
 
994.83 1,050.98 61.72 114.39 200.
 
15.59 79.23 
1995 5,054.41 3,337.2
 
1,177.4
 
1,283.71 79.93 154.48 251.
 
19.62 99.91 
1996 6,115.66 4,021.0
 
1,421.3
 
1,533.26 97.38 191.91 282.
 
27.98 134.63 
1997 7,491.41 5,541.8
 
1,652.6
 
1,835.66 159.11 331.46 503.
 
38.67 189.10 
1998 8,652.41 6,061.3
 
1,782.1
 
1,975.24 162.87 444.42 558.
 
47.16 248.75 
1999 9,373.43 6,388.7
 
1,794.8
 
1,989.09 147.69 479.24 616.
 
57.91 298.58 
2000 9,937.11 6,574.8
 
1,701.9
 
1,786.85 161.71 488.90 606.
 
65.46 304.98 
2001 11,231.47 6,732.7
 
1,863.6
 
1,856.34 209.96 571.15 641.
 
91.80 326.35 
2002 13,129.39 7,424.7
 
2,019.0
 
1,797.31 274.80 688.46 681.
 
105.88 269.74 
2003 15,899.62 8,366.1
 
2,275.6
 
1,799.44 300.21 841.14 766.
 
146.16 256.94 
2004 17,819.78 8,684.0
 
2,389.6
 
1,707.41 278.01 984.31 806.
 
208.16 219.84 
2005 19,469.04 8,744.9
 
2,251.6
 
1,644.76 298.37 1,152.99 790.
 
218.08 197.53 
2006 
 
 
 
22,534,72 
 
 
 
9,853.4
 
 
 
 
2,865.4
 
 
 
1,667.15 
 
 
 
361.26 
 
 
 
1,320.82 
 
 
 
622.
 
 
 
 
266.76 
 
 
 
183.27 
 
 
 
Source: Statistical Yearbooks of China, CEIC database (1985 – 2009). 
 
Table 20-A compares total savings and bank deposits in China, Japan, South Korea, and 
India during the period 1997-2009.  In terms of the ratio of Time and Savings Deposits/GDP, 
China maintains the highest or second highest level (an average of over 90% in recent years), 
while Japan leads the group in terms of total amount.  Looking at the breakdown of bank 
deposits, interest-bearing “savings deposits” are by far the most important form of deposits in 
China, providing a good source for bank loans and other forms of investment.  Figure 19-B 
compares total (nonstate) bank credit (over GDP) extended to Hybrid Sector firms in China, and 
privately owned firms (including those publicly listed and traded) in Taiwan and South Korea.  
For South Korea, we also plot the bank credit ratios during its high economic growth period of 
the 1970s and 1980s (each year appearing on the horizontal axis indicates the time period for 
China, while a particular year minus 20 indicates the time period for South Korea).  We can see 
that the scale and growth of China’s ‘hybrid’ bank credit during 1991-2009 are far below those 
(of private bank credit) of Taiwan and South Korea in the same period, but are similar to those 
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of South Korea twenty years ago.   
Table 20-B breaks down China’s bank loans by maturities, loan purposes, and borrower 
types during the period 1994-2009.  While there has been a shift from short-term to long-term 
loans (first two columns), the majority of loans goes to SOEs in manufacturing industries 
(“Industrial Loans” and “Commercial Loans”).  Most of the “Infrastructure/Construction Loans” 
(a small component of total loans) fund government sponsored projects, while the size of 
“Agricultural Loans” is much smaller.  More importantly, the size of loans made to TVEs, 
privately- and collectively-owned firms, and joint ventures (last 3 columns), which all belong to 
the Hybrid Sector, is also much smaller.  Consistent with the aggregate evidence from Section 
3.2 above and our firm-level evidence below, we find that bank loans have been one of the 
important financing sources for Hybrid Sector firms, but the majority of the bank loans goes to 
the State and Listed Sectors.  Researchers have argued that the imbalance between loans made 
to the State Sector and the Hybrid Sector reflects the government’s policies of wealth transfer 
from the Hybrid Sector to the State Sector via state-owned banks (e.g., Brandt and Zhu, 2000).  
 
3.3.2 An Analysis of NPLs and Further Reform of the Banking Sector  
China’s banking sector is dominated by large state-owned banks, namely, the “Big Four” 
banks of ICBC, BOC, PCBC, and ABC.  The dominance of the Big Four banks also implies that the 
degree of competition within the banking sector has been low.  For example, Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Levine (2001) compare the five-bank concentration (share of the assets of the five largest 
banks in total banking assets), and find that China’s concentration ratio of 91% at the end of 
1997 (and for much of 1990s) is one of the highest in the world.  However, China’s 
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concentration ratio has been falling sharply since 1997 with the entrance of many non-state 
banks and intermediaries.  
The most significant problem for China’s banking sector, and for the entire financial 
system during the last decade, was the amount of NPLs within state-owned banks, and in 
particular, among the Big Four banks.  Reducing the amount of NPLs to normal levels was a high 
priority for China’s financial system.  We mainly rely on official sources for our analysis on NPLs, 
but we also speculate based on data from non-government sources, including case studies from 
particular regions or banks.  Some of this data and speculations paint a much gloomier picture of 
the NPLs and China’s state-owned banks than the official data suggests.     
 
3.3.2.1 Comparing NPLs and Reducing NPLs in China 
In Panel A of Table 21-A, we compare NPLs in China, the U.S., and other major Asian 
economies during 1998-2010 based on official figures.  NPLs are measured by their size (in 
US$ billion) and as a percentage of GDP in the same year (shown in brackets).  Notice that the 
official information on China’s NPLs first became available in 1998, but the figures in 1998 and 
1999 in Table 21-A probably significantly under-estimate the actual size of NPLs; this also 
explains the jump in the size of China’s NPLs from 1999 to 2000.  China’s NPLs are the highest in 
the group from 2000 to 2007, and as high as 20% to 22.5% of GDP (in 2000 and 2001).  The 
cross-country comparison includes the period during which Asian countries recovered from the 
1997 financial crisis (e.g., the size of NPLs in South Korea exceeded 12% of GDP in 1999 but it 
was reduced to below 3% two years later), and the period during which the Japanese banking 
system was disturbed by the prolonged NPL problem (the size of Japan’s NPLs is the second 
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largest of the group throughout the period).  However, the level of NPLs (over GDP) in China has 
shown a clear downward trend since the peak in 2000-2001, with the total amount of NPLs also 
falling during 2004-2010.  In fact, with the banking sector in most developed countries struggling 
with the ongoing global financial crisis, China’s banking sector has done quite well, with its total 
NPLs in 2010 ($68.1 billion) only one seventh of that of the U.S. and the ratio of NPLs over GDP 
falling below that of the U.S. as well.  
As bad as some of the NPL numbers in early years in Panel A of Table 21-A appear, they 
may still significantly underestimate the amount of NPLs within China’s banking system 
according to some critics.  First, the official figures on outstanding NPLs (cumulated across all 
commercial banks in China) do not include the bad loans that have been transferred from banks 
to four state-owned asset management companies (AMCs)—with the purpose of liquidating 
these bad loans.  For example, if we add the NPLs held by the four AMCs (book value of RMB 
866 billion, or $125.5 billion, shown in the last row of Table 21-B) in the first quarter of 2006 to 
the mix of NPLs shown in Panel A of Table 21-A, the total amount of China’s NPLs would increase 
by two-thirds.  Second, the classification of NPLs has been problematic in China.  The Basle 
Committee for Bank Supervision classifies a loan as “doubtful” or bad when any interest 
payment is overdue by 180 days or more (in the U.S. it is 90 days); whereas in China, this step 
has not typically been taken until the principal payment is delayed beyond the loan maturity 
date or an extended due date, and in many cases, until the borrower has declared bankruptcy 
and/or has gone through liquidation.  Qiu et al. (2000) estimate that the ratio of loan interest 
paid to state-owned banks over loan interest owed is on average less than 50% in 1999, 
suggesting that the actual ratio of NPLs over total loans made can be higher than 50% in 1999.  
This piece of evidence, along with others, suggests that the amount of NPLs (and as a 
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percentage of GDP) could be twice as large as the official figures reported in Panel A of Table 21-
A.46
Since a large fraction of the NPLs among state-owned banks, and in particular, the Big 
Four banks, resulted from poor lending decisions made for SOEs, some of which were due to 
political or other non-economic reasons, it can be argued that the natural party to bear the 
burden of reducing the NPLs is the government.  This view of essentially treating NPLs as a fiscal 
problem implies that the ultimate source of eliminating NPLs lies in China’s overall economic 
growth.
  
47
Unlike the severity of its NPL problem in the early 2000s, the Chinese government has 
not issued a large amount of debt, with total outstanding government bonds growing from only 
9% of GDP in 1998 to around 20% of GDP in 2010.  By contrast, countries such as the U.S. and 
India have a large amount of government debt.  Japan is the only country in the group that has a 
large amount of NPLs and government debt for most of the period.  When we combine the 
  As long as the economy maintains its strong growth momentum so that tax receipts 
also increase, the government can always assume the remaining (and new) NPLs without 
significantly affecting the economy.  In this regard, Panel B of Table 21-A compares total 
outstanding government debt, and Panel C presents a comparison of the ratio of (NPLs + 
Government Debt)/GDP across countries, with the sum of NPLs and government debt indicating 
the total burden of the government.  Depending on data availability, total government debt is 
either measured by the sum of all types of domestic and foreign debt (the U.S., Japan, and India), 
or by the level of outstanding government bonds (all other countries) in a given year.   
                                                          
46 Consistent with this view, Lardy (1998) argues that, if using international standards on bad loans, the 
existing NPLs within China’s state-owned banks as of the mid-1990s would make these banks’ total net 
worth negative, so that the entire network of state banks would have been insolvent. 
47 See, for example, Perkins and Rawski (2008) for a review and projections on the prospects of long-run 
economic growth and statistics in China. 
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results from Panels A and B and compare the total government burden in Panel C, we use two 
sets of ratios for U.S. and Japan.  In addition to using total outstanding government debt, we use 
ratios (in the brackets) based on the sum of net government debt and NPLs, where net 
government debt is the difference between government borrowing (a ‘stock’ measure) and 
government lending (also a stock measure); not surprisingly, these ratios are much lower than 
using the gross figures. 
From Panel C, China’s total government burden is in the middle of the pack: the ratios of 
total government burden over GDP (using the official NPL figures) are significantly lower than 
those in Japan, the U.S., and India, are comparable with those of Taiwan and Korea, and are 
higher than Indonesia only.  In recent years, even if we double the size of the official NPL figures, 
China’s total government burden would not increase much as the total amount of NPLs is small 
relative to the size of GDPs.  Based on these crude comparisons, going forward it seems that the 
NPLs should not be an arduous burden for the Chinese government (or the banking sector), 
while the same cannot be said for Japan and the U.S.  Caution is needed for this conclusion: first, 
new NPLs in China may grow much faster than other countries as the government’s recent 
massive economic stimulus plan led to a significant increase in new loans made during 2008-
2009, including many questionable loans to local governments48
Recognizing the importance of and its responsibility in reducing NPLs in the Big Four 
; and second, China’s currently 
small government debt may experience a sharp increase in the near future given the need for 
higher fiscal spending in areas such as pension plans and other social welfare programs. 
                                                          
48 According to senior officials from the CBRC, Chinese banks are facing default risks on more than one-
fifth of the RMB7,700bn ($1,135bn) loans they have made to local governments across the country; most 
of these loans were used to fund regional infrastructure projects (Financial Times, 08/01/2010). In July 
2011, Moody estimated that local government loans can be as high as RMB14.2 trillion, and the NPL ratio 
for Chinese banks could be 8-12% (Reuters, 07/05/2011).    
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banks, the Chinese government injected large amounts of foreign currency reserves (mostly in 
the form of US dollars, T-bills, Euros and Yen) into these banks to improve their balance sheets 
in preparation for going public.  This process began at the end of 2003, with the establishment 
of the Central Huijin Investment Company, through which the PBOC injected US$45 billion of 
reserves into the BOC and PCBC, while ICBC (the largest commercial bank in China and one of 
the largest in the world in terms of assets) received US$15 billion during the first half of 2005.  In 
2008, ABC received US$19 billion from Huijin in spite of the global financial crisis.  All Big Four 
banks have since become publicly listed and traded on either the HKSE and/or the SHSE, 
including ABC (the last of the Big Four), which completed its IPO on July 15, 2010 (SHSE) and July 
16 (HKSE).  
However, the injection plan will not prevent new NPLs from originating in the banking 
system.  In fact, it may create perverse “too big to fail” incentives for state-owned banks, in that 
if these banks believe that there will be a ‘bailout’ whenever they run into future financial 
distress, they have an incentive to take on risky, negative-NPV projects. This moral hazard 
problem can thwart the government’s efforts in keeping the NPLs in check, while similar 
problems occurred during and after the government bailouts in the S&L crisis in the U.S. in the 
1980s (e.g., Kane 1989, 2003) and are among the most significant factors that caused the 
ongoing financial crisis.  In this regard, a credible commitment from the government that the 
capital injection plan is a one-time measure to boost the capital adequacy of these banks, and 
that there will be no (similar) injection plans in the future can help alleviate the moral hazard 
problem.   
Another measure taken by the Chinese government to reduce the NPLs is the 
133 
 
establishment of four state-owned AMCs.  As discussed earlier, the goal of the AMCs is to 
assume the NPLs (and offering debt-for-equity swaps to the banks49) accumulated in each of the 
Big Four banks and liquidate them.  The liquidation process includes asset sales, tranching, 
securitization, and resale of loans to investors.50  Table 21-B shows that cash recovery on the 
bad loans processed by the AMCs ranges from 6.9% to 35% between 2001 and 2006 (first 
quarter)51
To summarize, NPLs have been considerably reduced in recent years.  If the economy 
can maintain its current pace of growth, the government can always write off a large fraction of 
the rest (and newly accumulated) of the NPLs to avert any serious problems for China.  Again, 
caution is in place for this optimistic outlook.  One can argue that NPLs are bigger than the 
official statistics suggest to begin with, and that a substantial amount of new NPLs will continue 
to arise within state-owned banks.  If the growth of the economy significantly slows down, while 
the accumulation of NPLs continues, the banking sector problems could lead to a financial crisis.  
, while the asset recovery rates are slightly higher.  A critical issue that affects the 
effectiveness of the liquidation process is the relationship among AMCs, banks, and distressed 
or bankrupt firms.  Since both the AMCs and the banks are state-owned, it is not likely that the 
AMCs would force the banks to cut off (credit) ties with defaulted borrowers (SOEs or former 
SOEs) as a privately owned bank would do.  Thus, as the old NPLs are liquidated, new NPLs from 
the same borrowers continue to surface. 
                                                          
49 One example is Cinda Asset Management Corporation, which was set up in April, 1999, with a registered 
capital of RMB 10 billion provided by the Ministry of Finance. It took over RMB 220 billion NPLs from 
the China Construction Bank and funded its purchase via bond issues. 
50 The sale of tranches of securitized NPLs to foreign investors began in 2002. The deal was struck between 
Huarong , one of the four AMCs, and a consortium of U.S. investment banks led by Morgan Stanley (and 
including Lehman Brothers and Salomon Smith Barney) and was approved by the government in early 
2003 (Financial Times, 05/2003).  
51 The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), from which we obtained data (for 2004-2009), 
stopped reporting data on NPLs from AMCs. 
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This could spill over into other sectors of the economy and cause a slowdown in growth or a 
recession.   
 
Table 21-A  A Comparison of Non-performing Loans (NPLs) and Government Debt 
        This table compares total outstanding NPLs within the banking system, government debt, and the ratio of (NPLs + 
Government Debt)/GDP among China, the U.S., and other major Asian countries for the period 1997-2010.  Panel A 
presents the size of the NPLs, as measured by US$ billion and as the percentage of GDPs in the same year.  NPLs in the 
U.S. measure the outstanding “delinquency loan”; NPLs in Japan measure the “risk management loans” (or loans 
disclosed under the Financial Reconstructed Law and/or loans subject to self-assessment).  In Panel B, outstanding 
government debt is measured at the end of each year; for the U.S. and Japan, total government debt includes 
domestic and foreign debt.  In Panel C, the ratios for China include using the official NPL numbers and using doubled 
official NPLs (i.e., the ratios in the brackets are (doubled NPLs + government debt)/GDP); the ratios in the brackets for 
the U.S. and Japan are (net government debt + NPLs)/GDP, where net government debt is the difference between 
government borrowing (stock measure) and government lending (flow measure).  All figures are converted into U.S. 
dollars using the average exchange rate within the observation year. 
Year  China  U.S.  Japan  Korea  India  Indone
 
 Taiwan 
Panel A: Size of NPLs: In US$ billion and as percentage of GDPs in the same year (in brackets) 
    -- 66.9 (0.8%) 217.4 (5.1%) 16.2  (3.1%)  -- 0.2 (0.1%) 19.6 (6.5%) 
1998 20.5 (2.0%) 71.3 (0.8%) 489.7 (12.7%) 23.2  (6.7%) 12.7  (3.1%) 5.5 (5.2%) 21.8 (7.9%) 
1999 105.1 (9.7%) 72.2 (0.8%) 547.6 (12.6%) 54.4  (12.2%) 14.0  (3.2%) 3.2 (3.8%) 27.2 (9.1%) 
2000 269.3 (22.5%) 90.1 (0.9%) 515.4 (11.1%) 35.5  (6.9%) 12.9  (2.8%) 6.3 (2.7%) 33.2 (10.3%) 
2001 265.3 (20.0%) 108.4 (1.1%) 640.1 (15.6%) 12.2  (2.5%) 13.2  (2.8%) 4.3 (1.7%) 37.9 (13.0%) 
2002 188.4 (13.0%) 107.8 (1.0%) 552.5 (14.1%) 9.9  (1.8%) 14.8  (3.0%) 3.3 (2.0%) 30.7 (10.4%) 
2003 181.2 (11.0%) 95.9 (1.0%) 480.1 (11.3%) 11.7  (1.9%) 14.6  (2.5%) 4.7 (1.5%) 23.1 (7.7%) 
2004 207.4 (10.7%) 81.3  (0.9%) 334.8  (7.3%) 10.0  (1.5%) 14.4  (2.2%) 3.8 (2.1%) 26.4 (5.1%) 
2005 164.2 (7.3%) 84.6 (0.7%) 183.3 (4.0%) 7.6  (1.0%) 13.4  (1.7%) 6.0  (1.5%) 11.2  (3.2%) 
2006 157.4  (5.9%) 103.8  (0.8%) 157.8  (3.6%) 8.2  (0.9%) 11.2  (1.3%) 5.2 (1.4%) 11.3  3.1% 
2007 166.8  (5.1%) 168.1  (1.2%) 148.6  (3.4%) 8.3  (0.8%) 13.6  (1.2%) 4.5 (1.0%) 10.0  2.6% 
2008 80.6  (1.9%) 328.7  (2.3%) 190.8 (3.7%) 13.0  (1.4%) 15.4  (1.3%) 4.3 (0.8%) 9.0  2.3% 
2009 72.6  (1.5%) 477.5 (3.3%) 188.45 (3.63%) 13.9  (1.5%) 18.2  (1.3%) 4.6 (1.0%) 6.7  (1.8%) 
2010 68.1  (1.1%) 423.4  (2.9%) 208.70 (3.82%) 26.8  (2.6% 20.7  (1.2%) 4.3  (0.6%) 3.8  (0.9%) 
Panel B: Outstanding Government Debt ($ billion) 
 
Outstanding 
Government 
Bond 
Total 
Government  
Debt 
Total Governm
ent  Debt 
Outstanding 
Treasury   
Bonds 
Total Public     
Debt 
Outstanding 
Government 
Bond 
Outstanding 
Government 
Bond 
1997  66.5  5,802.8  4,254.0  5.3  --     
1998  93.8  5,788.8  4,858.0  14.4  178.4     
1999  127.3  5,822.7  6,053.1  28.5  260.2  34.1  46.5  
2000  165.1  5,612.7  6,209.8  32.7  232.4  45.1  45.5  
2001  188.6  5,734.4  6,036.0  39.8  225.4  43.5  58.7  
2002  233.5  6,169.4  6,321.3  45.2  250.2  42.1  77.7  
2003  273.0  6,789.7  6,852.9  67.9  259.7  48.0  75.7  
2004  311.3  7,335.6  7,446.6  107.0  299.6  44.7  85.2  
2005  350.0  7,809.5  8,299.5  165.5  347.1  39.9  86.7  
2006  364.6  8,451.4  7,587.1  216.7  375.2  45.7  85.8  
2007  599.8  8,950.7  7,707.7  245.0  472.0  51.8  94.5  
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2008  701.6  9,985.8  8,966.2  217.8  496.4  52.8  90.4  
2009  753.6 12,867.
  
 9,466.8  290.9  556.6  52.5  82.9 
2010  805.3 14,551.
 
 11,284.
  
 364.0  643.6  68.4  102.0  
Panel C: (NPLs + Outstanding Government Debt)/GDP 
   --  0.71  (0.54) 1.05  (0.40)  0.04   --  --  -- 
1998 0.11  0.67  (0.50) 1.39  (0.63)  0.11   0.46   --  -- 
1999 0.21  0.64  (0.45) 1.51  (0.64)  0.19   0.62   0.24   0.25  
2000 0.36  0.58  (0.40) 1.45  (0.65)  0.13   0.53   0.31   0.24  
2001 0.34  0.58  (0.39) 1.63  (0.83)  0.11   0.50   0.30   0.33  
2002 0.29  0.60  (0.42) 1.76  (0.90)  0.10   0.54   0.23   0.37  
2003 0.28  0.63  (0.45) 1.73  (0.86)  0.13   0.48   0.22   0.33  
2004 0.27  0.63  (0.46) 1.70  (0.81)  0.17   0.47   0.19   0.32  
2005 0.23  0.63  (0.47) 1.86  (0.84)  0.22   0.47   0.16   0.27  
2006 0.20  0.65  (0.44)  1.78  (0.88)   0.24   0.44   0.14   0.26  
2007 0.23  0.66  (0.45)  1.79  (0.89)   0.24   0.44   0.13   0.27  
2008 0.18  0.72 (0.50) 1.78 (0.88)   0.25  0.42  0.11  0.25 
2009 0.17  0.94 (0.46) 1.55 (1.15)   0.24   0.58  0.11  0.24 
2010 0.21  1.01 (0.70) 1.94 (1.20)   0.33   0.45   0.10  0.25 
Sources: Statistical Bureau of China, the People’s Bank of China, Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission; Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank, Statistical Abstracts of the U.S., the Statistical Bureau of Japan; Ministry of 
Finance, Korea, the Bank of Korea, Korean Statistical Information System; IMF, World Bank; Bank Indonesia; Ministry 
of Finance, India; National Statistical Bureau of Taiwan, Bloomberg, Chinabond, and Taiwan financial supervisory 
commission. 
 
Table 21-B  Liquidation of NPLs by Four Asset Management Companies (RMB billion) 
This table presents results on the liquidation of NPLs by four state-owned asset management companies in 
China during the period 2001 to the 1st quarter of 2006.  These asset management companies were set up to 
specifically deal with NPLs accumulated in the ‘Big Four’ state-owned banks. 
 Book value of 
Assets 
(Accumulated) 
Assets 
Recovered 
Cash 
Recovered  
Asset Recovery 
Rate (%) 
Cash 
Recovery 
Rate (%) 
2001 
Hua Rong 23.21 12.54 7.55 54.0 32.5 
Great Wall 53.11 6.30 3.69 11.9 6.9 
Oriental 18.29 8.51 4.42 46.5 24.2 
Xin Da 29.90 22.50 10.49 75.3 35.1 
Total 124.51 49.86 26.15 40.0 21.0 
2002 
Hua Rong 32.04 11.43 10.20 35.7 31.8 
Great Wall 45.48 7.94 5.47 17.5 12.0 
Oriental 22.10 10.60 5.57 47.9 25.2 
Xin Da 33.10 17.46 10.51 52.7 31.8 
Total  132.73 47.43 31.75 35.7 23.9 
2004 
 Accumulated 
 
Cash 
 
Disposal Ratio 
 
Asset Recovery 
  
Cash 
 
  
Hua Rong 209.54 41.34 59.77 25.29 19.73 
Great Wall 209.91 21.57 61.91 14.43 10.27 
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Oriental 104.55 23.29 41.42 29.50 22.27 
Xin Da 151.06 50.81 48.90 38.29 33.64 
Total 675.06 137.00 53.96 25.48 20.29 
2005 
Hua Rong 243.38 54.39 69.17 26.92 22.35 
Great Wall 263.39 27.35 77.88 12.90 10.39 
Oriental 131.76 32.01 52.08 28.73 24.30 
Xin Da 201.21 62.84 63.82 34.30 31.23 
Total 839.75 176.60 66.74 24.58 21.03 
2006 (Q1) 
Hua Rong 246.80 54.66 70.11 26.50 22.15 
Great Wall 270.78 27.83 80.11 12.70 10.28 
Oriental 141.99 32.81 56.13 27.16 23.11 
Xin Da 206.77 65.26 64.69 34.46 31.56 
Total 866.34 180.56 68.61 24.20 20.84 
Notes:  1. Accumulated Disposal refers to the accumulated amount of cash and non-cash assets recovered as 
well as loss incurred by the end of the reporting period.  
2. Disposal Ratio = Accumulated Disposal / Total NPLs purchased . 
3. Asset Recovery Ratio = Total Assets Recovered / Accumulated Disposal. 
4. Cash Recovery Ratio = Cash Recovered / Accumulated Disposal. 
Source: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking 2002-2005, and the reports of China Banking Regulatory 
Commission 2004-2009.  
 
 
3.3.2.2 The Efficiency of State-owned Banks 
As discussed above, the size of NPLs in the banking sector critically depends on the 
efficiency of banks.  We briefly discuss measures that have been taken to improve the efficiency 
of state-owned banks.  First, state-owned banks have diversified and improved their loan 
structure by increasing consumer-related loans while being more active in risk management and 
monitoring of loans made to SOEs.  For example, the ratio of consumer lending to total loans 
outstanding made from all banks increased from 1% in 1998 to 12% in 2008; by the third quarter 
of 2009, RMB 4.99 trillion (or $730.4 billion) of outstanding bank loans were extended to 
consumers.  The size of housing mortgages, now the largest component (87% as in the third 
quarter of 2009) of consumer credit, grew more than 200 times between 1997 and 2008, 
reaching a total of RMB 4.35 trillion ($637.2 billion), although the speed of growth has slowed 
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down in 2011, according to the China Quarterly Monetary Policy Report of the PBOC.  One 
problem with the massive expansion of consumer credit is that China lacks a national consumer-
credit database to spot overstretching debtors, although a pilot system linking seven cities was 
set up in late 2004.  The deficiency in the knowledge and training of credit risk and diligence of 
loan officers from state-owned banks is another significant factor in credit expansion, which can 
lead to high default rates and a large amount of new NPLs if the growth of the economy and 
personal income slows down.   
Accompanying the rapidly expanding automobile industry, the other fast growing 
category of individual-based loans is automobile loans, most of which are made by state-owned 
banks.  The total balance of all China’s individual auto loans increased from RMB 400 million 
($50 million) in 1998 to RMB 200 billion ($25 billion) at the end of 2003, and as much as 30% of 
all auto sales were financed by loans during this period (Financial Times, 05/25/2005).  The 
growth in both auto sales and loans slowed down significantly since 2004 in part due to the high 
default rates.  In 2008, outstanding auto loans decreased to RMB 158.3 billion ($23 billion).  Only 
8% of the auto sales were financed by loans during that year.  Shanghai and Beijing have the 
largest number of car sales and loans.  As many as 50% of debtors defaulted on their car loans in 
these cities.  There are examples in which loan applications were approved based solely on the 
applicants’ description of their personal income without any auditing (Barron’s, 12/06/2004).  
However, the slowdown of the auto loan market was temporary and it quickly resumed its fast 
pace of growth, mainly driven by tremendous demand—China has recently overtaken the U.S. 
to become the largest auto market in the world.  In aggregate auto loans amount to 10%-20% of 
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the total amount spent on autos.  Most loans mature in three to five years.52
Second, the ongoing privatization process, including the listing of state-owned banks, is 
also an effective channel for enhancing efficiency.  As state ownerships stakes shrink, these 
banks can focus more on for-profit goals, and, with more non-state owners entering the mix the 
strengthening of corporate governance to ensure profit-maximizing is the next step.  Panel A of 
Table 22-A presents the performance of IPOs of the Big Four banks (ABC remains in the State 
Sector) and that of the Bank of Communications (BComm).  A notable case is the IPO of ICBC 
(see Allen, Qian, Shan and Zhao, 2012 for more details).  Simultaneously carried out in the HKSE 
and SHSE on October 27, 2006, ICBC raised US$21.9 billion, making it the largest IPO (up to that 
date).  The first day (and first week cumulative) return, measured by the net percentage return 
of the closing price on the first (fifth) trading day over offer price, was almost 15%, suggesting 
high demand for ICBC’s H shares among (foreign) investors.  In terms of ownership structure, 
the state, through various agencies, is by far the largest shareholder, with only 22% of the 
market cap is ‘free float’ or tradable.  The largest foreign shareholder is Goldman Sachs with its 
5.8% ownership stake negotiated before the IPO.  The recent IPO of ABC also attracted a lot of 
attention.  The total proceeds from its IPO from HKSE (July 16, 2010) and SHSE (July 15, 2010) 
reached $22.1 billion, overtaking the ICBC IPO as the world’s largest IPO (Associated Press, 
08/16/2010).
   
53  In particular, foreign investors, including institutional investors and wealthy 
families, contributed over 40% of the $12 billion raised from H shares (in the HKSE).54
                                                          
52 A few foreign lenders (e.g., GM and Ford) were approved to enter China’s auto loan market by forming 
joint ventures with Chinese automakers (Financial Times, 05/27/2005).  
  While the 
53 From Panel A, Table 4A, the total proceeds (in HK$ and RMB) of the ICBC IPO are actually larger than 
that of ABC’s IPO, but given the appreciation of RMB over the period 2006-2010, the proceeds of the 
ABC IPO are slightly larger measured in US$. 
54 Foreign institutional investors include Qatar Investment Authority ($2.8 billion), Kuwait Investment 
Authority ($800 million), Britain's Standard Chartered Bank ($500 million), Dutch bank Radobank 
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first-week stock performance in the two markets was not as impressive as that of ICBC, the fact 
that the IPO was carried out successfully during the recovery period following one of the worst 
global financial crises is evidence that investors from around the globe have confidence in ABC’s 
role as a leading institution in the world.   
The IPOs of the other three large state-owned banks were also successful in terms of 
total proceeds raised, and they all attracted significant foreign ownership at the IPO date as well.  
In fact, as shown in Panel B of Table 22-A, four of the 10 largest banks in the world, measured in 
market capitalization as of July 2010, are Chinese banks, with ICBC leading the chart and the 
newly listed ABC making it into the chart too.  In terms of (book) assets, ICBC is the eleventh 
largest bank in the world (Panel C); however, given the accounting problems of evaluating 
troubled assets related to subprime loans and sovereign debt in troubled Euro Zone countries, it 
is possible that ICBC’s assets, with virtually no exposure to the U.S. housing markets or European 
sovereign debt, could be one of the largest and highest quality in the world.  Finally, Moody’s 
current ratings on these publicly listed banks (on both deposits and loans) range from A to Baa 
(highest rating is Aaa); while S&P rates these banks’ outstanding bonds between A and BBB 
(highest rating is AAA). 
There are two imminent issues with the privatization process.  The first is related to the 
structure of the banking sector, and in particular, whether more competition, including the 
entrance of more non-state (domestic and foreign) banks and intermediaries, is good for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Nederland ($250 million), Australia's Seven Group Holdings Ltd ($250 million) and Singapore's Temasek 
Holdings ($200 million); source: ABC’s post-IPO news report. However, on a global basis, including 
shares that are distributed to various government agencies prior to the IPO, foreign investors only hold 4% 
of all of ABC’s shares. 
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improving the efficiency of both the Big Four banks and the entire sector.55
Third, reforming the organization structure of banks and providing more incentives to 
banks and their employees can improve efficiency.  For example, reforms taking place in the 
mid-1990s provided local banks with more autonomous power, and after the 1994 reforms, 
approved credit volume for specialized banks was based on a maximum ratio between loans and 
deposits instead of administrative quota, which provided those banks with greater flexibility to 
use within-bank transfers to adjust fund allocation.
  Another issue is the 
government’s dual role as regulator and as majority owner.  These potentially conflicting roles 
can diminish the effectiveness of each of the two roles that the government intends to carry out.  
In Section 3.4 below, we  consider whether the ongoing process of floating non-tradable 
government shares in many listed companies can be applied to the privatization process of 
many state-owned banks/institutions.  Only after these banks are (majority) owned by non-
government entities and individuals can they unconditionally implement all profit- and 
efficiency-enhancing measures.  However, in light of what occurred in the developed countries, 
where excessive risk-taking and poor risk management and governance in a few large 
institutions essentially brought down the entire financial system, the current ownership 
structure of the largest Chinese banks, in which the government retains the majority control, 
can enhance the regulation of large financial institutions and help to prevent banking and 
financial crisis in China and other emerging economies. 
56
                                                          
55 For example, with a sample of both state- and non-state owned banks, Berger et al. (2009) show that the 
addition of foreign ownership stakes into banks’ ownership structure is associated with a significant 
improvement of bank efficiency. 
  The reforms also provide more profit 
incentives for managers.  The evaluation criteria changed from adherence to the national credit 
56 These reforms did not liberalize interest rates; the PBOC continues to set the range (upper and lower 
bounds, or base rate and floating range) within which interest rates can be set; relending was also 
centralized by the PBOC.   
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plan to “a combination of profits made by the bank branch, attention to cost control, 
investment in fixed capital of the branch, deposit increases, and reduction of overdue loans” 
(Park and Sehrt, 2001, p619). 
A critical aspect of the decentralization process is to provide individuals with more 
authority and responsibilities.  According to a number of theories (e.g., Stein, 2002), these 
changes improve the quality of ‘soft’ information produced by banks, an essential part of the 
lending process. Under the old regime, decision making of the entire lending process was group-
based and no individual loan officers were held responsible for poor decisions.  Facing imminent 
pressure from competitors (including foreign banks) following China’s entrance to WTO in 2001, 
many state-owned banks began implementing new lending policies in 2002.  These new policies 
grant more authority to individuals in charge of different steps of making loans and monitoring 
borrowers and hold them responsible (ex post) for poor performance; decisions such as the final 
approval of loan contracts are left to a group of senior employees (through voting).  Using 
detailed loan-level data from a large state-owned bank with branches throughout the country, 
Qian, Strahan and Yang (2011) find that an internal risk assessment measure has a more 
pronounced effect, relative to publicly available information (‘hard’ information), on both 
pricing (interest rates) and nonpricing terms (loan size) of loan contracts after the reform and 
becomes a better predictor of loan outcomes.  They also show that when the loan officer and 
the branch president who approves the loan contract work together for a longer period of time, 
the rating has an incrementally stronger effect on loan contracts. These results highlight how 
organizational structure and incentives can affect the production and quality of soft information.  
Better information, in turn, expands the supply of credit and improves (lending) outcomes.   
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One problem that hinders banks’ efforts in improving efficiency is poor and inconsistent 
enforcement of bankruptcy laws and creditor protection.  China’s first bankruptcy law, passed in 
1986, governed only SOEs and had little impact in practice.  The new bankruptcy law, enacted in 
August 2006 and effective on June 1, 2007, applies to all enterprises except partnerships and 
sole proprietorships.  In many aspects the new law resembles bankruptcy laws in developed 
countries.  For example, it introduces the bankruptcy administrator, who manages the assets of 
the debtor after the court has accepted the bankruptcy filing.  Moreover, the law states that 
these administrators should be independent professionals, such as those working for law or 
accounting firms.  Despite all the legal procedures specified by the law, enforcement of the law 
remains weak and inconsistent.  Many distressed and insolvent firms are kept afloat, and almost 
all the listed firms that file for bankruptcy end up with restructuring plans and these firms are 
rarely delisted.57
A number of reasons can explain the weak enforcement of the bankruptcy law.  There 
are regulations and circulars issued by the central government applicable to SOE bankruptcies 
that are de facto in priority over the Law.  A good example is Doctrine #10 of the State Council, 
which governs the bankruptcy process of SOEs in 111 pilot cities.  This doctrine requires 
approval from secured/senior creditors (e.g., banks) before an enterprise can go through 
bankruptcy proceedings.  In reality, however, the bankruptcy court also requires the consent of 
local government (Fan et al., 2008).  Since local governments are usually responsible for the 
settlement of workers displaced by bankrupt firms, it is in their best interest to halt the 
   
                                                          
57 According to the National Development and Reform Commission, 67,000 small and mid-sized 
enterprises were shut down in the first half of 2008, but only 2,955 bankruptcy cases were filed nationwide 
for the same year. When a listed firm is in distress (with the “ST” flag), typically other (nonlisted) firms 
will invest in and restructure the ST firm to avoid delisting, since the ‘shell’ of the distressed firm is 
valuable given the difficult and costly process of IPOs. 
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bankruptcy filing until a satisfactory settlement plan is reached.  As a result, mergers and 
acquisitions with other firms are preferred to bankruptcy, and it has been documented that 
M&As have been indeed used extensively to resolve firms’ distress (e.g., Kam et al., 2008), and 
many bankruptcies cases are postponed or avoided.  In fact, when in distress, both the SOEs and 
local government give the greatest priority to employees; local government favors SOEs over 
banks since SOEs provide more employment opportunities.  Furthermore, banks are often 
reluctant to push for bankruptcy since most of the distressed debt would be written off; the 
recovery rate for most bank loans is less than 10% (World Bank, 2001).  Taking the defaulted 
firm to court to recover loans or seize the firm’s assets is a lengthy process and the chances of 
winning are slim; as a result, only a small number of lawsuits involving bankrupt firms reach the 
courts. 
For insolvent SOEs, what triggers the bankruptcy procedure is not their financial status 
per se, but whether they can get preferential treatment from the government.  The average 
number of bankruptcy cases placed on file (by courts) was 277 per year during 1989-1993. This 
then jumped to 5,900 per year between 1994 and 2003, after the Capital Structure Optimization 
Program for industrial SOEs was implemented in several pilot cities.58
                                                          
58 In China, a court must accept a case petition before deciding whether it should be declined or placed on 
file for investigation/prosecution; thus the number of cases accepted is always greater than the number of 
cases placed on file.  
  The number of cases fell 
after 2003 partly due to the central government’s intention to maintain social stability by 
controlling the number of bankruptcies; the Supreme People’s Court also ruled in 2002 that the 
courts would not process bankruptcy cases if the main intention were to escape debts.  
According to the surveys presented by Garnaut, Song and Yao (2004), 90% of CEOs of the 
surveyed SOEs believe that bankruptcy is actually a feasible channel to evade bank debts. Since 
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the government’s program provides preferential treatments including debt write-offs, many 
SOEs would wait until they are covered by the program before filing for bankruptcy.   
As the most senior creditors (secured debt), banks’ willingness to lend depends on their 
bargaining power and ability to seize collateralized assets upon default, and hence ineffective 
creditor protection not only increases potential losses from bad loans, it also reduces banks’ 
incentive to investigate and monitor borrowers.59
 
  The favorable treatment SOEs enjoy during 
distress adversely change their incentives in investment and corporate governance, these 
effects can also spill over into banks’ decisions to lend to non-state firms and reduce the credit 
access of these firms.  Therefore, consistent regulation guidelines in dealing with distress and 
bankruptcy by different types of firms, along with the government’s commitment to leave the 
decision process to professionals and courts, can benefit the development of credit markets.  On 
the other hand, we discuss evidence below that informal dispute resolution mechanisms outside 
the legal system based on reputation and relationships has been an effective substitute for 
Chinese firms and investors. 
Table 22-A  Chinese Banks’ IPOs and Comparison with Other Banks 
This table presents information on the IPOs of the Big Four banks and that of Bank of Communications (BComm).  BOC, 
ICBC and ABC were listed in both the HKSE (HK dollar) and SHSE (RMB), while PCBC and BComm only listed shares on 
the HKSE.  First day (first week) return is percentage return of closing price of first day (fifth trading day) over offer 
price.  Foreign ownership indicates size of ownership stakes of foreign institutions and investors at the date of IPOs.  
Panel A Performance of Chinese Banks’ IPOs 
 ICBC BOC PCBC BComm ABC* 
 HKSE    
(HK$) 
SHSE   
(RMB) 
HKSE 
(HK$) 
SHSE 
(RMB
 
HKSE    
(HK$) 
HKSE 
(HK$) 
HKSE 
(HK$) 
SHSE 
(RMB
 
                                                          
59 With a large sample of syndicated loans around the globe, Qian and Strahan (2007) show that strong 
creditor protection (in borrower countries) enhances loan availability as lenders are more willing to provide 
credit on favorable terms (e.g., longer maturities and lower interest rates). 
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IPO Date 10/27/
2006 
10/27
/2006 
6/01/
2006 
7/05/
2006 
10/27
/2005 
6/23/2
005 
7/15/
2010 
7/16/
2010 
Offer Price  3.07 3.12 2.95 3.08 2.35 2.5 3.2 2.68 
Proceeds  124.95
 
46.64
 
82.86
 
20.00
 
59.94
 
14.64B 93.8B 68.5B 
1st Day 
 
14.66% 5.13% 14.41
 
22.73
 
0.00% 13.00% 2.2% 1％ 
1st Week 
 
16.94% 4.81% 19.49
 
19.16
 
-
 
13.00% 9.1% 1.9% 
Foreign 
Ownership 
7.28% -- 14.40
% 
-- 14.39
% 
18.33% 40.8
% 
-- 
Source: IPO prospectuses submitted to SHSE and HKSE; SHSE and HKSE. 
*: In USD, ABC raised $22.1 billion from its IPO, beating the record of $21.9 billion from ICBC’s IPO. However in terms 
of RMB, ICBC still holds the record of largest IPO since RMB has appreciated significantly since 2006. 
 
Panel B Top 10 Banks Measured by Market Capitalization ($billion) 
Rank Bank Name HQ Country 
Market Cap. 
$B(July. 16th, 2010) 
Total Return (%) 
YTD 
1 IND & COMM BK  China 214.51  -20.14  
2 CHINA CONST BANK China 189.04  -1.99  
3 HSBC HLDGS PLC U.K. 166.51  -15.40  
4 JPMORGAN CHASE U.S. 155.17  -6.06  
5 BANK OF AMERICA U.S. 140.26  -7.06  
6 WELLS FARGO & CO U.S. 136.71  -2.46  
7 BANK OF CHINA China 130.29  1.71  
8 AGRICULTURAL BANK China 128.60  0.4 
9 CITIGROUP INC US 113.00  17.82  
10 BANCO SANTANDER Spain 102.77  -21.87  
                     Source: Bloomberg. 
 
Panel C Top 20 Banks Measured by Total Assets (July 2010; $trillion) 
Rank Bank Name (HQ Country) HQ Country Total Assets ($trillion) 
1 BNP PARIBAS France 2.95  
2 ROYAL BANK SCOTLAN UK 2.68  
3 HSBC HLDGS PLC UK 2.36  
4 BANK OF AMERICA U.S 2.36  
5 DEUTSCHE BANK-RG Germany 2.26  
6 CREDIT AGRICOLE France 2.23  
7 BARCLAYS PLC U.K. 2.23  
8 MITSUBISHI UFJ F Japan 2.18  
9 JPMORGAN CHASE U.S. 2.01  
10 CITIGROUP INC U.S. 1.94  
11 IND & COMM BANK China 1.73  
12 MIZUHO FINANCIAL Japan 1.67  
13 LLOYDS BANKING U.K. 1.66  
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14 BANCO SANTANDER Spain 1.55  
15 CHINA CONST BA-H China 1.48  
16 SOC GENERALE France 1.47  
17 SUMITOMO MITSUI Japan 1.32  
18 AGRICULTURAL BANK China 1.30  
19 UBS AG-REG Switzerland 1.29  
20 UNICREDIT SPA Italy 1.28  
Source: Bloomberg (based on latest filings), July 15th, 2010. 
 
3.3.3 Growth of Non-state Financial Intermediaries  
The development of both non-state banks and other (state and non-state) financial 
institutions will allow China to have a stable and functioning banking system in the future.  In 
addition to boosting the overall efficiency of the banking system, these financial institutions 
provide funding to support the growth of the Hybrid Sector.  
First, we examine and compare China’s insurance market to other Asian economies 
(South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore).  In terms of the ratio of total assets managed by 
insurance companies over GDP (Figure 19-C), China’s insurance market is significantly smaller 
than that of other economies.  At the end of 2009 total assets managed are only about 10% of 
GDP, while this ratio for the other three economies is over 30%.  It is clear that the insurance 
industry is also significantly smaller compared to China’s banking industry, and property 
insurance is particularly underdeveloped due to the fact that the private real estate market was 
only recently established (in the past most housing was allocated by employers or the 
government).  Despite the fast growth of insurance coverage and premium income, only 4% of 
the total population was covered by life insurance.  Insurance premiums were only 3.2% of GDP 
in 2008, standing far behind the global average figure of over 7%; coverage ratios for property 
insurance are even lower (according to the reports by KPMG LLP).  However, coverage ratios 
147 
 
have been growing steadily at an average annual rate of 6% between 1998 and 2005 (XinHua 
News).  In 2008 the insurance industry in China grew at the fastest pace (40%) since 2002.  In the 
first quarter of 2010, China Insurance Regulatory Committee announced that China’s insurance 
premiums totaled RMB 454.14 billion, representing an increase of 38.6 percent year on year. 
 
Figure 19-C  A Comparison of Assets Under Management of Insurance Companies 
 
 
Table 22-B  State-owned and Private Banks in China (RMB billion) 
Types of Banks Total Assets  Total Deposits Outstanding 
Loans  
Profit1 NPL rate 
(%) 
2009  
Big Five Banks 40,089.0 29,506.5 20,151.7 400.1 1.8 
Other Commercial Banks 17,465.0 15,041.5 9,606.6   
   1) Joint Equity  11,785.0 10,548.7 6,707.4 92.5 1.0 
   2) City Commercial Banks 5,680.0 4,492.8 2,899.2 49.7 1.3 
Foreign Banks 1,349.2 668.8 727.1 6.5 0.9 
Urban Credit Cooperatives 27.2 39.5  0.2  
Rural Credit Cooperatives  5,492.5 4,742.1 5,421.3 22.8  
2008 
Big Five Banks 31,836.0 23,696.1 15,029.3 354.2 2.8 
Other Commercial Banks 12,941.2 11,072.2 7,162.4   
   1) Joint Equity  8,809.2 7,801.8 5,054.5 84.1 1.3 
   2) City Commercial Banks 4,132.0 3,270.4 2,107.9 40.8 2.3 
Foreign Banks 1,344.8 533.5 762.1 11.9 0.8 
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Urban Credit Cooperatives 80.4 76.2  0.62  
Rural Credit Cooperatives  5,211.3 4,173.6 3,753.2 21.9  
2007 
Big  Five Banks 28,007.0 20,067.7 13,850.9 246.6 8.05 
Other Commercial Banks 10,589.9 9,023.3 5,684.4   
   1) Joint Equity 7,249.4 6,432.0 4,001.9 56.4 2.15 
   2) City Commercial Banks 3,340.5 2,591.4 1,682.6 24.8 3.04 
Foreign Banks 1,252.5 390.0 700.0 6.1 0.46 
Urban Credit Cooperatives 131.2 134.1 84.7 0.77  
Rural Credit Cooperatives  4,343.4 3,534.9 3,256.1 19.3  
2006 
Big Five Banks 24,236 18,285.1 11,426.2 197.5 9.22 
Other Commercial Banks 8,038.4 7512.8 5526.6   
   1) Joint Equity  5,444.6 5,396.5 4,156.9 43.4 2.81 
   2) City Commercial Banks 2,593.8 2,116.2 1,369.7 18.1 4.78 
Foreign Banks 927.9 244.0 485.9 5.8 0.78 
Urban Credit Cooperatives 183.1 157.9                        
   
1.0  
Rural Credit Cooperatives  3,450.3 3,040.2 2,747.6 18.6  
2005 
Big Five Banks2 21,005.0 16,283.8 10,224.0 156.1 10.49 
Other Commercial Banks 6,502.2 6,261.1 4,576.6   
   1) Joint Equity  4,465.5 4,570.0 3,487.7 28.9 4.22 
   2) City Commercial Banks 2,036.7 16,91.2 1,088.9 12.1 7.73 
Foreign Banks 715.5 179.3 363.8 3.7 1.05 
Urban Credit Cooperatives 203.3 181.3 113.1 0.9  
Rural Credit Cooperatives  3,142.7 2,767.4 2,319.9 12.0  
2004 
Big Four Banks 16,932.1 14,412.3 10,086.1 45.9 15.57 
Other Commercial Banks 4,697.2 4,059.9 2,885.9 50.7 4.93 
   1) Joint Equity     17.6 5.01 
   2) City Commercial Banks 1,693.8 1,434.1 904.5 8.5 11.73 
Foreign Banks 515.9 126.4 255.8 18.8 1.34 
Urban Credit Cooperatives 171.5 154.9 97.9 0.4  
Rural Credit Cooperatives  3,101.3 2,734.8 1,974.8 9.65  
2003 
Big Four Banks 16,275.1 13,071.9 9,950.1 196.5 19.74 
Other Commercial Banks    
      
3,816.8 3,286.5 2,368.2  
 
7.92 
                   
   2) City Commercial Banks 1,465.4 1,174.7 774.4 5.4 14.94 
Foreign Banks 333.1 90.7 147.6 18.1 2.87 
Urban Credit Cooperatives 148.7 127.1 85.6 0.01  
Rural Credit Cooperatives  2,674.6 2,376.5 1,775.9 4.4  
2002 
Big Four Banks 14,450.0 11,840.0 8,460.0 71.0  26.1 
Other Commercial Banks 4,160.0 3,390.0 2,290.0 -- -- 
   1) Joint Equity 2,990.0 -- -- -- 9.5 
   2) City Commercial Banks 1,170.0 -- -- -- 17.7 
Foreign Banks 324.2 -- 154.0 15.2 -- 
Urban Credit Cooperatives 119.0 101.0 66.4 -- 
 Rural Credit Cooperatives  -- 1,987.0 1,393.0 -- -- 
2001 
Big Four Banks 13,000.0 10,770.0 7,400.0 23.0 25.37 
Other Commercial Banks 3,259.0 2,530.7 1,649.8 12.9 -- 
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   1) Joint Equity  2,386.0 1,849.0 1,224.0 10.5 12.94 
   2) City Commercial Banks 873.0 681.7 425.8 2.4 -- 
Foreign Banks 373.4 -- 153.2 1.7 -- 
Urban Credit Cooperatives 128.7 107.1 72.5 2.6 -- 
Rural Credit Cooperatives  -- 1,729.8 1,197.0 -- -- 
     
  Notes: 1. It is before tax profit up to 2006, and after tax profit from 2006-2009. 
  2.  Big four (stated owned) banks refer to Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Industrial and    Commercial  
Bank of China, and Agricultural Bank of China. Big five banks are the Big four Banks and Bank of Communications. 
Source: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking 2000-2008, CEIC data base, Quarterly Monetary Report of PBC. 
 
 
Table 22-C  Comparison of Assets Held by China’s Non-Bank Intermediaries (RMB billion) 
This table compares total assets held by banks and non-bank intermediaries during the period 1995-2009. 
Year State-
owned 
Banks 
RCCs UCCs Insurance 
Companies 
TICs Non-
deposit 
Intermed-
iaries 
Other 
Commer-
cial 
Banks 
Foreign 
Banks 
1995 5,373.3 679.10 303.92 -- 458.60 48.97 536.91 42.90 
1996 6,582.7 870.66 374.78 -- 563.70 82.02 769.98 55.30 
1997 7,914.4 1,012.
 
498.94 -- 636.40 100.42 948.61 75.80 
1998 8,860.9 1,143.
 
560.63 -- 802.50 120.97 1,128.18 118.40 
1999 9,970.6 1,239.
 
630.15 260.4 907.50 137.08 1,376.89 191.40 
2000 10,793.
 
1,393.
 
678.49 337.4 975.90 160.82 1,828.26 379.20 
2001 11,188.
 
1,610.
 
780.02 459.1 1,088.3
 
223.67 2,255.70 341.80 
2002 13,549.
 
2,205.
 
119.23 649.4 1,544.1
 
408.10 2,997.72 317.90 
2003 16,275.
 
2,674.
 
148.72 912.3 -- 495.58 3,816.80 331.10 
2004 16,932.
 
3,103.
 
171.50 1185.4 -- -- 4,697.20 515.90 
2005 21,005.
 
3,142.
 
203.3 1529.6 -- -- 6,502.2 715.5 
2006 24,23.0 3,450.
 
183.1 1973.1 -- -- 8,038.4 927.9 
2007 28,007.
 
4,343.
 
131.2 2900.4 -- -- 10,589.9 1,252.5 
2008 31,836.
 
5,211.
 
80.4 3341.8 -- -- 12,941.2 1,344.8 
2009 40,089.
 
5,492.
 
27.2 4063.5   17,465.0 1,349.2 
        Source: Aggregate Statistics from the People’s Bank of China (China’s Central Bank) and CEIC, 2000 – 2009.   
 
Table 22-B provides a (partial) breakdown of the different types of banks.  During the 
period of 2001-2009, although the largest four or five banks (the fifth largest bank is Bank of 
Communications, also state owned) dominate in every aspect of the banking sector, the role of 
other banks in the entire banking sector cannot be ignored.  As of 2009, other banks (including 
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foreign banks) and credit cooperatives’ total assets compose over 70% of the largest five banks 
(the actual fraction is likely to be higher due to incomplete information on all types of deposit-
taking institutions); similar comparisons can be made for total deposits and outstanding loans.  
In addition, these banks and institutions appear to have less NPLs than the largest state-owned 
banks.  Table 22-C provides evidence on the growth of non-bank intermediaries.  Overall, the 
growth of these non-bank intermediaries has been impressive since the late 1990s.  Among 
them, “other commercial banks” (many of them are state-owned), RCCs, and TICs hold the 
largest amount of assets; the size of foreign banks and mutual funds (not listed in the table) is 
minuscule, but these are likely to be the focus of development in the near future.60
 
  Finally, our 
coverage of non-bank financial institutions excludes various forms of informal financial 
intermediaries, some of which are deemed illegal but overall provide a considerable amount of 
financing to firms in the Hybrid Sector.  
3.4  Financial Markets 
In this section, we examine China’s financial markets, including both the stock and real 
estate markets, and the recent addition of venture capital and private equity markets as well as 
asset management industries.  We also compare, at the aggregate level, how firms raise funds in 
China and in other emerging economies through external markets in order to determine if 
China’s experience is unique.  We then briefly review publicly traded companies’ financing and 
investment decisions.  Finally, we discuss the further development of financial markets as well 
                                                          
60 Postal savings (deposit-taking institutions affiliated with local post offices) is another form of non-bank 
intermediation that is not reported in Table 4-B due to a lack of time series data.  However, at the end of 
2008, total deposits within the postal savings system exceeded RMB 2079 billion, or 9.5% of all deposits in 
China.    
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as corporate governance and the performance of listed firms.  
 
3.4.1 Overview of Stock Markets  
After the inception of China’s domestic stock exchanges, the SHSE and SZSE, in 1990, 
they initially grew quickly.  The high growth rates continued through most of the 1990s, and the 
market reached a peak by the end of 2000.  As shown in Figure 20, the momentum of the 
market, indicated by the SSE Index, then reversed during the next five years as it went through a 
major correction with half of the market capitalization lost.  Most of the losses were recovered 
by the end of 2006, and the market reached new heights during 2007.  However, following a 
string of negative news worldwide (culminating with the subprime loans-led global crisis) and 
domestically (including high levels of inflation) the market lost three quarters of its value by the 
end of 2008.  During the first half of 2009, with the impact of the massive stimulus package and 
rebounding from a trough, China’s stock market bounced back and recovered about one third of 
the losses in 2008.  However the stock market dipped again in the first half of 2010, partly due 
to the concern that the government is taking measures to cool down the fast growing housing 
market.  Figure 20 compares the performance of some of the major stock exchanges around the 
world, as measured by the ‘buy-and-hold’ return in the period December 1992 and December 
2010 (gross return at December 2010 with $1 invested in each of the valued-weighted stock 
indexes at the end of 1992).  We plot inflation-adjusted real returns.  Over this period, the 
performance of the value-weighted SHSE index (the calculation for the SZSE is very similar) is 
below that of the SENSEX (India), which has the best performance among the group, and that of 
S&P (U.S.), but better than FTSE (London) and the Nikkei Index, the worst among the group.  
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Table 23- A Comparison of the Largest Stock Markets in the World (01/01-12/31, 2010) 
Rank Stock Exchange Total Market 
Cap 
  
Concentration 
(%) 
Turnover 
Velocity (%) 
1 NYSE Euronext (US) 13,394,081.8 57.0% 130.2% 
2 NASDAQ OMX 3,889,369.9 71.9% 340.4% 
3 Tokyo SE Group 3,827,774.2 60.1% 109.6% 
4 London SE Group 3,613,064.0 82.3% 76.1% 
5 NYSE Euronext (Europe) 2,930,072.4 68.9% 76.5% 
6 Shanghai SE 2,716,470.2 55.8% 178.5% 
7 Hong Kong Exchanges 2,711,316.2 69.4% 62.2% 
8 TSX Group 2,170,432.7 79.5% 74.1% 
9 Bombay SE 1,631,829.5 87.7% 18.1% 
10 National Stock Exchange India 1,596,625.3 69.6% 57.3% 
11 BM&FBOVESPA 1,545,565.7 64.2% 64.7% 
12 Australian Securities Exchange 1,454,490.6 79.4% 82.3% 
13 Deutsche Börse 1,429,719.1 78.4% 119.3% 
14 Shenzhen SE 1,311,370.1 31.2% 344.3% 
15 SIX Swiss Exchange 1,229,356.5 65.6% 73.5% 
16 BME Spanish Exchanges 1,171,625.0 NA 117.2% 
17 Korea Exchange 1,091,911.5 75.7% 176.3% 
18 NASDAQ OMX Nordic Exchange 1,042,153.7 69.7% 79.7% 
19 MICEX 949,148.9 64.3% 52.8% 
20 Johannesburg SE 925,007.2 35.0% 33.3% 
Notes: All figures are from http//:www.world-exchanges.org, the web site of the international organization of stock 
exchanges.  Concentration is the fraction of total turnover of an exchange within a year coming from the turnover of 
the companies with the largest market cap (top 5%).  Turnover velocity is the total turnover of domestic stocks for the 
year expressed as a percentage of the total market capitalization. 
   
 
Table 23-B  China’s Bond Markets: 1990 – 2009 (Amount in RMB billion) 
This table presents the development of China’s bond markets.  “Policy Financial Bonds” are issued by “policy 
banks,” which belong to the Treasury Department, and the proceeds of bond issuance are invested in 
government run projects and industries such as infrastructure construction (similar to municipal bonds in the 
U.S.) "Redem." here stands for Redemption 
 Treasury Bonds Policy Financial Bonds Corporate Bonds 
Year Amount 
Issued 
Redem. 
Amount 
Balance Amount 
Issued 
Amounts 
Redem. 
Balance Amounts 
issued 
Amounts  
Redem. 
Balance 
1990 19.72 7.62 89.03 6.44 5.01 8.49 12.4 7.73 19.54 
1991 28.13 11.16 106.00 6.69 3.37 11.81 24.9 11.43 33.11 
1992 46.08 23.81 128.27 5.50 3.00 14.31 68.37 19.28 82.20 
1993 38.13 12.33 154.07 0.00 3.43 10.88 23.58 25.55 80.24 
1994 113.76 39.19 228.64 0.00 1.35 9.53 16.18 28.20 68.21 
1995 151.09 49.70 330.03 -- -- 170.85 30.08 33.63 64.66 
1996 184.78 78.66 436.14 105.56 25.45 250.96 26.89 31.78 59.77 
1997 241.18 126.43 550.89 143.15 31.23 362.88 25.52 21.98 52.10 
1998 380.88 206.09 776.57 195.02 32.04 512.11 15.00 10.53 67.69 
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1999 401.50 123.87 1,054.20 180.09 47.32 644.75 15.82 5.65 77.86 
2000 465.70 152.50 1,367.40 164.50 70.92 738.33 8.30 0.00 86.16 
2001 488.40 228.60 1,561.80 259.00 143.88 853.45 14.70 0.00 100.86 
2002 593.43 226.12 1,933.60 307.50 155.57 1,005.41 32.50 0.00 133.36 
2003 628.01 275.58 2,260.36 456.14 250.53 1,165.00 35.80 0.00 169.16 
2004 692.39 374.99 2,577.76 414.80 177.87 1,401.93 32.70 0.00 201.86 
2005 704.20 404.55 2,877.40 585.17 205.30 1,781.80 204.65 3.70 401.81 
2006 888.33 620.86 3144.87 898.00 379.0 2,300.80 393.83 167.24 553.29 
2007 2313.91 584.68 4874.10 1109.02 413.36 2992.68 505.85 288.09 768.33 
2008 855.82 753.14 4976.78 1082.30 406.38 3668.6 843.54 327.78 1285.06 
2009 1792.7 707.15 -- 1167.8 -- -- 1662.9 440.0 -- 
Yearly 
Growth 
25.3% 24.4% 25.0% 29.7% 27.7% 40.1% 25.5% 22.3% 26.2% 
Source: Aggregate Statistics from the People’s Bank of China (China’s Central Bank) 2000 – 2009 and the Statistical 
Yearbook of China 2000-2009.   
 
 
Figure 20 A Comparison of Performance of Major Stock Indexes  
(Buy-and-hold returns of $1 between Dec. 1992 and Dec. 2010)  
 
As Table 23-A indicated, at the end of 2010, the SHSE was ranked the sixth largest 
market in the world in term of market capitalization, while the SZSE was ranked the fourteenth.  
The Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE), where selected firms from Mainland China have been 
listed and traded, is ranked the seventh largest in the world.  Needless to say, the Chinese 
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financial markets will play an increasingly important role in world financial markets.  Also from 
Table 23-A, “Concentration” is the fraction of total turnover of an exchange within a year 
coming from the turnover of the companies with the largest market cap (top 5%), and SHSE 
(55.8%) is in line with that of other large exchanges, indicating that trading is concentrated 
among large-cap stocks.  “Turnover velocity” is the (annual) total turnover for all the listed firms 
expressed as a percentage of the total market capitalization, and the figures for SZSE and SHSZ 
are the highest among the largest exchanges, suggesting that there is a large amount of 
speculative trading especially among small- and medium-cap stocks (as these are more easily 
manipulated than large cap stocks) in the Chinese markets. 
There are two other markets established to complement the two main exchanges.  First, 
a fully electronically operated market (“Er Ban Shi Chang” or “Second-tier Market,” similar to the 
NASDAQ) for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) was opened in June 2004.  It was designed 
to lower the entry barriers for SME firms, especially newly established firms in the high-tech 
industries.  By the end of February 2007, there are 119 firms listed in this market.  Second, a 
“third-tier market” (“San Ban Shi Chang,” or “Third-tier Market,”) was established to deal 
primarily with de-listing firms and other over-the-Counter (OTC) transactions.  Since 2001, some 
publicly listed firms on both SHSE and SZSE that do not meet the listing standards have been 
delisted and the trading of their shares shifted to this market. On October 23, 2009, China 
launched a Nasdaq-style Growth Enterprises Market (GEM, or “Chuang Ye Ban”) with 28 
companies, mainly from hi-tech, electronic and pharmaceutical industries.  The main purpose of 
GEM is to provide financing for small and medium sized private enterprises.  The first 10 firms 
seeking to list on the GEM drew a combined RMB 784 billion in subscriptions in September 2009, 
while the second and third sets had 18 firms, including Huayi Brothers Media, China’s largest 
155 
 
privately owned film company.  As of October 2011, no index is available for the GEM but most 
of the listed stocks have outperformed the indexes of the two main exchanges.  By April 2010, 
the number of listed firms on the GEM reached 200. 
There is abundant evidence showing that China’s stock markets are not efficient in that 
prices and investors’ behavior are not necessarily driven by fundamental values of listed firms.  
For example, Morck et al. (2000) find that stock prices are more ‘synchronous” (stock prices 
move up and down together) in emerging countries including China than in developed countries.  
They attribute this phenomenon to poor minority investor protection and imperfect regulation 
of markets in emerging markets.  In addition, there have been numerous lawsuits against insider 
trading and manipulation (see, e.g., AQQ (2008), for more details).  In many cases, unlike Enron 
and other well known companies in developed markets stricken by corporate scandals, 
managers and other insiders from the Chinese companies did not use any sophisticated 
accounting and finance maneuvers to hide their losses (even by China’s standards).  These cases 
reveal that the inefficiencies in the Chinese stock markets can be (partially) attributed to poor 
and ineffective regulation.  We discuss below issues related to regulation, market efficiency, and 
the further development of China’s financial markets.   
 
3.4.2 Overview of Bond Markets 
Table 23-B provides information on China’s bond markets.  The government bond 
market had an annual growth rate of 25.3% during the period 1990-2009 in terms of newly 
issued bonds, while total outstanding bonds reached RMB 4,976.8 billion (or $721.3 billion) at 
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the end of 2008.61
 The small size of the bond market, especially the corporate bond market, relative to the 
stock market, is common among Asian countries.  AQQ (2008) compares different components 
(bank loans to the private sectors or the Hybrid Sector of China; stock market capitalization; 
public/government and private/corporate bond markets) of the financial markets around the 
world at the end of 2003.  Compared to Europe and the U.S., they find that the size of both the 
government (public) and corporate (private) bond markets is smaller in Asia excluding Japan 
(Hong Kong, South Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand); 
even in Japan, the size of the corporate bond market is much smaller compared with its 
government bond market.  They also find that the size of all four components of China’s 
financial markets are small relative to that of other regions and countries, including bank loans 
made to the Hybrid Sector (private sector) in China (other countries).  Moreover, the most 
  The second largest component of the bond market is called “policy financial 
bonds” (total outstanding amount RMB 3,668.6 billion (or $531.7 billion) at the end of 2008.  
These bonds are issued by “policy banks,” which operate under the supervision of the Ministry 
of Finance, and the proceeds of bond issuance are invested in government run projects and 
industries such as infrastructure construction (similar to municipal bonds in the U.S.).  Compared 
to government-issued bonds, the size of the corporate bond market is small. In terms of the 
amount of outstanding bonds at the end of 2008, the corporate bond market is less than one-
fourth of the size of the government bond market. However, the growth of the corporate bond 
market has picked up pace in the past few years and this trend is likely to continue in the near 
future. 
                                                          
61 On July 26, 2007, Moody’s raised the rating on China’s government bonds to A1 from A2 and kept it 
unchanged up to now. In November 2009 it raised China’s sovereign rating outlook from stable to positive. 
These ratings are better or comparable than Moody’s ratings on government bonds from most emerging 
economies.  
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under-developed component of China’s financial markets is the corporate bond market (labeled 
“private” bond market). 
There are a number of reasons for the underdevelopment in bond markets in China and 
other parts of Asia (see, e.g., Herring and Chatusripitak 2000).  Lack of sound 
accounting/auditing systems and high-quality bond-rating agencies is a factor.62
 
  Given low 
creditor protection and court inefficiency (in China and most other emerging economies) the 
recovery rates for bondholders during default are low, which in turn leads to underinvestment 
in the market (by domestic and foreign investors).  Lack of a well constructed yield curve is 
another factor in China, given the small size of the publicly traded Treasury bond market and 
lack of historical prices. The situation is improving however, as the terms of China’s Treasury 
bonds now ranges from one month to 30 years. In December 2009, China’s first 50-year 
government bond made its trading debut simultaneously in the interbank market and the stock 
exchange bond market, extending the bond yield curve even further.  The deficiencies in the 
term structure of interest rates have hampered the development of derivatives markets that 
enable firms and investors to manage risk, as well as the effectiveness of the government’s 
macroeconomic policies.  Therefore, further development of China’s bond markets, along with 
its legal system and related institutions, can help the advancement of other markets and the 
overall financial system. 
3.4.3 Evidence on the Listed Sector 
                                                          
62 Dagong Global Credit Ratings, a leading Chinese credit ratings agency, recently released its first 
sovereign ratings report, in which the Chinese and German sovereign debt received higher ratings (AA+ 
and a stable outlook) than those of US, the UK and Japan (AA or lower ratings and a negative outlook; 
Bloomberg, 7/14/2010). 
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In this section, we briefly examine publicly listed and traded companies in China.  It is 
worthwhile to first clarify whether firms from the Hybrid Sector can become listed and publicly 
traded.  Regulations and laws (the 1986 trial version of the bankruptcy law and the 1999 version 
of the Company Law) did not prohibit the listing of Hybrid Sector firms; and selected firms from 
the Hybrid Sector did enter the Listed Sector through an IPO or acquisition of a listed firm from 
the inception of SHSE and SZSE.  However, the accessibility of equity markets for these firms has 
been much lower than for former SOEs in practice due to the enforcement of the listing 
standards and process.  As a result, AQQ (2005) find that 80% of their sample of more than 
1,100 listed firms are converted from former SOEs.  In recent years, the government has 
attempted to change the composition of listed firms by relaxing regulations toward Hybrid 
Sector firms, including the establishment of the recently opened GEM. 
Until the recent share reform, which is discussed further below, listed firms in China 
issued both tradable and nontradable shares (Table 24-A).  The nontradable shares were either 
held by the government or by other state-owned legal entities (i.e., other listed or non-listed 
firms or organizations).  Table 24-B shows that, as of the end of 2009, nontradable shares 
constituted around half of all shares (53%, column 2) and the majority of tradable shares were A 
shares.  Among the tradable shares, Class A and B shares are listed and traded in either the SHSE 
or SZSE, while Class A (B) shares are issued to and traded by Chinese investors (foreign investors 
including those from Taiwan and Hong Kong and QFIIs).  While the two share classes issued by 
the same firm are identical in terms of shareholder rights (e.g., voting and dividend), B shares 
were traded at a significant discount relative to A shares and are traded less frequently than A 
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shares.63
Table 24-A  Types of Common Stock Issued in China 
  The “B share discount” has been reduced significantly since the CSRC allowed Chinese 
citizens to invest and trade B shares (with foreign currency accounts) in 2001.  In addition, Class 
H shares, issued by selected “Red Chip” Chinese companies, are listed and traded on the HKSE.  
Finally, there are N shares and S shares for firms listed in the U.S. and Singapore but operate in 
China (we omit discussions on these shares since they are not listed on the domestic exchanges).  
After the share reforms discussed below in Section 3.4.7, government shares became G shares 
and are tradable. 
Tradable? Definition 
No (Private 
block 
transfer 
possible) 
State-owned 
shares* 
(G shares after 
recent reform and 
tradable) 
Shares that are controlled by the central government during the process when 
firms are converted into a limited liability corporation but before listing.  These 
shares are either managed and represented by the Bureau of National Assets 
Management or held by other state-owned companies, both of which also 
appoint firms’ board members.  After reforms announced in 2005 and 
implemented in 2006-7 state shares became G shares and are tradable. 
Entrepreneur's 
shares 
Shares reserved for firms’ founders during the same process described above; 
different from shares that founders can purchase and sell in the markets. 
Foreign owners Shares owned by foreign industrial investors during the same process 
Legal entity holders Shares sold to legal identities (such as other companies, listed or non-listed) 
during the same process. 
Employee shares Shares sold to firm’s employees during the same process. 
Yes 
(Newly 
issued 
shares) 
A Shares Shares issued by Chinese companies that are listed and traded in the Shanghai 
or Shenzhen Stock Exchange; most of these shares are sold to and held by 
Chinese (citizen) investors.  
B Shares Shares issued by Chinese companies that are listed and traded in the Shanghai 
or Shenzhen Stock Exchange; these shares are sold to and held by foreign 
investors; starting in 2001Chinese investors can also trade these shares. 
H Shares Shares issued by selected Chinese companies listed and traded in the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange; these shares can only be traded on the HK Exchange but 
can be held by anyone. 
 *: There are sub-categories under this definition 
                                                          
63 Explanations of the B share discount include: 1) Foreign investors face higher information asymmetry 
than domestic investors, 2) lower B share prices compensate for the lack of liquidity (due to low trading 
volume), and 3) the A share premium reflects a speculative bubble component among domestic investors.  
See, e.g., Chan, Menkveld, and Yang (2008) and Mei, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2003) for more details.   
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Table 24-B   Tradable vs. Non-tradable Shares for China’s Listed Companies 
Year Shanghai SE: 
State/total 
shares  
^Non-tradable/total 
shares 
*Tradable/total 
shares 
A/total shares A/Tradable 
shares* 
1992 0.41 0.69 0.31 0.16 0.52 
1993 0.49 0.72 0.28 0.16 0.57 
1994 0.43 0.67 0.33 0.21 0.64 
1995 0.39 0.64 0.36 0.21 0.60 
1996 0.35 0.65 0.35 0.22 0.62 
1997 0.32 0.65 0.35 0.23 0.66 
1998 0.34 0.66 0.34 0.24 0.71 
1999 0.43 0.65 0.35 0.26 0.75 
2000 0.44 0.64 0.36 0.28 0.80 
2001 0.50 0.64 0.36 0.29 0.80 
2002 0.52 0.65 0.35 0.26 0.74 
2003 0.57 0.64 0.35 0.27 0.76 
2004 0.58 0.64 0.36 0.28 0.77 
2005 0.57 0.62 0.38 0.30 0.78 
2006  0.36 0.65          0.35 0.27 0.81 
2007 0.37 0.69 0.31 0.28 0.90 
2008 0.47 0.58 0.42 0.37 0.91 
2009  0.49 0.53         0.47 0.50 0.98 
  
^: Non-tradable shares include “state-owned” and “shares owned by legal entities”;   
This column is calculated as “(Non-tradable in Shanghai SE+ Non-tradable in Shenzhen SE)/(Market cap 
in Shanghai SE + Market cap in Shenzhen SE)” 
*: tradable shares include  A, B, and H shares; 
 Source: China Security Regulation Committee Reports (2000-2006), CEIC database and 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn 
 
 
We next describe standard corporate governance mechanisms in the Listed Sector.  First, 
according to the (2005) Company Law, listed firms in China have a two-tier board structure: the 
Board of Directors (five to nineteen members) and the Board of Supervisors (at least three 
members), with supervisors ranking above directors.  The main duty of the Board of Supervisors 
is to monitor firms’ operations as well as top managers and directors; it consists of 
representatives of shareholders and employees, with the rest either officials chosen from 
government branches or executives from the parent companies; directors and top managers of 
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the firms cannot hold positions as supervisors.  The company has the discretion to decide the 
number of representatives of employees on the Board of Supervisors, but representatives of 
employees must account for at least one third of the board.  The Board of Directors serves 
similar duties as their counterparts in the U.S., including appointing and firing CEOs.  According 
to the “one-share, one-vote” scheme adopted by firms in the Listed Sector, shareholders 
including the state and legal person shareholders (that typically own the majority of shares) 
appoint the board members.  Specifically, the Chairman (one person) and Vice Chairman (one or 
two) of the Board are elected by all directors (majority votes); at the approval of the Board, the 
CEO and other top managers can become members of the Board.  The CSRC requires at least 
one third (and a minimum of two people) of the Board to be independent. 
Since the Law does not specify that every member of the Board must be elected by 
shareholders during general shareholder meetings, in practice some directors are nominated 
and appointed by the firms’ parent companies and the nomination process is usually kept secret, 
in particular for former SOEs.  Since not all members of either board are elected by shareholders, 
a major problem with the board structure is the appointment of and contracting with the CEOs.  
Based on firm-level compensation data (available since 1998 due to disclosure requirements), 
Fung et al. (2003) and Kato and Long (2004) find that no listed firms grant stock options to CEOs 
or board members.  The situation is somewhat different now. Among overseas listed SOEs, 
barriers to exercising stock options have been overcome, and some senior executives have been 
granted stock options (examples include the former chairman of CNOOC Wei Liucheng and Bank 
of China-Hong Kong former chairman Liu Mingkang) and received substantial rewards (Caijing 
Magazine, 2008). However, the cash-based compensation level for CEOs is still much lower than 
their counterparts in developed countries, and the consumption of perks, such as company cars, 
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is prevalent. 
Second, the existing ownership structure, characterized by the large amount of non-
tradable shares including cross-holdings of shares among listed companies and institutions, 
makes it difficult for value-increasing M&As.  According to the China Venture Source, there were 
2,656 M&A deals involving listed firms in 2010 totaling US$169.6 billion, a small fraction of the 
total market capitalization.  In many deals, a Hybrid Sector firm (non-listed) acquires a listed firm 
that is converted from an SOE, but the large amount of non-tradable shares held by the state 
remain intact after the transaction.64
Third, one factor contributing to the occurrence of corporate scandals is the lack of 
institutional investors (including non-depository financial intermediaries) as they are a very 
recent addition to the set of financial institutions in China.  Professional investors would perhaps 
not be so easily taken in by simple deceptions.  Another factor is that the enforcement of laws is 
questionable due to the lack of legal professionals and institutions.   
  Such an acquisition can be the means through which low 
quality, non-listed companies bypass listing standards and access financial markets (e.g., Du et 
al., 2008).  
Fourth, the government plays the dual roles of regulator and blockholder for many 
listed firms, including banks and financial services companies.  The main role of the CSRC 
(counterpart of the SEC in the U.S.) is to monitor and regulate stock exchanges and listed 
companies.  The government exercises its shareholder control rights in listed firms through the 
                                                          
64 If we include the cross-border M&As and transactions between parent companies and subsidiaries, the 
total amount increases to US $47 billion in 2000, $14 billion in 2001, $29 billion in 2002, and $24 billion 
in the first three quarters of 2003. 68% of all M&A deals (66% in terms of dollar deal amount) are initiated 
by Hybrid Sector firms, while former SOEs and foreign firms initiate 29% and 3% of the rest, respectively 
(27% and 7% in deal amount).  M&As are most active in coastal regions, and in industries such as 
machinery, information technology, retail, and gas and oil. 
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Bureau of National Assets Management, which holds large fractions of nontradable shares, or 
other SOEs (with their holdings of nontradable shares).  However, since the senior managers of 
the Bureau are government officials, it is doubtful that they will pursue their fiduciary role as 
controlling shareholders diligently, since their compensation is probably not incentive-based; 
even if their compensation was tied to performance, they may lack the expertise to make the 
correct strategic decisions.  Moreover, the government’s dual roles can lead to conflicting goals 
(maximizing profits as shareholder vs. maximizing social welfare as regulator or social planner) in 
dealing with listed firms, which in turn weaken the effectiveness of both of its roles.65
Overall, internal and external governance for the Listed Sector is weak, and further 
development of governance mechanisms is likely in this sector going forward. In Section 3.4.7 
below we further discuss this issue..   
  There are 
cases in which the government, aiming to achieve certain social goals, influenced the markets 
through state-owned institutional investors (e.g., asset management companies) but created 
unintended adverse effects.  Based on a sample of 625 firms with 28% of the CEOs being ex- or 
current government bureaucrats, Fan et al. (2007) find that the three-year post-IPO average 
stock returns of the sample underperform the market by 20%, and the underperformance of 
firms with such politically-connected CEOs exceeds those without politically-connected CEOs by 
almost 30%.  Firms with politically-connected CEOs are also more likely to appoint other 
bureaucrats but not personnel with relevant professional to boards of directors.  
 
                                                          
65 See Pistor (2010) for a description of the complicated relationships among various regulatory agencies 
and the central government branches, and how these relationships affect the decision-making process of 
regulations and enforcement.   
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3.4.4 Real Estate Market 
Like other economic sectors, China’s real estate market has long been operating under 
the ‘dual tracks’ of both central planning and market-oriented systems.  Prior to 1998, 
government control was dominant with the market only playing a secondary role, and 
mortgages were not designated for retail customers and households.  Chinese citizens working 
for the government and government owned companies and organizations could purchase 
properties at prices significantly below market prices, with the subsidies coming from their 
employers.  The reform policies introduced in 1998 aimed to end the distribution of properties 
by employers and establish new housing finance and market systems.  Provinces and 
autonomous regions have established programs to sell properties (e.g., apartments in urban 
areas) to individuals instead of allocating residency as part of the employment benefits.   
Since 1998 the residential housing reform and the development of individual mortgages, 
along with rising household income and demand for quality housing, had stimulated the fast 
growth of the real estate market.  Figure 21-A shows the total real estate investments and their 
funding sources over time.  Total investment increased from RMB 321 billion in 1996, 12% of the 
national fixed assets investments, to RMB 4.8 trillion in 2010 and 20% of the national fixed 
assets investment.  Most of the investment funds have come from domestic sources.  Not 
surprisingly, bank loans are the most important source of real estate financing.  China’s 
continuing economic growth especially in private sectors, urbanization and industrialization, 
limited land supply, increasing foreign direct investments and institutional investments, will 
further enhance the liquidity and long-term prospects of China’s real estate assets.  
As the real estate sector gained more weight in the economy, its impact on other 
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industries, especially the financial and banking industries, increased considerably.  With the 
expansion of the real estate market, banks and other financial institutions lent more to keep up 
with the demand for financing.  When the fast expansion, in part fueled by the inflows of 
speculative capital and agency problems in investment, could not be sustained, increased 
demand led to hikes in property prices and real estate bubbles surfaced. The bursting of such 
bubbles can lead to painful consequences in the entire economy.       
 
 
 
Figure 21-A  Total Real Estate Investments and their sources (1996-2009) Bottom part of the figure in the top panel is enlarged and plotted in the bottom panel, which presents the funding sources of real estate investment over the period of 1996-2009. 
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Figure 21-B  Total Floor Space (developed vs. sold) in China 
 
 
Figure 21-C  Growth Rats in Total Floor Space (developed vs. sold) in China 
(data source for Figures 21-B and 21-C: CEIC) 
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the entire nation, and Figure 21-C compares the growth rates of total housing space developed 
vs. total space sold; actual space is normalized so that both charts begin at 100 in 2002; hence 
the vertical axis measures growth rates.  We can see that while total space developed and total 
space sold (for both residential and nonresidential properties) grew at similar rates over the 
period (Figure 21-C), the gap between total space developed and sold—a proxy for the 
inventory of housing supply in the markets—widened from around 0.6 billion square meters in 
2002 to 2.2 billion square meters in 2009.  
In Figures 22-A through 22-E we plot and compare growth rates of average housing 
prices and disposable household income, over the period 2002-2009, for the nation and the four 
major cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Guangzhou.  Once again, actual housing prices 
(RMB per square meter) and disposable income are normalized so that both charts begin at 100 
in 2002; hence the vertical axis measures growth rates and all the figures for prices and income 
are inflation adjusted.  Steady growth of disposable income in line with rising housing prices can 
help sustain the growth of the housing markets, and hence considerable and increasing gaps in 
the growth rates reflect potential bubbles in the housing markets.  Based on the figures it 
appears that while at the national level and in the city of Guangzhou there are no signs of 
bubbles, the opposite can be said for the large regional markets in Beijing, Shanghai and 
Shenzhen, where housing prices are rising at much higher paces than those of real disposable 
income in recent years.  Shenzhen presents the most worrisome case, where despite fast-rising 
housing prices fueled by the inflow of speculative capital, real household income actually 
declined in 2008 and 2009 (from 2007 levels), perhaps (partially) due to the adverse effects of 
the global financial crisis on the exporting sectors, which rely mainly on migrant workers from 
other regions.                  
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Figure  22-A:  Comparing the growth of National Housing Prices and Disposable Household Income  
(data source for Figures 5-A through 5-E: CEIC) 
 
 
 
 Figure 22-B:  Growth of Housing Prices and Disposable Household Income in Beijing 
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Figure 22-C:  Growth of Housing Prices and Disposable Household Income in Shanghai 
 
  
Figure 22-D:  Growth of Housing Prices and Disposable Household Income in Shenzhen 
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Figure 22-E:  Growth of Housing Prices and Disposable Household Income in Guangzhou 
 
We would like to emphasize again that our results are based on simple measures; 
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Huang, 2010).  Given the rising status of the Chinese economy and its currency, coupled with the 
weakening of the U.S. economy (and other developed countries), the dollar and near-zero 
interest rates in most developed countries, the inflow of ‘hot money’ into China’s real estate 
markets (and other sectors) may continue. 
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deposit ratio.  In 2010 and 2011, in response to the fast rising housing prices, the government 
has announced a series of interventions including: (a) increased equity down payment shares 
from 20% to 30% for first homes of more than 90 square meters in size; (b) increased equity 
down payment shares from 40% to 50% for second homes; (c) general discouragement of the 
use of any leverage on third homes or by external buyers (i.e., those not living in the market of 
the intended purchase); (d) new rules to prevent developers from hoarding housing units; (e) 
preparation of the introduction of a local property tax, with possible pilot implementations in 
Chongqing, a large city in the southwestern region that is under direct control of the central 
government, within the next one to two years; and (f) direct administrative orders on how much 
land and units of buildings can be developed.66
Despite the government’s macroprudential policies in recent years and the newly 
announced measures and strong signals in recent months, the impact of these measures on the 
housing markets seems to be limited.  One reason, as stipulated by many observers, is that since 
various government agencies and officials have played a major role in developing ‘commercial 
properties’ it is not in their best interest to see major market corrections.  The evidence in Wu et 
al. (2011) provides some support of this view.  They find that much of the increase in housing 
prices is occurring in land values.  Using land auctions data from Beijing, they also find SOEs 
controlled by the central government paid 27% more than other bidders for an otherwise 
equivalent land parcel.  Since many vested government officials have a lot to lose following a 
  Among these measures, the proposed property 
tax may play a significant role in cooling down the markets, because it would raise the cost of 
carry on speculative investments in owner-occupied housing.  
                                                          
66 For more details, see “Gazette of Executive Meeting of the State Council,” December 14th, 2009; and 
“Circular of the State Council on Resolutely Containing the Precipitous Rise of Housing Prices in Some 
Cities” (Decree No. [2010] 10), April 17th, 2010, and Wu et al. (2011). 
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crash in the real estate markets, it is argued that the new measures, including the proposed 
property taxes, will not be effectively enforced; such a belief can also explain why speculative 
capital continues to enter the housing markets.   
Given the experiences of many other countries in the recent and previous financial 
crises, the government’s efforts in controlling the rise of housing markets in the aforementioned 
regions, and preventing this spreading to other regions of the country can augment its other 
efforts in stabilizing the economy and alleviating social tensions.  In Section 3.4 below we 
further examine how the inflow of speculative capital and subsequent outflow can create 
bubbles in the markets and then the bursting of the bubbles can spread to other sectors of the 
economy.  
 
3.4.5 Private Equity/Venture Capital and the Funding of New Industries 
Allen and Gale (1999, 2000a) have suggested that stock market-based economies, such 
as the U.K. in the 19th century and the U.S. in the 20th century, have been more successful in 
developing new industries than intermediary-based economies such as Germany and Japan.  
They argue that markets are better than banks for funding new industries, because evaluation of 
these industries based on experience is difficult, and there is wide diversity of opinion.  Stock 
market-based economies such as the U.S. and U.K. also tend to have well-developed systems for 
the acquisition and distribution of information, so the cost of information to investors is low.  
Markets then work well because investors can gather information at low costs and those that 
anticipate high profits can provide the finance to the firms operating in the new industries.  
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A key part of this process is the private equity/venture capital sector (see, e.g., Kortum 
and Lerner 2000).  Venture capitalists are able to raise large amounts of funds in the U.S. 
because of the prospect that successful firms will be able to undertake an IPO.  With data from 
21 countries, Jeng and Wells (2000) find that venture capital is less important in other countries, 
while the existence of an active IPO market is the critical determinant of the importance of 
venture capital in a country.  This is consistent with the finding of Black and Gilson (1998) in a 
comparison of the U.S. and Germany, that the primary reason venture capital is relatively 
successful in the U.S. is the active IPO market that exists there.  
These facts imply that the development of active venture capital and private equity 
markets can increase the financing for China’s new industries.  What is unusual about China 
(perhaps along with India) is that it currently has the ability to develop both traditional 
industries, such as manufacturing, and in the near future new, high-tech industries, such as 
aerospace, computer software, semiconductors, and bio-genetics.  This is different from the 
experience of South Korea and Taiwan in the 1970s and that of most other emerging economies 
in the 1990s, as all these other countries focused on developing manufacturing industries first.  
In terms of developing traditional industries (e.g., Korea and Taiwan in the 1970s), China has 
already followed suit in first introducing advanced (relative to domestic companies) but not the 
most advanced technologies from developed countries; and “nationalizing” these technologies 
within designated companies before moving toward the more advanced technologies.  Allen and 
Gale (1999, 2000a) argue that banks are better than financial markets for funding mature 
industries because there is wide agreement on how they are best managed, so the delegation of 
the investment decision to a bank works well.  This delegation process, and the economies of 
scale in information acquisition through delegation, makes bank-based systems more efficient in 
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terms of financing the growth in these industries.  Therefore, the banking system can contribute 
more in supporting the growth and development of these industries than markets.  
 
3.4.6 Asset Management Industries 
The mutual fund industry in China has gone through three stages of development.  The 
first stage is between 1992, when China’s first fund (LiuBo) was established, and 1997, when the 
first version of the mutual fund regulation was drafted and passed by the CSRC.  The LiuBo Fund 
was a closed-end fund with NAV RMB100 million RMB ($12.5 million) and began to trade on the 
SHSE in 1993.  While the industry experienced fast growth in the few years after 1992, lack of 
regulation and problems associated with fund trading hampered the further development of the 
industry.  The first open-end fund was established in September, 2001 (Hua An Chuangxin), 
following the announcement of the proposal for open-end fund investment by the CSRC, a 
milestone for China’s mutual fund industry.     
Figure 23 shows the development of the mutual fund industry in China.  With only a 
handful of funds in 1998, China now has sixty-five fund companies managing 551 different funds 
as of November 2009.  The total net assets value increased from RMB11 billion (or $1.3 Billion) 
in 1998 to about RMB 2.26 trillion (or $328 billion) in November 2009 (this figure was much 
higher in the second half of 2007 before the markets went south).  In 2001, the NAV of all funds 
was about 0.8% of GDP and 1.19% of total national savings; these figures rose to 6.16% of GDP 
and 8.58% of total savings in 2008.  The growth of open-end funds contributed to most of the 
growth in the industry.  As of November 2009, 520 funds are open-ended and 31 are close-
ended, with 96% of the total fund value managed by open-end funds.  The most popular 
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investment style is actively managed (domestic) equity, with only a few index funds and ETFs 
(exchange traded funds). 
 
 
 
Figure 23 Growth in China’s Mutual Fund Industry (1998-2009) 
 
 
Many mutual fund companies are owned by securities and other financial services 
companies.  Like their counterparts in the U.S., management fees are the major source of 
income for fund companies, accounting for about 80% of total income.  Administration fees 
account for 9% of total income, and the rest of the income comes from investment and other 
incomes.  More than half of the fund managers have a master-level or higher academic degree, 
and the majority of them are 36 to 45 years old.  Investment capital from institutional investors 
is about the same as that from individual investors in 2005, but in 2006 individual investors 
account for 70% of the total mutual fund investment.  Among the 23 newly launched funds in 
the first half of 2009, individual investors account for 75.8%. 
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The first fund managed by a qualified foreign institutional investor (QFII) was set up in 
2002. The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) is the government agent that 
regulates the QFII funds.  The QFII Act allows foreign investors to invest in Chinese securities, 
with the intention of introducing sophisticated foreign investors to the Chinese market with the 
hope that their presence would improve market efficiency.  In addition, with the exercise of 
their shareholder rights, their presence can also help improve corporate governance of the 
Listed Sector.  However, the original QFII rules imposed restrictions on foreign investors, such as 
a capital lock-up period of one to three years limiting capital withdrawal (and leaving China) and 
other operating restrictions.  In August 2006, CSRC revised QFII rules to promote more 
participation from foreign investors.  Under the new rules, there has been a significant increase 
in applications from foreign investors for QFII quotas.   
Most of the institutions in the first group of QFII applicants were securities companies 
and investment banks, with other financial services companies such as insurance companies and 
pension fund companies also on the list.  By the end of July 2006, China had approved a total of 
$7.495 billion foreign investment capital (quota) from 45 QFIIs, or three quarters of the then 
ceiling of $10 billion capital inflow through QFIIs.  In December 2007, the investment 
quota/ceiling tripled, from $10 billion to $30 billion.  In September 2009, draft rules were issued 
by SAFE to increase the upward limit of investment for an individual QFII institution to $1 billion 
from the previous $800 million. Some analysts believe that the move to increase the QFII quota 
was also intended to prepare for the large amount of floating of non-tradable shares.  If the 
holders of the newly floated shares rush to sell, QFII funds can be a stabilizing source of the 
market.  As of August 2011, there were a total of 116 approved QFIIs operating in China, of 
which 103 were investment funds. The approved investment quotas reached $20.69 billion.   
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The approval of qualified domestic institutional investors (QDII) to invest in overseas 
markets came after QFII, in July 2006.  The QDII funds invest in stocks, bonds, real estate 
investment trusts and other mainstream financial products in markets such as New York, 
London, Tokyo and Hong Kong.  Similarly to the QFII scheme, it is a transitional arrangement 
that provides limited opportunities for domestic investors to access foreign markets at a stage in 
which a country/territory’s currency is not freely convertible and capital flows are restricted.  As 
of early 2008, ten fund companies had obtained the approval to launch QDII. The total number 
of QDII funds reached 75 in July 2009.  By April 2011, QDIIs had approved investment quotas of 
$72.67 billion.  Given the recent turmoil in the global financial markets, the performance of the 
QDII funds has been less than stellar.  Going forward, the probable continuing appreciation of 
the RMB against major international currencies including the dollar is a major concern for QDII 
investors.   
China’s asset management industry is expected to continue its growth in the near future.  
In the U.S., mutual funds became the largest group of financial intermediaries in financial 
markets in 1999, holding 29% of all financial assets.  By contrast, mutual funds in China only held 
around 8.1% of all financial assets as at the end of 2009. The further growth of the economy and 
continuing reform of the pension system will generate both demand and supply of capital for 
the industry.  If the trend of opening up domestic markets to foreign investors continues, there 
will be a greater inflow of QFIIs.   
 
3.4.7 Further Changes in Financial Markets 
As we have documented, the financial markets in China do not currently play nearly as 
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important a role as banks.  Going forward, further improvements in the operation of China’s 
financial markets can help to promote the development of high-technology industries as 
discussed in Section 3.4.5.  In addition, developing new financial products and markets can 
enhance the risk management capabilities of China’s financial institutions and firms.  Finally, 
deep and efficient markets can provide an alternative to banks for raising large amounts of 
capital. 
In recent years the performance of the stock markets has been volatile.  This is 
somewhat surprising given the robust performance of the real economy.  We attribute this 
(relatively) poor performance to a number of factors including the following: 
Limited self-regulation and formal regulation.  
The large overhang of shares owned by government entities. 
The lack of listed firms originating in the Hybrid Sector. 
The lack of trained professionals. 
The lack of institutional investors. 
Limited financial markets and products. 
Efforts have been made to address some of these weaknesses.  However, some of these 
are problems can only be tackled over the long run. We discuss each in turn. 
3.4.7.1 Regulations 
There are two ways in which markets are regulated in practice and each has advantages 
179 
 
and disadvantages: first, market forces and self-regulation, and second, government regulation.  
A good example of regulation through market forces and self-regulation is provided by 
the capital markets in the UK in the nineteenth and early twentieth century (Michie, 1987).  The 
role of government regulation and intervention was minimal.  Despite this the markets did 
extremely well and London became the financial capital of the world.  Many firms and countries 
from all over the world raised large amounts of funds.  Reputation and trust were an important 
factor in the smooth operation of these markets.  For example, Franks et al. (2003) compare the 
early twentieth century capital markets with those in the mid-twentieth century.  Despite 
extensive changes in the laws protecting minority shareholders there was very little change in 
the ways in which the market operated.  The authors attribute this to the importance of trust. 
We argue below that China’s Hybrid sector is another example of a situation where 
market forces are effective.  Formal regulation and legal protections do not play much of a role 
and yet financing and governance mechanisms are quite effective.  In this case, as we shall see, 
it appears that competition as well as reputation and trust work well. 
In contrast, the examples of fraud and other problems of manipulation and the 
inefficiency of markets pointed to in Section 3.4.1 suggest that in China’s formal financial 
markets these alternative mechanisms do not work well.  Although such mechanisms may 
develop in the long run as in the nineteenth and early twentieth century U.K., in the short run 
formal government regulation of the type introduced in the U.S. in the 1930s and subsequently 
as a response to the stock market collapse that started in 1929 and the Great Depression may 
allow Chinese markets to function better.  There is evidence from many countries that this type 
of formal regulation is effective.  For example, based on a study of securities laws with the focus 
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on the public issuance of new equity in 49 countries (China is not included) LLS (2006) find that 
disclosure and liability rules help to promote stock market development. 
 
3.4.7.2 Sale of Government Shares in Listed Firms 
One of the major problems Chinese stock markets have faced in recent years has been 
caused by the large amount of shares in listed companies owned by the government and 
government entities shown in Table 24-B.  The Chinese government attempted sales of state 
shares of selected firms in 1999 and 2001, but halted the process both times after share prices 
plunged and investors grew panicky about the value of the entire market.  This overhang 
created great uncertainty about the quantity of shares that would come onto the market going 
forward.  This uncertainty was probably in part responsible for the stagnation of share prices 
between 2002 and 2005 despite the very high levels of growth in the economy.   
In 2005 the government announced a plan of “fully floating” state shares.  Under the 
plan, the remaining state shares among listed firms were converted to “G” shares.  The CSRC 
outlined the format for compensating existing shareholders and also imposed lockups and 
restrictions on the amount of G shares that could be sold immediately after they became 
tradable.  More specifically, the plan stipulated that G shares were not to be traded or 
transferred within 12 months after the implementation of the share structure reform.  
Shareholders owning more than 5% of the original non-tradable shares can only trade less than 
5% of the total shares outstanding within one year and less than 10% within 2 years.  These 
restrictions of G share sales were intended to reduce the downward pressure on the stock price, 
maintain market stability and protect the interests of public investors.  The details of the “fully 
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floating plan” for a firm, including the number of G shares to be granted to each Class A 
shareholder and the time window (e.g., one to three years) of G shares become fully floating, 
had to be approved by two thirds of Class A shareholders of the firm. 
Share reforms began with a pilot program with only four companies participating in 
April 2005.  By the end of 2006, 96% of all the listed companies had completed share reforms; 
by the end of 2007, there were only a few companies that had not reached an agreement with 
their shareholders on the terms of the reform.67
Another fact worth mentioning is that for the firms that go public (IPOs) after the share 
reform, not all of their stocks are immediately floated to the market.  Lock-up periods may still 
apply to large shareholders who obtained the shares before the IPO.  For example, in the case of 
ABC’s recent IPO, the majority of A shares (87.6%) have already been distributed to various 
agencies of the government before the IPO.  In fact, only 25.5 billions A shares (8.6% of total 
outstanding A shares) were issued in the IPO.  Those shares held by the government have a lock-
up for 3 years.  However, they are technically A (not G) shares.  Thus no compensation will be 
paid when those shares become freely tradable.    
  As documented in Table 24-B above, as of 
September 2009, for the first time tradable shares accounted for more than half of the stock 
market, suggesting that the floating of nontradable shares is progressing.  
 
                                                          
67 Hwang et al. (2006) document that share reform increases turnover, especially for firms with low 
liquidity prior to the reform, and reduces speculative trading.  Although share prices drop significantly on 
the day of share supply increases, shareholder wealth increases by 15% overall.  Beltratti and Bortolotti 
(2006) document an 8% abnormal return around the date of share reform announcement.  Liao and Liu 
(2008) show that market reactions to share reforms are positively associated with the quality of the listed 
firms (as measured by firm disclosure), providing evidence of improved market efficiency. 
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3.4.7.3 The Listing of Firms from the Hybrid Sector 
One of the major problems of the stock exchanges is that most of the firms listed are 
former SOEs.  Relatively few are firms from the more dynamic Hybrid Sector.  Reforming listing 
requirements and procedures to make it advantageous for dynamic and successful companies to 
become listed on the exchanges can enhance the overall quality of the Listed Sector.  The 
establishment of the recently opened “GEM” provides an example in this regard.  
 
3.4.7.4 The Training of More Professionals 
This step will allowan improvement in the enforcement of laws and contracts. An 
independent and efficient judicial system requires a sufficient supply of qualified legal 
professionals.  The Ministry of Justice of China states that there are 143,000 lawyers and 12,428 
law firms as of 2007.  Two hundred and six out of China’s 2,000 counties still do not have 
lawyers. Lawyers represent only 10% to 25% of all clients in civil and business cases, and even in 
criminal prosecutions, lawyers represent defendants in only half of the cases.  Among the 
approximately five million business enterprises in China, only 4% of them currently have regular 
legal advisers.  Moreover, only one-fifth of all lawyers in China have law degrees, and even a 
lower fraction of judges have formally studied law at a university or college.  As mentioned 
before, a similar situation exists for auditors and accounting professionals.  
 
3.4.7.5 Institutional Investors 
In most developed stock markets institutional investors, such as insurance companies, 
pension funds, mutual funds, and hedge funds, play an important role.  They employ well-
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trained professionals who are able to evaluate companies well.  This causes markets to have a 
higher degree of efficiency than if they are dominated by individual investors.  In addition, there 
can be advantages in terms of corporate governance if institutional investors actively participate 
in the monitoring of firms’ managers and are directly involved in firms’ decision-making process 
as blockholders of stocks.  For example, in the U.S., pension funds such as CALPERS have 
become the symbol of shareholder activism that strengthens corporate governance, while in 
Japan and Germany, financial intermediaries serve similar purposes.  For China, the efficiency of 
China’s stock markets as well as corporate governance of listed firms can be improved by  
further entry of domestic financial intermediaries that can act as institutional investors.  With 
their large-scale capital and expertise in all relevant areas of business, financial intermediaries 
can provide a level of stability and professionalism that is sorely lacking in China’s financial 
markets. 
Currently institutional investors such as insurance companies, mutual funds and pension 
funds are relatively small in terms of assets held given their early stage of development.  
However, they are expanding dramatically.  Among policies that can further encourage the 
development of such intermediaries are those that provide tax advantages to various types of 
products such as life insurance and pension related savings and investments.   
 
3.4.7.6 A Greater Range of Financial Products and Markets  
More financial products allow investors to form diversified portfolios with more than 
just stocks.  As discussed above, corporate bond markets, along with better enforcement of 
bankruptcy laws and bond rating agencies, provide an alternative class of assets to stocks.  
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Second, the introduction of more derivative securities such as forwards, futures, and options on 
commodities (already in place and trading) as well as on other securities, enlarges the risk 
management toolbox of investors and firms.  In fact, China has launched an index future on April 
16th, 2010, tracking the Shanghai-based Hushen 300, the index of 300 Shanghai- and Shenzhen 
listed class A-shares.  On the first day four contacts were traded.  Of the 2,200 index future 
accounts opened as of May 4, 2010, 95% of them were individuals, and the rest were 
institutional investors.  The proportion of institutional investors is expected to rise in the future, 
since the index future is targeted mainly toward more sophisticated investors for hedging 
purposes.  The launch of this long awaited index future is a major step in the reform of capital 
markets in China and introduces a new tool for risk management. Along with the index future, 
margin trading and short selling of shares were also permitted in April. 
Third, the expansion of their coverage and products (e.g., in property and auto 
insurance as well as life and medical insurance) by insurance companies, and the introduction 
and development of asset-backed securities and other structured finance products by financial 
services companies can further diversify the supply of financial products. 
 
3.5 The Non-standard Financial Sector and Evidence on Hybrid Sector Firms  
In this section we study how the non-standard financial sector supports firms in the 
Hybrid Sector to raise funds and to grow from start-ups to successful industry leaders.  We also 
examine the alternative governance mechanisms employed by investors and firms that can 
substitute for formal corporate governance mechanisms.  Due to data limitations, much of this 
185 
 
evidence is by necessity anecdotal or by survey.68
We first compare the Hybrid Sector with the State and Listed Sectors to highlight the 
importance of its status in the entire economy in Section 3.5.1.  Second, we consider survey 
evidence in Section 3.5.2.  Finally, Section 3.5.3 provides discussions and comparisons of 
alternative financing channels and governance mechanisms that support the growth of the 
Hybrid Sector versus formal financing channels (through banks and markets) and governance 
mechanisms (laws and courts). 
  
 
3.5.1 Comparison of Hybrid Sector vs. State and Listed Sectors  
Figure 24-A compares the level and growth of industrial output produced in the State 
and Listed Sectors combined vs. that of the Hybrid Sector from 1998 to 2009.69  The output from 
the Hybrid Sector has been steadily increasing during this period and exceeded that of the other 
two sectors in 1998.  The total output in 2009 is almost $5,700 billion for the Hybrid Sector, 
while it is around $2,500 billion in the State and Listed Sectors combined.70
                                                          
68 All firms including Hybrid Sector firms must disclose accounting and financial information to the local 
Bureau of Commerce and Industry, and most of the reports are audited.  However, these data are then 
aggregated into the Statistical Yearbook without any firm-level publications. 
  The Hybrid Sector 
grew at an annual rate of over 23% between 1998 and 2009, while the State and Listed Sectors 
69 The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China revised its total industrial output statistics in the 2000 
year book without any explicit explanations. The outputs in previous years (i.e. 1997) were significantly 
revised down compared to the 1998 year book. To be consistent and avoid confusion, we only use data 
from the NBS after 1998.  
70 Due to data limitations, our calculations underestimate the output of the State and Listed Sectors.  We use 
the output produced by SOEs and listed firms in which the state has at least a 50% ownership stake as the 
total output for these sectors, but this calculation excludes output from listed firms that are not majority 
owned by the state; the output for the Hybrid Sector is the difference between the total output and the total 
for the other two sectors.  However, as mentioned above, only around 20% of all listed firms do not have 
the state as the largest owner, hence the total output of these firms is not likely to change our overall 
conclusion on the dominance of the Hybrid Sector over the other two sectors. 
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combined grew at around 15% during the same period.71
All of the above facts make the growth of the Hybrid Sector even more impressive.  Not 
surprisingly, there has been a fundamental change among the State, Listed, and Hybrid Sectors 
in terms of their contribution to the entire economy: the State Sector contributed more than 
two thirds of China’s GDP in 1980 and (non-agricultural) privately owned firms, a type of Hybrid 
Sector firm, were negligible, but in 2009 the State Sector only contributed 30% of the GDP 
(China Statistical Yearbook, 1998-2010).  The above trend of the Hybrid Sector replacing the 
State Sector is likely to continue in the near future. 
  In addition, the growth rates for 
investment in fixed assets of these sectors are comparable (China Statistics Yearbooks; and AQQ 
(2005)), which implies that the Hybrid Sector is more productive than the State and Listed 
Sectors.  In fact, with large samples of firms (from sources) with various ownership structures, 
Liu (2007) and Dollar and Wei (2007) both find that the returns to capital is much higher in non-
state sectors than the State Sector, and that a capital reallocation from state to private sectors 
will generate more growth in the economy.  Fan et al. (2006) and Li et al. (2007) find that state-
owned firms in China have a much easier access to the debt market and accordingly higher 
leverage than non-state firms.  One reason for the differences is that due to government 
protection (for economic and social/political reasons) the costs for bankruptcy and financial 
distress are much lower for state-owned firms.  These firms also have easier access to bank 
loans, especially credit extended by state-owned banks.   
                                                          
71 There is an ongoing process of privatizing SOEs. Potentially this may bias the growth rate of the Hybrid 
Sector higher, as there are firms shifting from the State Sector to the Hybrid Sector. However, the 
overwhelming majority of SOEs became Listed Sector firms (the main channel through which SOEs were 
partially privatized prior to 2004), thus this process is unlikely to change the validity of the results above. 
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Figure 24-A  Comparing the Sectors – Industrial Output 
In this figure we plot total “industrial output” for State (SOEs) and Listed (publicly listed and traded firms) Sectors 
combined and for the Hybrid Sector (all the rest of the firms) during 2000 to 2008.  Data source for this table is the 
Chinese Statistical Yearbook (2000 – 2009).  
 
 
Figure 24-B  Comparing the Sectors – Employment 
In this figure we plot total number of workers employed by the State (SOEs) and Listed (publicly listed and traded 
firms) Sectors combined and by the Hybrid Sector (all the rest of the firms) during 1990 to 2008.  Data source for this 
table is the Chinese Statistical Yearbook and CEIC database .  
 
Figure 24-B presents the number and growth of non-agricultural employees in the three 
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sectors.  The Hybrid Sector is a much more significant source for employment opportunities 
than the State and Listed Sectors.  Over the period from 1990 to 2010, the Hybrid Sector 
employs an average of over 77% of all non-agricultural workers; the TVEs (part of the Hybrid 
Sector) have been the most important employers providing (non-agricultural) jobs for residents 
in the rural areas, while (non-agricultural) privately owned firms employ more than 40% of the 
workforce in the urban areas. Moreover, the number of employees working in the Hybrid Sector 
has been growing at 1.5% over this period, while the labor force in the State and Listed Sectors 
has been shrinking. 72
 
  These patterns are particularly relevant for China, given its vast 
population and potential problem of unemployment. 
3.5.2 Comparison of Hybrid Sector vs. State and Listed Sectors  
Much of the information concerning the Hybrid Sector comes from surveys.  We focus 
on evidence in AQQ (2005) and Cull and Xu (2005).  The most significant findings of these 
surveys regarding financing channels are the following.  First, during the startup stage, funds 
from founders’ family and friends are an essential source of financing.  Banks can also play an 
important role.  Second, internal financing, in the form of retained earnings, is also important.  
During their growth period financing from private credit agencies (PCAs), instead of banks, as 
well as trade credits are key channels for firms in AQQ’s sample.  As documented by Tsai (2002), 
PCAs take on many forms, from shareholding cooperative enterprises run by professional money 
brokers, lenders and middlemen, to credit associations operated by a group of entrepreneurs 
(raising money from group members and from outsiders to fund firms; zijin huzushe), from 
pawnshops to underground private money houses.  
                                                          
72 Our calculations of the total number of workers employed by the Hybrid Sector actually underestimate 
the actual work force in the sector, because the Chinese Statistics Yearbooks do not provide employment 
data for all types of firms (by ownership structure), especially small firms, in the Hybrid Sector. 
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As far as corporate governance is concerned, when asked about what type of losses 
concern them the most if the firm failed, every firm’s founders/executives (100%) included in 
the AQQ study said reputation loss is a major concern, while only 60% of them said economic 
losses are of major concern.  Competition also appears to be an important factor ensuring firms 
are well run.   
Cull and Xu (2005) find that firms in most regions and cities rely on courts to resolve less 
than 10% of business-related disputes (the highest percentage is 20%), with a higher reliance on 
courts in coastal and more developed areas.  One reason that firms go to courts to resolve a 
dispute is because the courts are authoritative so that the dispute will be resolved even though 
the resolution may not be fair (e.g., Clarke et al. 2008).  
 
3.5.3 Discussion on How the Non-standard Financial Sector Works 
In this subsection we first discuss mechanisms within the non-standard financial sector 
in supporting the growth of the Hybrid Sector.  We then compare these alternative institutions 
that operate outside the legal system with the law and legal institutions that have been widely 
regarded as the basis for conducting finance and commerce.  There are two aspects to 
alternative financing channels in the Hybrid Sector.  The first is the way in which investment is 
financed.  The second is corporate governance.  We consider each in turn.  
Once a firm is established and doing well, internal finance can provide the funds 
necessary for growth.  AQQ (2005) find that about 60 percent of the funds raised by the Hybrid 
Sector are generated internally.  Of course, internal finance is fine once a firm is established but 
this raises the issue of how firms in the Hybrid Sector acquire their “seed” capital, perhaps the 
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most crucial financing during a firm’s life cycle.  AQQ present evidence on the importance of 
alternative and informal channels, including funds from family and friends and loans from 
private (unofficial) credit agencies (see also Tsai (2002)).  There is also evidence that financing 
through illegal channels, such as smuggling, bribery, insider trading and speculations during 
early stages of the development of financial markets and real estate market, and other 
underground or unofficial businesses can also play a critical role in the accumulation of seed 
capital.   
Perhaps the most significant corporate governance mechanism is competition in 
product and input markets, which has worked well in both developed and developing countries 
(e.g., McMillan 1995, 1997; Allen and Gale 2000b).  What we see from the success of Hybrid 
Sector firms in WenZhou and other surveyed firms recounted in AQQ, suggest that it is only 
those firms that have the strongest comparative advantage in an industry (of the area) that 
survived and thrived.  A relevant factor for competition in an industry is entry barriers for new 
firms, as lower entry barriers foster competition.  Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (DLLS hereafter, 2002) examine entry barriers across 85 countries, and find that 
countries with heavier (lighter) regulation of entry have higher government corruption (more 
democratic and limited governments) and larger unofficial economies.  With much lower 
barriers to entry compared to other countries with similar (low) per capita GDP, China is once 
again an “outlier” in the DLLS sample given that China is one of the least democratic countries, 
and such countries tend to have high barriers to entry.  Survey evidence from AQQ (2005) 
reveals that there exist non-standard methods to remove entry barriers in China, which can 
reconcile these seemingly contradictory facts.  
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Another mechanism is reputation, trust, and relationships.  Greif (1989, 1993) argues 
that certain traders’ organizations in the 11th century were able to overcome problems of 
asymmetric information and the lack of legal and contract enforcement mechanisms, because 
they had developed institutions based on reputation, implicit contractual relations, and 
coalitions.  Certain aspects of the growth of these institutions resemble what worked to 
promote commerce and the financial system in China prior to 1949 (e.g., Kirby (1995)) and the 
operation of the non-standard financial sector today (AQQ (2005)), in terms of how firms raise 
funds and contract with investors and business partners.  In addition, Greif (1993) and Stulz and 
Williamson (2003) point out the importance of cultural and religious beliefs for the development 
of institutions, legal origins, and investor protections.  
The above factors are of particular relevance and importance to China’s development of 
institutions.  Without a dominant religion, some argue that the most important force in shaping 
China’s social values and institutions is the set of beliefs first developed and formalized by 
Kongzi (Confucius).  This set of beliefs clearly defines family and social orders, which are very 
different from western beliefs on how legal codes are formulated.  Using the World Values 
Survey conducted in the early 1990s, LLSV (1997b) find that China has one of the highest levels 
of social trust among a group of 40 developed and developing countries.73
                                                          
73 Interestingly, the same survey, used in LLSV (1997b), finds that Chinese citizens have a low tendency to 
participate in civil activities.  However, our evidence shows that, with effective alternative mechanisms in 
place citizens in the developed regions of China have a strong incentive to participate in business/economic 
activities. 
  We interpret high 
social trust in China as being influenced by Confucian beliefs.  Throughout this chapter and AQQ 
(2005; 2008) we have presented evidence that reputation and relationships make many 
financing channels and governance mechanisms work in China’s Hybrid Sector. 
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There are other effective corporate governance mechanisms.  First, Burkart et al. (2003) 
link the degree of separation of ownership and control to different legal environments, and 
show that family-run firms will emerge as the dominant form of ownership structure in 
countries with weak minority shareholder protections, whereas professionally managed firms 
are the optimal form in countries with strong protection.  Survey evidence on the Hybrid Sector 
in AQQ and empirical results on the Listed Sector, along with evidence in Claessens et al. (2000, 
2002) and ACDQQ (2008), suggests that family firms are a norm in China and other Asian 
countries, and these firms have performed well.  Second, Allen and Gale (2000a) show that, if 
cooperation among different suppliers of inputs is necessary and all suppliers benefit from the 
firm doing well, then a good equilibrium with no external governance is possible, as internal, 
mutual monitoring can ensure the optimal outcome.  AQQ (2005) and ACDQQ (2008) present 
evidence on the importance of trade credits as a form of financing for firms in the Hybrid Sector.  
Cooperation and mutual monitoring can ensure payments (as long as funds are available) among 
business partners despite the lack of external monitoring and contract enforcement.  The 
importance of trade credits is also found in other emerging economies (e.g., ACDQQ (2012) on 
India) as well as in developed countries (Burkart et el. (2011) on the U.S.).   
It is worth mentioning how entrepreneurs and investors alleviate and overcome 
problems associated with government corruption.  According to proponents of institutional 
development (e.g., Rajan and Zingales 2003b; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005), poor institutions, 
weak government and powerful elites can severely hinder China’s long-run economic growth.  
However, our evidence shows that corruption has not prevented a high rate of growth for 
China’s firms, in particular, firms in the Hybrid Sector, where legal protection is perhaps weaker 
and problems of corruption worse compared to firms in the State and Listed sectors.   
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A potentially effective solution for corruption is competition among local 
governments/bureaucrats from different regions within the same country.  Entrepreneurs can 
move from region to region to find the most supportive government officials for their private 
firms, which in turn motivates officials to lend “helping hands” rather than “grabbing hands” in 
the provision of public goods or services (e.g., granting of licenses to start-up firms), or else 
there will be an outflow of profitable private businesses from the region (Allen and Qian 2009).  
This remedy is typically available in a large country with diverse regions like China.  
Complementing this view, Xu (2011) reviews China’s unique institutional foundation of 
“regionally decentralized authoritarian system,” in which the sub-national governments have 
considerable autonomous power over regional economic decisions and at the same time remain 
under the control of the central government.  Under this structure, local governments play a 
major role in supporting TVEs, allocating bank credits to firms, choosing good firms to get listed.  
This system alleviates the information problem that regulators face, and creates incentives for 
sub-national governors though personnel control and regional competition.  Xu argues that this 
governance structure is responsible for the spectacular economic growth of China, despite weak 
enforcement of formal laws.   
To summarize, the extraordinary economic performance of China in recent decades, 
especially that of the Hybrid Sector, raises questions about the conventional wisdom of using 
the legal system as the basis of commerce.  Most observers would characterize the economic 
performance in China and India as ‘successful despite the lack of western-style institutions,’ and 
the failure to adopt western institutions will be one of the main factors to halt the long-run 
economic growth.  By contrast, Allen and Qian (2010) argue that China’s economy has been 
successful because of this lack of western-style institutions – in that conducting business outside 
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the legal system in fast-growing economies such as China can actually be superior to using the 
law as the basis for finance and commerce.   
Focusing on dispute resolution and contract enforcement mechanisms based on the law 
and courts vs. alternative mechanisms operating outside the legal system, Allen and Qian (2010) 
argue that despite many well-known advantages, there are disadvantages in using legal 
institutions.  First, recent research on political economy factors, and in particular, work by Rajan 
and Zingales (2003a,b) shows that rent-seeking behaviors by vested interest groups can turn 
legal institutions into barriers to changes.  We expect these problems to be much more severe 
in developing countries and the costs of building good institutions can be enormous.74
Second, in democracies there can be a lengthy political process before significant 
changes can be approved (by the majority of the population and/or legislature), and the people 
in charge of revising the law (e.g., politicians and judges) may lack the expertise of business 
transactions and have limited capacity (time and effort) to examine the proposed changes.
  One way 
to solve this problem is not to use the law as the basis for commerce but instead to use 
alternative mechanisms outside the legal system.  Evidence presented in this chapter and other 
related work on China and other emerging economies (e.g., ACDQQ (2012) on India) suggests 
that these alternative mechanisms can be quite effective.   
75
                                                          
74 A frequently talked about and controversial topic is intellectual property rights including patents and 
copyrights.  The practice of enforcing intellectual property rights by courts is much more vigilant and 
prevalent in developed countries than in developing countries such as China. An extensive literature in 
economics has found mixed evidence on the relationship between patent/copyright protection and the pace 
of innovations. While exclusive property rights provide strong incentives for innovations and do lead to 
more innovations in a few industries such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals, excessive protection deters 
competition, which is another important factor in spurring innovations. 
  In 
75 A good example is the U.S. payment system. At the beginning of the 21st Century the U.S. had a 19th 
Century system: Checks had to be physically transported from where they were deposited to a central 
operations center, then to the clearer and then back to the banks they were drawn on. Despite repeated calls 
for changes from the banks and businesses, the U.S Congress did not act on this simple yet costly problem, 
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the context of a fast-growing economy with frequent changes such as China, Allen and Qian 
(2010) show that there is an additional advantage of using alternative institutions because this 
type of system can adapt and change much more quickly than when the law is used.  In 
particular, competition can ensure the most efficient mechanism prevails and this process does 
not require persuading the legislature and the electorate to revise the law when circumstances 
change. 
To conclude, we argue that while legal institutions along with formal financing channels 
are an integral part of developed economies’ institutions, alternative mechanisms and financing 
channels play a much more prominent role in emerging economies, and can be superior to legal 
mechanisms in supporting business transactions in certain industries or entire economies.  
Therefore, the development of alternative dispute resolution and contract enforcement 
mechanisms alongside the development of legal and other formal institutions can promote a 
broader base of economic growth that is also more sustainable in emerging economies.  The 
coexistence of and competition between alternative and legal mechanisms can also exert 
positive impact on the development of legal institutions, so that they are less likely to be 
captured by interest groups and become more efficient in adapting to changes.   
 
3.6 Financial Crisis 
Financial crises often accompany the development of a financial system.  Conventional 
wisdom says that financial crises are bad.  Often they are very bad, as they disrupt production 
                                                                                                                                                                             
until after September 11, 2001. After the terrorist attack all commercial flights were grounded for several 
days, completely halting the check clearing process. The Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act was 
signed in October 2003, allowing electronic images to be a substitute for the original checks, and thus the 
clearing process is no longer dependent on the mail and transportation system. 
196 
 
and lower social welfare as in the Great Depression in the U.S.  Hoggarth et al. (2002) carefully 
measure the costs of a wide range of recent financial crises and find that these costs are on 
average roughly 15-20 percent of GDP.  It is these large costs that make policymakers so averse 
to financial crises.  
It is worthwhile to point out, however, that financial crises may be welfare improving for 
an economy.  One possible example is the late nineteenth century U.S., which experienced 
many crises but at the same time had a high long run growth rate.  In fact, Ranciere et al. (2003) 
report an empirical observation that countries which have experienced occasional crises have 
grown on average faster than countries without crises.  They develop an endogenous growth 
model and show theoretically that an economy may be able to attain higher growth when firms 
are encouraged by a limited bailout policy to take more credit risk in the form of currency 
mismatch, even though the country may experience occasional crises (see Allen and Oura (2004) 
for a review of the growth and crises literature, Allen and Gale (2004a) who show that crises can 
be optimal and Allen and Gale (2007) for a review of the crises literature).  
In this section, we consider financial crises in China.  Given China’s current situation with 
limited currency mismatches any crisis that occurs is likely to be a classic banking, currency or 
twin crisis.  It is perhaps more likely to be of the damaging type that disrupts the economy and 
social stability than of the more benign type that aids growth.  The desirability of preventing 
crises thus needs to be taken into account when considering reforms of China’s financial system.  
First, we examine how China can prevent traditional financial crises, including a banking sector 
crisis and a stock market or real estate crisis/crash.  We then discuss the impact of different 
types of financial crises, such as the “twin crises” (simultaneous foreign exchange and 
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banking/stock market crises) that occurred in many Asian economies in the late 1990s, on China. 
 
3.6.1 Banking Crises and Market Crashes 
Among traditional financial crises, banking panics, arising from the banks’ lack of liquid 
assets to meet total withdrawal demands (anticipated and unanticipated), were often 
particularly disruptive.  Over time one of the most critical roles of central banks came to be the 
elimination of banking panics and the maintenance of financial stability.  To a large degree 
central banks in different countries performed well in this regard in the period following the 
Second World War.  However, in recent years, banking crises are often preceded by abnormal 
price rises (“bubbles”) in the real estate and/or stock markets.  At some point the bubble bursts 
and assets markets collapse.  In many cases banks and other intermediaries are overexposed to 
the equity and real estate markets, and following the collapse of asset markets a banking crisis 
ensues.  Allen and Gale (2000c) provide a theory of bubbles and crises based on the existence of 
an agency problem.  Many investors in real estate and stock markets obtain their investment 
funds from external sources.  If the providers of the funds are unable to observe the 
characteristics of the investment, and because of the investors’ limited liability, there is a classic 
risk-shifting problem (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  Risk shifting increases the return to risky 
assets and causes investors to bid up asset prices above their fundamental values.  A crucial 
determinant for asset prices is the amount of credit that is provided for speculative investment.  
Financial liberalization, by expanding the volume of credit, can interact with the agency problem 
and lead to a bubble in asset prices. 
As discussed above in Section 3.3, if NPLs continue to accumulate and/or if growth slows 
198 
 
significantly then there may be a banking crisis in China.  This may involve withdrawal of funds 
from banks.  However, given the government’s strong position regarding the low level of debt 
(Table 21-A), it is feasible for the government to prevent this situation from getting out of 
control.  Since the real estate markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen (largest volume and most 
developed) and other major cities have already experienced bubbles and crashes (see China 
Industry Report, http://www.cei.gov.cn, http://house.focus.cn and Cao and Liao (2008) for more 
details), it is quite possible that similar episodes in the future could cause a banking crisis that 
will be more damaging to the real economy.  With booming real estate markets, there will be 
more speculative money poured into properties with a large amount coming from banks.  The 
agency problem in real estate lending and investment mentioned above worsens this problem.  
If the real estate market falls significantly within a short period of time, defaults on bank loans 
could be large enough to trigger a banking panic and crisis.  The size of the stock market during 
the first decade of its existence was small relative to the banking sector and the overall 
economy, and hence a crash in the market could hardly put a dent in the real economy.  
However, given the quick growth of the stock market (as shown in Table 23-A) and the fact large 
and small investors may borrow (from banks) to finance their investment, especially during a 
bubble period, a future market crash could have much more serious consequences.  Overall, a 
banking crisis triggered by crashes in the real estate and/or stock markets represents the most 
serious risk of a financial crisis in China. 
Having said that, we also want to point out that the Chinese government has 
maintained strong control over the big banks through their (nontradable) shareholdings.  While 
government control may have a negative effect in more developed countries in terms of 
efficiency, it may be beneficial in countries with less developed financial markets.  In particular, 
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the government can help to control the risk taking behaviors of the banks by regulations and 
direct interventions as a shareholder.  Moreover, in the case of a crisis, the government has the 
ability to speed up the recovery and maintain the stability of the market by loan expansion if it 
has control over major banks.  In fact, the Chinese banking sector and financial markets were 
not affected much by the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. Though we recognized earlier in the 
paper that government’s dual roles as regulator and as majority owner can be problematic, this 
can also be beneficial both in terms of preventing and coping with a crisis.  
 
3.6.2 Capital Account Liberalization, Sterilization, Twin Crises and Contagion  
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, a different breed of 
financial crisis emerged.  Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996) found that three quarters of the 
IMF’s member countries suffered some form of banking crisis between 1980 and 1996, and their 
study did not include the subsequent Asian financial crisis in 1997.  In many of these crises, 
banking panics in the traditional sense were avoided either by central bank intervention or by 
explicit or implicit government guarantees.  But as Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) find, the 
advent of financial liberalization in many economies in the 1980s, in which free capital in- and 
out-flows and the entrance and competition from foreign investors and financial institutions 
follow in the home country, has often led to “twin” banking and currency crises.  A common 
precursor to these crises was financial liberalization and significant credit expansion and 
subsequent stock market crashes and banking crises.  In emerging markets this is often then 
accompanied by an exchange rate crisis as governments choose between lowering interest rates 
to ease the banking crises or raising them to defend the home currency.  Finally, a significant fall 
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in output occurs and the economies enter recessions.  
3.6.2.1 Capital Account Liberalization, Sterilization, Twin Crises and Contagion  
Capital account liberation can attract more foreign capital, but large scale and sudden 
capital flows and foreign speculation significantly increase the likelihood of a twin crisis.  The 
first key question is, when and to what extent a country opens its capital account and financial 
sector to foreign capital and foreign financial institutions?   With a model of endogenous 
financial intermediation, Alessandria and Qian (2005) demonstrate that an efficient financial 
sector prior to liberalization is neither necessary nor sufficient for a successful financial 
liberalization.  Applying these ideas to China, even though the overall efficiency of China’s 
banking sector (especially state-owned banks) is still low compared to international standards, 
banks can have a stronger incentive to limit the moral hazard concerning borrowers’ choices of 
investment projects through monitoring and designing of loan contracts (e.g., adjusting interest 
rates and/or maturities) following a capital account liberalization.  Therefore, the efficiency of 
the banking sector improves and the liberalization can generate a large welfare increase, since it 
leads to both a larger scale of investment and a better composition of investment projects.  This 
is more likely to occur with low interest rates in international markets (so that cost of capital for 
domestic banks is also low).  A financial sector liberalization, which allows foreign financial 
institutions to enter China’s lending markets, can further improve welfare as more competition 
provides stronger incentives for all banks to further discourage moral hazard in investment. 
 
3.6.2.2 Sterilization of Foreign Currency Reserves  
China has experienced a large increase in its foreign exchange reserves since 2001, due 
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to a continuous inflow of capital and the commitment to maintain a fixed rate against the US 
dollar initially and then a crawling peg exchange rate regime after 2005. Figure 25-A plots the 
exchange rate of RMB against US dollar.  The RMB kept appreciating against US dollar until mid 
2008, when the exchange rate stayed flat again at around 6.83 RMB/US$.  It resumed the path 
of appreciation in June 2010 and the exchange rate further dropped to 6.5 RMB/US by April 
2011.  Figure 25-B plots monthly foreign reserves as shown on the balance sheet of the PBOC; a 
clear trend emerges as the reserves increased rapidly since 2003.76
                                                          
76 The PBOC has made use of its foreign reserves in ways other than investing in low risk assets such as 
long term government bonds.  As discussed above, some foreign reserves were used to recapitalize the 
large state owned financial institutions. 
  On the balance of payments 
side, the current account surplus grew from $37 billion in 1997 to $305.4 billion in 2010; net 
export grew from 2.5% of GDP in 2004 to 8% of GDP in 2008 and then dropped to 3.1% in 2010 
due to a decrease in net exports. The capital account was mostly positive during the period 1995 
to 2009, implying a net capital inflow.  The current account surplus has come mainly from trade 
surpluses, while the capital account surplus mainly comes from FDI.  It has long been recognized 
that a large stock of foreign reserves has both pros and cons.  Abundant foreign reserves enable 
a country to maintain a stable exchange rate and to meet its foreign debt obligations.  It can also 
be used to cushion the sudden shocks on a country’s current and capital accounts.  However, an 
increase in foreign exchange reserves leads to an accumulation of foreign assets, a component 
of the monetary base.  Thus an increase in foreign reserves, ceteris paribus, causes monetary 
expansion and puts inflationary pressures on the economy, resulting in an appreciation of the 
real exchange rate.  This experience is not unique for China.  Many East Asian countries have 
experienced similar problems induced by large (private) capital inflows starting in the late 1980s.   
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Figure 25-A  Trends of Exchange Rates (US$, RMB, and HK$) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25-B China’s Foreign Exchange Reserves 
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sterilize the foreign assets by taking opposite actions with domestic assets, or implement other 
contractionary monetary policies.  In China’s case, the major sterilization tools are open market 
operations (OMO) and raising required reserve ratios.  These two methods affect the liability 
side of the central bank’s balance sheet in a similar way.  Generally the cost of sterilization using 
required reserves is lower than open market operations, since the central bank pays minimal 
interest on required and excess reserves.  OMOs in China mainly include central bank bill 
issuance and short term repurchases operations (repos, usually within 91 days).  Since February 
2003, the central bank has engaged in two or more OMOs each week.  The total PBOC bonds 
outstanding as percentage of foreign reserves has been increasing consistently from 2000 to 
2010, implying an increasing trend in sterilization.77
Moreover, China has been gradually raising the required reserve ratios since the third 
quarter of 2003, corresponding to an increase in foreign reserves inflows.  The required reserve 
ratio rose from 6% to 21.5% in June 2011, an historical high.  Since Chinese commercial banks 
tend to maintain a high excess reserve ratio due to a lack of alternative investment channels, 
the PBOC has decreased the interest rate on excess reserves from 1.62% in 2003 to 0.72% in 
2008 to discourage the hoarding of excess reserves.  To make sterilization effective, China also 
has to impose tight capital controls.  As the famous “trilemma” implicates, with a fixed exchange 
rate and free capital flows, the sterilization process will be immediately offset by further capital 
inflows.  Though it has been documented that capital controls in China are somewhat porous 
(Prasad and Wei (2007)), it is still widely believed that China has successfully sterilized at least 
some of its rising foreign reserves (e.g., Prasad and Goodfriend (2006), Ouyang, Rajan and 
   
                                                          
77 There are also non-market tools such as transferring the deposits from the commercial banking system to 
the central bank.  In recent years, the PBOC also started making foreign exchange swaps with big 
commercial banks as a tool for controlling liquidity. 
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Willett (2007), He. at el. (2005)).  Moreover, due to a combination of rapid increases in foreign 
reserves and low interest rates on domestic bonds, the PBOC’s income from foreign reserve 
investment is likely to exceed the sterilization cost stemming from central bank bill issuance and 
high required reserve ratios, enabling China to carry out sterilization to a large extent.  
Nevertheless, possible appreciation of the RMB may have a profound negative impact on the 
PBOC’s income from foreign reserves in domestic currency terms. 
 
3.6.2.3 Currency Crisis and Banking Crisis (A Twin Crisis) 
A currency crisis that may trigger a banking crisis is a possibility.  The rapid increase in 
foreign exchange reserves in recent years suggests there is a lot of speculative money in China in 
anticipation of an RMB revaluation.  If there is a significant future revaluation or if after some 
time it becomes clear there will not be one then much of this money may be withdrawn.  What 
happens then will depend on how the government and central bank respond.  If they allow the 
currency to float so they do not use up the exchange reserves then any falls in the value of the 
RMB may occur quickly and this may limit further outflows.  If they try to limit the exchange rate 
movement then there may be a classic currency crisis.  This is in turn may trigger a banking crisis 
if there are large withdrawals from banks as a result.  Quickly adopting a full float can help to 
avoid a twin crisis, and thus reduce the overall economic costs of the currency crisis.78
 
 
                                                          
78 Chang and Velasco (2001) develop a model of twin crises based on the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
model of bank runs.  Money enters agents’ utility function, and the central bank controls the ratio of 
currency to consumption.  In some regimes, there exists both a “good” equilibrium in which early (late) 
consumers receive the proceeds from short-term (long-term) assets, and a “bad” equilibrium in which 
everybody believes a crisis will occur and these beliefs are self-fulfilling.  If the bad equilibrium occurs, 
there is a twin crisis. 
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3.6.2.4 Financial Contagion 
Another phenomenon that has been present in many recent crises (e.g., the 1997 Asian 
crisis) is that financial crises are contagious.  A small shock that initially affects only a particular 
region or sector can spread by contagion within the banking system or asset markets to the rest 
of the financial sector, then to the entire economy and possibly other economies.  Contagion 
can occur in a number of ways.  In the Chinese context with tight capital control and where 
financial markets are relatively unimportant it is most likely they will occur either from 
contractually interconnected financial institutions or large asset price movements that cause 
spillovers to financial institutions.   
Allen and Gale (2000d) focus on the channel of contagion that arises from the 
overlapping claims that different regions or sectors of the banking system have on one another 
through interbank markets.  When one region suffers a banking crisis, the other regions suffer a 
loss because their claims on the troubled region fall in value.  If this spillover effect is strong 
enough, it can cause a crisis in the adjacent regions, and a contagion can occur which brings 
down the entire financial system.  Allen and Gale (2004b) show how large price falls can come 
about as a result of forced liquidations when there is a limited supply of liquidity in the market.  
Cifuentes et al. (2005) show that contagion is likely to be particularly severe when these two 
factors interact. 
Table 25 Trading Volume of National Interbank Market 
(RMB billion) 
Maturity Overnight 7 days 20 days 30 days 60 days 90 days 120 
 2001 103.88 560.69 93.35 35.28 9.40 4.73 0.87 
2002 201.52 852.34 100.35 29.17 10.78 4.76 11.81 
2003 641.89 1,456.31 56.60 44.11 10.14 10.18 2.81 
2004 283.34 1041.41 30.67 18.93 9.20 5.84 2.57 
2005 223.03 896.26 60.42 29.91 7.51 14.09 1.54 
206 
 
2006  635.21  1290.43  38.13  19.11  12.03  5.22  1.41 
2007 8030.47  2178.01  50.16  34.16  27.94  31.80 13.34 
2008 10651.36  3500.47  110.71  113.55  44.52  66.61  18.50  
2009   16166.60      
  
   102.15     204.84       53.80        71.00  62.3  
2010  24486.20     
 
      65.01     161.30       46.61     
 
19.75 
         Source: The People’s Bank of China (2001-2010). 
Given China’s current financial system, what is the likelihood of financial contagion 
caused by contractual interlinkages as in the interbank market or because of a meltdown in 
asset prices if there are forced sales?  China’s interbank market grew very quickly since its 
inception in 1981; in fact, the growth of this market was so fast, with the participation of many 
unregulated financial institutions and with large amount of flows of funds through this market 
to fixed asset investment, that it exacerbated high inflation in the late 1980s.  Since then the 
government and PBOC increased their regulation by limiting participation of non-bank financial 
institutions and by imposing restrictions on interest rate movements.  In 1996 a nation-wide, 
uniform system of interbank markets was set up.  It contains two connected levels: the primary 
network, which includes the largest PBOC branches, large commercial banks, and a few large 
non-bank financial institutions, and the secondary network that includes many banks and non-
bank institutions and their local branches (see China Interbank Market Annual Reports for more 
details).  Table 25 documents the growth of the interbank market during 2001-2010: while the 
trading volume of long maturity contracts (20 days or longer) is low, the volume of short-term 
contracts (overnight and week-long) has been high (reaching RMB 10 trillion to 20 trillion, or 
$1.5 billion to $2.9 billion).  Therefore, the increasing interlinkages can potentially create a 
contagion if a crisis develops in one area or sector.   
With regard to a meltdown of asset prices, this can happen because of a limited supply 
of liquidity if there is a rapid liquidation of assets.  It seems unlikely that this can occur and cause 
a serious problem in China’s securities markets.  A more serious threat is real estate markets if 
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there are bankruptcies and forced selling.  This could potentially interact with bank interlinkages 
and cause a systemic problem.  As mentioned above, a crash in real estate and/or stock markets 
could quite possibly be the cause of a financial crisis in China. 
3.7 Summary and Concluding Remarks 
One of the most frequently asked questions about China’s financial system is whether it 
will stimulate or hamper its economic growth.  Our answer to this question, based on examining 
the history and current status of the financial system and comparing them to those of other 
countries, is in four parts.  First, the large banking sector dominated by state-owned banks has 
played a much more important role in funding the growth of many types of firms than financial 
markets.  While the problem of NPLs has been under control in recent years, continuing the 
improvement of the efficiency of major banks toward international standards will allow growth 
to continue.  Second, the stock market has been growing fast since 1990, but has played a 
relatively limited role in supporting the growth of the economy.  However, with rapid growth 
that is likely to be sustained in the near future the role of the financial markets in the economy 
will become increasingly more significant.     
 If we can summarize that the role of the banking sector and financial markets 
has been that they have done enough not to slow down the growth of the economy, our third 
conclusion is that alternative financing channels have had great success in supporting the 
growth of the Hybrid Sector, which contributes most of the economic growth compared to the 
State and Listed Sectors.  The non-standard financial sector relies on alternative financing 
channels including internal finance, and on alternative governance mechanisms, such as those 
based on trust, reputation and relationships, and competition in output and input markets to 
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support the growth of the Hybrid Sector.  It is possible that these alternative institutions are 
superior to western-style legal institutions in supporting a fast-growing economy such as China’s.    
We conclude by pointing out that economic stability is crucial for the continuing 
development of the Chinese economy, and the stability of the financial system relates to 
economic stability in three dimensions.  The continuing effort by banks to reduce NPLs and 
improve efficiency can help to avoid a banking crisis, while the efforts to improve the regulatory 
environment surrounding the financial markets (including governance and accounting standards) 
can help to prevent a crash/crisis in the stock and/or real estate markets.  If China further opens 
the capital account, there will be a large inflow of foreign capital, but large scale capital flows 
and speculations also bring the risk of a twin crisis (foreign exchange and banking/stock market 
crisis), which severely damaged emerging economies in Asia in 1997.   
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